

that His Excellency will be able, consistently with his duty to the Imperial Government, to take such steps as will delay the departure from the Colony of Her Majesty's 18th Regiment until the Home Government has again been communicated with on this subject. The last paragraph of the Duke of Buckingham's Despatch No. 127, of the 1st December ultimo, clearly indicates that such a responsibility might devolve on His Excellency. Ministers are prepared to ask the Assembly to make provision, by Act, for paying the troops according to the rate demanded by the Imperial Government.

WILLIAM FOX.

No. 5.

COPY of a DESPATCH from Governor Sir G. F. BOWEN, G.C.M.G., to the
Right Hon. Earl GRANVILLE, K.G.

(No. 81.)
MY LORD,—

Government House, Wellington,
New Zealand, 5th July, 1869.

I have the honor to state that some expressions in several of your Lordship's recent Despatches, and especially in Nos. 12 and 30 of 1869, have naturally caused me much concern. I will now ask permission to submit explanations of the circumstances to which my attention has been thus directed.

2. It would seem from the two first paragraphs of the Despatch No. 12, that it is supposed at the Colonial Office that I was remiss in reporting the massacre at Poverty Bay, and other late events in New Zealand. I would, therefore, observe that, during several years past, it was the convenient and almost necessary practice,—seeing that there was no regular communication in connection with the Suez mail between Australia and New Zealand,—to send the Despatches to and from this Colony and Downing Street by the Panama steamers. Now, so far as I can ascertain at this distance of time, it was expected that the mails bringing the tidings of the Poverty Bay massacre would reach England about the same day in January last. It appears, in fact, as I am informed, that the mail *via* Marseilles reached London on or about the 26th of that month, the mail *via* Panama (which brought my Despatches) on the 29th, and the mail *via* Southampton on the 30th; and that if the Panama mail had not been later than usual on that occasion, it would have been the first of the three delivered in London. The mails referred to were made up at Wellington, *via* Suez, on 21st November, and *via* Panama on 8th December ultimo. It follows that by sending my Despatches by the Panama mail, there was a certain gain of seventeen days for the arrival of later intelligence from the disturbed districts, and the probable gain of an earlier delivery in England. But it will be recollected that I did not trust to the Panama mail alone. So often as there was important news to communicate, I sent the substance of my Despatches in an unofficial shape to the permanent Under Secretary of State by the Suez mail. Accordingly, even while at the front at Wanganui in last November, I made an exertion to write fully to Sir Frederic Rogers, in a letter marked “Immediate,” and which was enclosed in a cover addressed in my own hand, “*via* Suez and Marseilles,” to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and put into the post at Wellington on the 21st November. This cover was in due time returned to me by Mr. Nunes, of the Colonial Office, with a note (of which I enclose a copy) stating that the letter conveyed in that cover did not reach Downing Street (certainly from no fault on my part) until the 30th January ultimo.

3. But there is a much more important point than any miscarriage of the Post Office to be borne in mind in connection with this part of the subject. From my Despatch No. 116, of 1868 (of which I venture to request a re-perusal), it will be seen that, after the repulse of the Colonial forces at Moturoa, the Native Contingent deserted the force under Colonel Whitmore, and refused to take up arms again for the Crown. Like all other nations living under the tribal system (like, it might be added, the Celts in Europe), the Maoris find much difficulty in appreciating Parliamentary institutions, and can be influenced, generally, by personal government alone. The loyal clans on the West Coast declared that they “must see the Governor himself;” and it was represented to me by those who know them best that nothing but my personal presence and exhortations would induce them to take the field once more. It cannot be forgotten that the crisis in