

little bloodshed as possible. I therefore waited for three-quarters of an hour beyond the time at first granted, and the force advanced closer to the position.

At seven o'clock, two hours after I had sent the letter, I sent Mr. Hamlin once more forward, with a small white flag on a pole, to inform the Hau Haus that I would wait no longer. They replied that there was no reason to do so as they meant to fight. By this time, the force very nearly surrounded the pa. The Cavalry Volunteers, enrolled the previous evening, had been despatched to seize the canoes at Park's Island, believed to have been intended to enable the Hau Haus to escape, or to cross the harbour to attack Napier. Captain Gordon was thus prevented from joining me at Omaranui till a later period and to fill the place intended for the Cavalry. I was obliged to avail myself of the detachment of No. 3 Company which Captain Rhodes had with so much zeal brought up from Clive and Havelock on horseback. I also was obliged to make a further slight change of plan and posted Captain Buchanan's Company of Rifle Volunteers and Mr. Brown's section of Militia about five hundred yards up stream of the pa, under cover of a ditch and bank fence. The Native Contingent, under Tareha, Hapuku, Ihaka, Kopu, Renata, and Karaiteana, and directed by Mr. Locke, occupied the edges of the swamp and outside of the cultivations, at a distance of several hundred yards, opposite the dray entrance. I formed the Napier Militia, Nos. 1 and 2 Companies, and a part of No. 4 Company, into open column. This part of the force was placed under Major Lambert, and I gave the signal to advance and to hoist the Union Jack at the flagstaff from this point. On sounding the advance, Major Lambert moved steadily forward and gained the top of the river bank, where he at once came into collision with the enemy. I found the Hau Haus drawn up and armed, and myself ordered the leading files to fire. We then received their fire and returned it, penetrating the outer courts of the pa. At this moment, part of the Native Contingent which had approached the pa also entered the outer parts, and, coming unexpectedly under fire, moved to the right in some disorder to take shelter under the river bank. Their movement disordered our Militia, and finding our men entangled with the Natives, I ordered them to take cover under that part of the bank which commanded all the ground we had taken. It was just now that Captain Kennedy, commanding No. 2 Company, was wounded; and, finding him apparently determined to remain with his men in that condition, I ordered him to leave the field, and Lieutenant Wilson took command of the Company. A very hot fire was now kept up for a quarter of an hour, and the friendly Natives joined our men and gradually pushed back the enemy, who abandoned the huts and took shelter in a hollow roadway near the further end of the pa, where he found complete shelter. Finding I could not easily dislodge them from this without unnecessary loss, I now sent orders by Mr. Hamlin to the Napier Volunteers to advance on the pa by the river. The fire from the main body was then stopped to enable the Volunteers to leave the shelter of the bank which protected them from our cross fire; but as it slackened, Captain Buchanan drew out his Company and gained the river bed. At first, so exposed were the enemy to this new advance, that the Volunteers mistook the men for friendly Natives and withheld their fire, but at length, being perceived and fired upon themselves by the enemy, the Volunteers opened fire and quickly drove him out of his position. Major Lambert thereupon moved up the bank, and drove the Natives into the last of the several court-yards into which the pa was sub-divided, many of the friendly Maoris notably. Takeha now moved up also, and in a few moments the last stronghold would have been carried by assault had the enemy not at this moment displayed the white flag. After some time in making his surrender known and stopping the fire, I called to the chief man to advance and lay down his arms. This having been done, he assembled the survivors of his party, whom I placed under charge of Tareha. Meanwhile a party, unperceived by me, had quitted the pa and had come into collision with the detachment of No. 3 Company, which had taken up the ground vacated by Captain Buchanan and Mr. Browne. Captain Rhodes met this party in a spirited manner, and delayed it for some time, but, being unable to get his horses through the fence, was prevented from arresting the flight. I now reached the spot, and, fortunately receiving intelligence of the arrival of the Cavalry, I sent for Captain Gordon and his men. Mr. Ferguson, of No. 3 Company, in gallantly endeavouring to delay the fugitives, had his horse shot under him. Captain Gordon overtook the fugitives before they gained the summit of the hills, where his leading files assailed them with their sabres (the only arm I had to give them), and they surrendered after some resistance; a few straggling Hau Haus escaped. The number at present is unknown; one, however, was taken this morning, and another was found dead, so that, according to the prisoners' account, nine only remain unaccounted for, of whom some may be dead in the adjoining swamp, where they were heavily fired upon.

In this action, which lasted nearly an hour and a half, which was maintained with the greatest gallantry by our forces, and an obstinate bravery, possibly stimulated by fanaticism, on the part of the enemy, I have to regret the loss of one man of the Colonial Forces and two of the Native Volunteer Contingent, among the former, one officer (Captain Kennedy), and eight men; of the latter four Maoris were wounded. The exact number of the enemy's casualties I do not yet know, but twenty-three have been buried, and at least as many are now wounded in our hospital. The prisoners amount to seventy-six, and of these two are chiefs of secondary rank, Nikora and Henare, while Kipa, the head chief, Panapa the prophet, and Kingita a notorious character, are killed. The enemy had the advantage of position and cover to compensate him for a disparity more apparent than real of number. The Militia and Volunteers turned out 204 rank and file, being every resident between the ages prescribed for the first and second classes for whom on such short notice arms could be obtained. But out of this number I had to furnish a guard of thirteen men for the canoes, and another for the reserve ammunition, so that there were not more than 180 actually engaged. None or almost none of these men had ever been before in action yet they marched in excellent order straight into the pa, and though borne on one side by the Native Contingent, they never again allowed the enemy to re-occupy that part of the pa they had at first taken, and gradually gaining ground under a very hot fire eventually hemmed him in a space of a very few yards of ground. Only a part of the European force was employed in attacking the pa in front. It is true the reserve and Volunteers made a flank movement which materially affected the result, but at no time were there more than 100 men about the pa itself in actual collision with the Natives. It may be out of place to remark, but I pray your