

soldiers which the Imperial Government offered to maintain here on the conditions now accepted by the Colonial Government and Legislature.* But my Responsible Advisers concur in the hope (as will be seen from my Despatch No. 125, of even date herewith,) that immediate instructions will be sent to General Chute, authorizing him to detain and send to New Zealand the regiment which is shortly to be removed from Australia, or such other of the troops under his command as can best be spared, in case the Governor of this Colony should send a requisition for them. No such application will be made except in the event of a general rising of the Maoris, or of some other imminent danger threatening the lives of a large portion of Her Majesty's subjects in this Colony. It is submitted that any such additional troops, if paid for by New Zealand at the rate paid in Australia, should be stationed and employed here, as in the other provinces of the British Empire, in accordance with the rules prescribed in the Queen's Colonial Regulations.

*See Sir G. F. Bowen's Despatch No. 100, October 8, 1868.

19. I am strongly inclined to agree with those who, from their long experience of the Native character, believe that if the same number of Imperial Troops, in addition to the Colonial Forces, were maintained in New Zealand for the next few years as was maintained here from 1846 to about 1860, during the interval between the first and second Maori wars, that is, two battalions of the line, and if no further attempt were made to occupy lands in distant and isolated positions, or in the immediate neighbourhood of hostile tribes, this Colony would probably enjoy permanent peace and security. It will be remembered that the Native race is rapidly diminishing, while the Europeans are as rapidly increasing in numbers. In 1848, only twenty years ago, the Maoris in the North Island exceeded 100,000; while now, in 1868, they are under 40,000. Consequently, the Maori difficulty is a question of time,—probably of the next ten years. During that period, every effort should be made to push roads into the interior. Experience has amply shown that the best weapons for the conquest of the Highlands of New Zealand in the 19th, as of the Highlands of Scotland in the 18th century, are the spade and the pickaxe.

20. Further, as I observed in my Despatch No. 49, of the 30th June ultimo, “it appears to be very generally agreed that, since the authority of the Crown and of the law was not established throughout the interior of this country while there was an English army of above 10,000 men in New Zealand, the attitude of the Colonial authorities towards Tawhiao and his adherents must and ought to be, in the main, defensive; that it is at once more politic and more humane to outlive the King movement than to endeavour to suppress it by the strong hand; that the turbulent Natives should receive every encouragement to live peaceably, but that murderous onslaughts, whether on the Europeans or on the friendly Maoris, should be punished with the rigour necessary to prevent a recurrence of unprovoked aggressions. . . . Many of the leading politicians of New Zealand are convinced that the King movement in its early stages might have been made an instrument for ‘elevating the Native race, by the introduction of institutions subordinate to and in harmony with the European Government of the Colony.’ It has been suggested that a native province might have been created, to be ruled, like the territories of the semi-independent rajahs in India, nominally by a great Maori Chief, but really by the advice and influence of a British Resident or Commissioner.” Many now think that the opportunity for any arrangement of this kind has been lost. Still King Tawhiao has played so moderate a part for some years past, that it may be worth while to make the attempt, especially as it is clear that his conquest by force of arms is impracticable.

21. I will conclude by summing up my practical suggestions with the expression of a strong conviction that permanent peace and security may be restored to New Zealand by adopting the following measures:—

- (a.) The presence, in addition to the Colonial Forces, of a garrison of two battalions of the line, to be maintained on conditions equitable to the Mother Country and to the Colony.
- (b.) The prohibition of fresh settlements in exposed and dangerous districts.