

837. Did you see the second telegram sent?—There were two telegrams sent, both by Mr. Ritchie, and both went together.

838. What telegrams are you speaking of—the telegram Mr. Ritchie signed, “J. R. Scott, per J. M. Ritchie,” and the one that Mr. Scott signed?—No. If I am not mistaken there was one sent at the same moment to the manager at Timaru.

839. *Mr. Solomon.*] The one signed “G. R. Scott” was not sent at all?—No.

840. *Mr. Chapman.*] Where was Mr. Scott then?—He had gone to his own office; it was shortly before 5.

841. You swear that?—Yes.

842. That the telegram signed by Mr. Ritchie in Scott’s name was signed after Scott had left the office and gone to his office?—Yes.

843. Do you say that was just before 5 o’clock?—It was immediately before 5 o’clock, so that they might get it in Timaru, and be prepared for action next morning.

844. Then the later telegram was never sent?—No; it was an exact copy signed by Scott in confirmation.

845. Whom did you send for Mr. Scott?—One of the lads in the office.

846. You must have sent a second time to sign the telegram?—No, that was not done by me. Mr. Gibson, who was in the office, wrote it out and took it over to Scott on the following morning.

847. Now, when it came to the rabbit question, you suggested Messrs. Perry and Perry?—Yes.

848. Did Scott appear to know anything about them?—No.

849. What did you know about them?—I had known them for many years as solicitors.

850. As the company’s solicitors at Timaru?—Yes. I had known them for years by name.

851. Then, in suggesting their names, was this a piece of pure philanthropy on your part?—There is no philanthropy about it.

852. You were interested in it?—No.

853. It was an ordinary piece of office business?—Certainly not. It was just to help Scott.

854. That is what I call pure philanthropy unless there is any reason for it?—Very well, call it that; it is a very nice name.

855. Was there any other reason than that?—No.

856. You say you were not really interested in the matter?—No.

857. That you did it purely for Scott’s sake?—Yes, he having taken the risk.

858. Did you take Mr. Haggitt’s opinion subsequently purely for Scott, and for Scott’s sake?—I told Mr. Ritchie, I think, what was taking place, and he said I might see Mr. Haggitt.

859. Mr. Ritchie does not know anything about taking Mr. Haggitt’s opinion?—He may have been away, and I may have gone there.

860. Without consulting him?—That is so.

861. At any rate, you did take Mr. Haggitt’s opinion as to the propriety of appealing?—Yes.

862. And that, again, was pure philanthropy on Scott’s behalf?—Well, there was not much philanthropy about it.

863. Then, was it a business transaction on behalf of your company?—No, it was not.

864. What was it?—It was for Scott’s information.

865. Mr. Henderson, will you swear that?—Well, Scott was in conversation with me regarding the whole matter.

866. Mr. Henderson, I ask you will you swear that the opinion of Mr. Haggitt was taken for Scott’s information?—I do not know that it was precisely for it.

867. Then, will you withdraw that expression?—Perhaps I had better.

868. Then, tell me, was it a business transaction of the company’s, of yours, of Mr. Ritchie’s, or was it a transaction of Scott’s?—It was a transaction of Scott’s.

869. It was a transaction of Scott’s, taking Mr. Haggitt’s opinion?—As far as Mr. Haggitt’s opinion is concerned, I do not know about that.

870. You went and took Mr. Haggitt’s opinion as to proceeding with the appeal from the rabbit conviction: was that a business transaction of the company’s, or was it a transaction of Scott’s?—It must have been a transaction of Scott’s; Scott was interested.

871. Will you swear it was a transaction of Scott’s?—Scott was interested to that extent.

872. Will you swear it was a transaction of Scott’s, Mr. Henderson? Sooner or later I must have an answer?—I will not swear that Mr. Scott asked me to get Mr. Haggitt’s opinion.

873. Was it done in the interests of your company or yourself, or was it done in Scott’s interest?—It was done in Scott’s interest.

874. Purely in Scott’s interest?—Perhaps not entirely in Scott’s interest.

875. Well, you have been a long time getting to this?—It is the way you put it.

876. It was perhaps not done entirely in Scott’s interest: who else might have been interested?—The stock was the property of the company.

877. And that gave the company an interest?—It was not the company’s property, but they had sold them.

878. At the date you took Mr. Haggitt’s opinion had they sold the stock?—I think so.

879. Mr. Haggitt’s opinion must have been taken in June?—Then they were sold, with the right to run—that is, only the sheep; the cattle were sold before.

880. You sold the stock, with the right to run?—Yes.

881. For how long did you give the right to run?—Up to the end of the first half-year.

882. Now, you tell me this opinion was Mr. Scott’s affair, taken in Mr. Scott’s interest: when did you disclose it to him?—Immediately after.

883. Will you swear that?—Yes.

884. Are you prepared to swear that you ever showed Mr. Scott this opinion?—I do not know; but I told him.