

SIR D. CAMERON.

the pa on the right as well as on the left bank of the river, for which his force was not sufficient.

30. Had the pa been defended, it would have been necessary to have attacked it in the manner stated in General Waddy's letter, or, what is more probable, by the sap.

31. I regret that the misrepresentations of the Governor have compelled me to trouble your Lordship with all these details, but I hope, in justice to myself, your Lordship will allow this letter to be published at the same time with the Governor's Despatch and Speech to the General Assembly.

I have, &c.,

D. A. CAMERON,

Lieut.-General.

To the Secretary of State for War.

Sub-Enclosure 1 to Enclosure in No. 19.

Brigadier-General WADDY to the ASSISTANT MILITARY SECRETARY.

SIR,—

Wanganui, 25th July, 1865.

I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Lieut.-General Commanding the Forces, a letter to me from His Excellency the Governor, in which His Excellency expresses his thanks for the invaluable aid afforded him by the troops under my command, which I sent to assist the Colonial Forces and friendly Natives in operations against the Weraroa Pa; which operations resulted in the evacuation of this strongly fortified place by the rebel Maoris during the night of the 21st instant. One of the rebel Chiefs who surrendered on the 17th instant, stated there were 600 men in the pa, but it is generally thought there were not more than 150 or 200.

His Excellency speaks highly of the energy and intelligence displayed by Lieut.-Colonel Trevor, 14th Regiment, who commanded the troops in front of the pa.

I have, &c.,

R. WADDY,

The Assistant Military Secretary,
Auckland.

Brigadier-General Commanding Field Force.

Sub-Enclosure 2 to Enclosure in No. 19.

Governor Sir G. GREY to Brigadier-General WADDY.

SIR,—

Wanganui, 23rd July, 1865.

As I am about to embark this morning for Wellington, I cannot write to you at such length as I should wish; but I cannot leave this place without expressing my thanks to you for the invaluable aid you afforded me by assisting me during the last few days, to the extent that your instructions allowed.

The aid you thus gave me most materially conduced to the speedy capture of the pa, a point of the utmost importance to attain whilst Captain Brassey and his party were in such danger at Pipiriki.

Lieut.-Colonel Trevor, of the 14th Regiment, with a detachment of one hundred men of that regiment, first arrived on the ground on the morning of the 20th instant. Lieut.-Colonel Trevor, and the officers and men of the 14th, afforded every assistance in their power.

Lieut.-Colonel Trevor was throughout in command of the troops. He acted with the greatest energy, and afforded on every occasion the most valuable advice and aid.

On the morning of the 21st, a further detachment of the 14th (thirty men), under Captain Furneaux, and a detachment of fifty men of the 18th, under Major Rooke, arrived on the ground; the officers and men of which detachment also afforded every aid in their power.

I have, &c.,

G. GREY.

Brigadier-General Waddy, C.B., Commanding Field Force.

Sub-Enclosure 3 to Enclosure in No. 19.

Lieutenant-General CAMERON to Brigadier-General WADDY.

SIR,—

Head Quarters, Auckland, 1st August, 1865.

In his speech at the opening of the General Assembly, His Excellency Sir George Grey has stated that you and the officers and men under your command had received orders which precluded you from taking any active part in the operations against the Weraroa Pa. This I have positively denied in a letter which I have addressed to the Governor.

In my private letter to you of the 33rd June, I mentioned that I thought it would harass the troops unnecessarily to make a formal siege of the Weraroa Pa by the sap before the month of September, an opinion in which you concurred, but, so far from prohibiting active operations of any other kind, one of the objects for which the post at Nukumarū was established, was, not to attack the pa with the troops occupying the post, as supposed by the Governor, but to enable you to observe the pa, and seize any favorable opportunity that might occur of making an attack upon it, for which troops could be quickly brought up from the nearest posts.