

In all, approximately 17,000 men were initially selected for this form of service. When all appeals were disposed of it was found that approximately 13,000 would be available if required for service, and some 6,000 of these were actually used by the Army, together with 1,900 other mobilized men drawn from Army camps. Some hundreds of these men were also used for short-term service in freezing-works.

7. THE WAR CONTRIBUTION REQUIRED OF NEW ZEALAND IN 1944

It is of some importance from the historical point of view to place on record the following extract from a report placed by the Right Hon. the Prime Minister before members of both Houses of Parliament on 24th February, 1944:—

Each branch of the Armed Forces, and each of the important industrial groups, is anxious to increase its share of the Dominion's man-power or to avoid further losses. The optimum allocation of the nation's man-power is, however, necessarily governed not by the needs of sectional groups within the Dominion, but by overriding factors which have their origin *outside* the Dominion.

If New Zealand could best assist the combined Allied effort by supplying an ever-larger number of fighting men overseas, even at the expense of food-supplies, then it would be clear that the proper policy would be to maintain the maximum possible flow of man-power to the Armed Forces overseas.

The advisability of this particular policy does not, however, appear to be indicated by recent trends. While it does seem possible to maintain the supply of a limited number of men of the types most valuable to the Armed Forces as a whole, yet the accumulating need for still further increases in industrial effort, particularly in *food-production*, may now be said to have become the dominating feature of the situation.

It is not difficult to see the reasons for this gradual shift in emphasis. The accumulation of Allied Forces in the Pacific (most easily supplied from New Zealand), the accumulation of vast invasion Armies in Britain (which cannot possibly be fed from British food resources), and the progressive need to feed populations in devastated countries following their occupation by Allied troops (a factor which may in the coming year very suddenly increase in importance) have combined to increase the relative importance of maintaining and increasing New Zealand's food-contribution. At the same time, the mobilization of Allied troops on a vast scale has diminished the relative importance of our fighting Forces as a factor in the whole situation.

In making this last observation it may be well to note that New Zealand has for four years maintained a greater proportion of her men on active fighting fronts than any Allied nation except Russia—a fact which is reflected alike in her front-line strengths and in her battle casualty figures. While, therefore, a change in emphasis towards food-production may perhaps involve a numerical reduction in her overall strengths at the fighting fronts, yet New Zealand has already done a very great deal of fighting and will have much more to do in the future.

As regards the allocation of man-power as between the *various branches* of the Forces, the predominant factor appears to be that throughout the war the priority which should properly be attached to the provision of man-power to the Air Force has been tending to rise along with the expansion of aircraft industries, the increasing size, range, and hitting-power of aircraft, and the development of their utilization in active warfare. During the whole period while vast Allied Armies remained quiet in England, the Royal Air Force was maintaining its various types of operational activities and was suffering casualties. At the same time, in zones where land fighting has been taking place, air fighting has accompanied it. Both in the land-sea-air fighting in the Pacific and during the period before (as well as after) the Armies go into action in the main invasion of Europe, the Allied Air Forces are due to experience a relatively large share of the total activity and correspondingly heavy casualties.

At the same time, the sources of suitable personnel have almost dried up (mainly owing to the mobilization of man-power in other services), and steps have been necessary to prevent the development of a position in which large numbers of aircraft would be grounded for lack of crews. Consequently, progressive steps have been taken to remove every obstacle to the entrance of the remaining suitable men to the various Air Forces, and compulsory methods have been resorted to in order to fill ground-crew requirements.

As regards naval requirements, a number of the above general observations apply also to the Navy, and its priority, as regards overseas personnel, still appears to be above that of the Army. With the problem of manning thousands of invasion craft as well as new warships and patrol vessels of all sizes, the man-power resources of the Royal Navy are stretched to the limit. New Zealand's naval man-power commitment is not large. Both from the point of view of seeing the Royal Navy through its hour of trial in opening the second front (and maintaining this front along with its many other activities), and considering also the long-term advantage of taking the present opportunity to build up a body of New-Zealanders trained in naval matters (an asset of very great value to a maritime country such as New Zealand), it appears to be clear that the naval commitment should continue to be met.

If, therefore, a reduction is found to be inevitable in some section of the Armed Forces in order to meet the need for expansion in the farming and food-processing industries on the substantial scale which is necessary, then it would appear from a comparison of the priorities as between the different branches of the Armed Forces that the reduction should affect some part of the Army rather than the Navy or Air Force.

8. THE EXTENT OF THE DOMINION'S CAPACITY

In February, 1944, a further examination was made of the scope for—

- (a) Continuing to reinforce one or both the overseas Divisions (while maintaining the Air Force and naval requirements):
- (b) Building up the farm-labour force on a sufficient scale from resources within the Dominion:
- (c) Increasing the volume of production in the manufacturing industries.

It was shown that, while it appeared to be possible to make progress toward *two* of these goals, the full achievement of *all three* would be well beyond the capacity of the Dominion.

The basic data by which to examine the Dominion's *capacity* must necessarily show the *extent of the unused resources*:—

- (i) In connection with reinforcements for the overseas Divisions, these resources consist of category "A" men, fit for service in any part of the world, now held in industry, but able to be released:
- (ii) In connection with farm-work, they consist of experienced farm workers who are at present employed in non-farming industries, and of inexperienced labour capable of being trained and placed on farms—in either case, of workers who are willing to transfer to farm work and able to be released from other industries:
- (iii) In connection with production in secondary industries, the unused man-power resources consist of labour that can be transferred into these industries, and of *man-hours* that could be worked (but not at present being worked) by the labour force already attached to them.

FIT MEN HELD IN INDUSTRY AND EFFECTS OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL

The following table, which comprises the final portion of the data relating to the Dominion's capacity, shows—

- (i) Number of male and female workers employed in each industry as at February, 1944.
- (ii) Number of single and married Category "A" men held from military service in each industry as at February, 1944.