

3rd. We also understood your Lordship to say, that while an Indian corps, whether Ghoorka or Sikh, was in general easily managed by its officers, yet, if the men believed there was any breach of engagements with them, they would refuse to do duty: that while they would consent to be employed on works of a military character, their pride as soldiers would certainly prevent their being used as labourers; and you instanced the case of an Indian force, sent under the designation of "Pioneers" to Ceylon, in which, on the men being sent to work on the public roads, and becoming otherwise dissatisfied with their treatment by the Ceylon Government, they broke up into small parties and crossed the Straits, the survivors of them being ultimately helped to their homes by the Indian Government.

4th. As regards the probable cost of a Sikh force, the change from the Indian climate to that of New Zealand would make it necessary to feed and clothe, if not also house them, in like manner as European troops. Perhaps they might not require so much tentage and camp equipage as a European force, but it would not be right to depend on any difference in food and clothing, especially considering the risk of rheumatic affections incident to the change of climate, which might soon, without due care, make the Indian soldier useless.

5th. It would be indispensable that all the officers employed should know the language well, in order to secure the confidence of the men in their leaders.

6th. But while you do not think obstacles would be interposed by the Indian Government (under fair conditions of service) against the enrolment of Sikhs, we understood you to express great repugnance to the suggestion of employing the Indian race against the Maori, and to advise us strongly not to resort to enlistment in India at all, but to engage European soldiers, and these only in this country, on the ground that an Indian force would be found in every respect inferior to a European, and cost very nearly, if not quite as much in the field, besides the ultimate expense of its return to India.

Permit us, my Lord, to take this opportunity of offering you our best thanks for the patience and courtesy with which, in the midst of the many claims on your time when departing to assume your high command, you listened to our varied inquiries.

We have, &c.,

F. D. BELL,

I. E. FEATHERSTON.

General Lord Napier of Magdala, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

THE above remarks contain, as nearly as possible, my opinion as it was given to the Commissioners of New Zealand.

London, 12th March, 1870.

NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

No. 11.

The Hon. W. GISBORNE to the NEW ZEALAND COMMISSIONERS.

(No. 70-1410.)

Colonial Secretary's Office,

Wellington, 30th May, 1870.

GENTLEMEN,—

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 9, of the 23rd March last, conveying the views of Lord Napier of Magdala relative to the employment of an Indian force in New Zealand, and to express my satisfaction that you have been able to obtain so influential an opinion on the subject.

I have, &c.,

W. GISBORNE.

The Hon. I. E. Featherston and the Hon. F. D. Bell,
Care of J. Morrison, Esq., 3 Adelaide Place,
King William Street, London.

No. 12.

The Hon. W. FOX to the NEW ZEALAND COMMISSIONERS.

Government Buildings, New Zealand,

Wellington, 2nd June, 1870.

GENTLEMEN,—

You have been already advised by telegraph that, now that the troops have left New Zealand, the Colonial Government are willing to allow you, in place of entering into any arrangement for the return of a regiment, to be content with an undertaking from Her Majesty's Ministers, that, on any emergency arising within the Colony requiring their assistance, troops shall be obtainable on such pecuniary terms as Her Majesty's Ministers and yourselves may agree on. The Governor for the time being should be able to send for troops, as did Sir George Grey in 1863. Moreover, it is essential that Earl Granville, in as public a manner as he made known the determination of Her Majesty's Government to desert the Colony, should allow it to be known that in case of emergency troops will be forthcoming. I will not, in explanation, repeat the arguments already used. You are aware, from Memoranda which have already been furnished you, that the Colonial Government regard Earl Granville's Despatch of 7th October, 1869, as an attempt to force New Zealand to secede from the Empire, and that they consider the statements made in that document, and the fiat of desertion conveyed therein, have already greatly increased the difficulty of dealing with the Natives. If Earl Granville denies the interpretation placed on his Despatch, and does not desire to lay down the doctrine that civil war in this part of Her Majesty's dominions will be a matter of no political concern to the Imperial Government, he will have no difficulty in acceding to the request that troops shall be sent to New Zealand if required. The pecuniary arrangements will afford a guarantee that the Colony will not unnecessarily act, I will not say upon the privilege, but upon the right, of seeking from the Mother Country aid in case of need.

On the other hand, the refusal of the request will add another to the many links in the chain of