

SIR D. CAMERON.

Enclosures 1 to 4.

orders which precluded them from taking any active part in the operations against the pa, I beg to forward copies of a correspondence between General Waddy and myself on the subject, from which your Lordship will see how little foundation there was for such statement.

25. It appears, on the contrary, from General Waddy's letter, that whilst that officer was prepared to employ the troops under his command in any way that could conduce to the capture of the pa, Sir George Grey displayed very little anxiety for his co-operation, or for the arrival of the reinforcements he had requested him to send from Wanganui.

26. According to the Governor's Despatch, it was at two o'clock in the morning of the 20th that he determined to commence operations against the pa at once, without waiting for reinforcements; and General Waddy being at that time at Wanganui, distant only twenty miles from the pa, Sir George Grey might easily have communicated with him by mounted orderly in two or three hours, and the reinforcements might have joined him on the afternoon of the 20th, or at latest on the morning of the 21st, before the pa was evacuated.

27. Sir G. Grey, however, did not think it necessary to acquaint General Waddy with the change he had made in his plans, or to communicate with him at all until after the evacuation of the pa, but left him under the impression that nothing would be attempted against the pa until he arrived with the guns and reinforcements from Wanganui.

28. And this is the more extraordinary, as, if the position of Captain Brassey at Pipiriki was as critical, and the necessity of marching to his relief as urgent as is represented in the Despatch, and if it was true that, had a larger force been at the disposal of the Governor, he would have been enabled to occupy a second point below the pa, and thus to cut off the retreat of the Natives, he had the strongest reason for wishing that the reinforcements should join him with as little delay as possible.

29. In point of fact, however, no risk was incurred, nor any advantage lost, by the non-arrival of the reinforcements from Wanganui. Captain Brassey's post was strong enough to defy any force the rebels could bring against it, and some days afterwards when the communication with him was re-opened, he and his detachment were found perfectly safe. Nor would the occupation of the point referred to by Sir George Grey have enabled him to cut off the retreat of the garrison, whose escape it would have been impossible to have prevented by night, even if he had invested

SIR GEORGE GREY.

Cameron had written to say that he intended to attack the place himself in the spring,—that preparations were to be made for that purpose,—and that they were afraid to interfere to defeat this intention. General Waddy distinctly stated in his first letter, of the 19th of July, that he would not direct an attack on the pa until General Cameron directed that such an attack should be made.

On the 19th Brigadier-General Waddy informed me that he could not direct an immediate attack on the Wereroa Pa unless he received the orders of General Cameron to do so, who was at that date distant in point of time from fourteen to fifteen days from Wanganui. Brigadier-General Waddy however undertook upon the same day, as a considerable time might elapse before he could receive orders from General Cameron, to establish without delay a post of four hundred men at a point I indicated, which post would serve at once as a moral support for the Local Forces and Natives, and answer the purposes of a post of observation.

Brigadier-General Waddy started into Wanganui to carry this arrangement out. I understood distinctly that the troops were to march from that place on the 20th of July, and were to arrive at the point arranged upon the morning of the 21st, and that Brigadier-General Waddy was to arrive with them. There was no change in my plans. I had determined on the 19th to attack the pa, and after inspecting the ground, I, during the course of the night of the 19th (that is, by 2 a.m. on the 20th), had decided on all the details of the attack. All these were based on the supposition that, as had been promised, the troops would march from Wanganui upon the 20th, and arrive on the 21st. The 20th however proved a rainy day, the order for the march of the troops was countermanded by Brigadier-General Waddy, and their march was delayed until the 21st from the rain. This change was not communicated to me, and I passed all the 21st in a state of great anxiety, expecting the momentary arrival of Brigadier-General Waddy and the reinforcements; and I did not know until the night of the 21st or the morning of the 22nd, after the Natives had fled from the pa, the reason why the reinforcements had not arrived on the morning of the 21st.

The enclosed memorandum from Mr. Parris (see Appendix G.) will show that a strong reinforcement was rapidly moving up to strengthen the pa, whilst Captain Brassey's own letters, and those of other persons, published with the original papers, show how critical was his position, and how great his need. See especially in his own letter of the 21st July, "*Simus sine rebus belli satis*. My cry, if I could make it heard, would be the M. M." It seems almost cruel, when so brave a man thus expresses himself, to say he was in no danger.

My opinion is quite different from General Cameron's on these points. I was at the place, which he was not. I had a good Native force and trained men of the Colonial Forces with me. Many years' experience qualifies me to form a judgment on such subjects, and I am sure General Cameron is wrong in what he here says.

G. GREY.