

accomplished. Let us, however, be discreet and start doing the work which has been assigned to the Administration not only in Europe, but also in the Far East, and let us refrain from any extension of our work." This anxiety was particularly obvious in relation to UNRRA activities in enemy or ex-enemy territories, which, moreover, raised questions of principle upon which there are sharp differences of opinion.

UNRRA had already been authorized to operate in such territories for the prevention or control of epidemics and for the care and repatriation of displaced persons. Both these activities are obviously directly in the interests of the United Nations, however narrowly interpreted, but the Atlantic City resolution which authorized them still required prior approval by the Council of "the scale and nature of the operations it is proposed to undertake and the standard of provision." One Montreal resolution freed the Administration from the obligation to obtain this prior approval. A further resolution, the preamble to which declared that "a substantial portion of Italy is now under the control of the United Nations, and the Italian people are sacrificing life and property side by side with the forces of the United Nations," added an authorization to organize in Italy, also without the necessity of obtaining prior approval by the Council, "(a) the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies; (b) assistance in the care and return to their homes of displaced persons; (c) care of, and welfare services for, children and nursing and expectant mothers," with the limitation that the total net expenditure in foreign exchange thus incurred was not to exceed the equivalent of \$50 million without further specific authorization from the Council.

Such a proposal to include ex-enemies among the "victims of war" for whose benefit UNRRA had been created naturally received the most critical attention from the representatives of European Allied Governments, who felt that a too generous extension of UNRRA's activities would, in fact, be mainly at the expense of their own nationals. The resolution was promoted by the United States and United Kingdom Governments, who naturally held the view that the responsibility which in any event is imposed upon them by military operations and occupation should be more widely shared, and, moreover, were concerned with the necessity for avoiding the unfavourable repercussions on the Allied cause, both in Italy and elsewhere, such as might be expected to occur if there were a prolonged period during which conditions in Italy appeared less satisfactory than they had been under German control. In response to a question pressed by the Council member for Norway, the Director-General stated that it was not contemplated that clothing or footwear would be used for the Italian programme until the requests submitted by UNRRA on behalf of the liberated areas had been satisfied, and that in relation to two food items expected to be in short supply, sugar and fats, adjustments would have to be made by the supplying countries to avoid interference with the programmes for other areas. He estimated that the number of supervisory personnel required for work in Italy would not exceed seventy-five. In public statements the representatives of France, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Ethiopia, the countries which might have been expected to be most resentful against Italy, all approved of the proposal in moving terms which elicited high praise from many of their colleagues. Nevertheless, there was clearly considerable uneasiness in their minds, and the ultimate reactions of their Governments are still a little uncertain. They insisted on the addition of a clause which was unanimously adopted, affirming that "the operations in Italy shall not constitute a precedent for operations in other enemy or ex-enemy territory," and at subsequent stages of the proceedings the opportunity was taken to give them still further assurances in regard to the details of operations in Italy itself. In a final statement, for example, the Director-General affirmed categorically that "UNRRA takes no responsibility for food, clothing, or other needs for the remainder of the civilian population," other than children and nursing and expectant mothers. He further recorded his understanding that the resolution did not "involve the use of UNRRA funds to substitute for or to diminish the extent of the supplies that are necessary for the subsistence of the civilian population and which are now and in the future to be maintained." Mr. Richard Law, the United Kingdom member of the Council, reassured his European colleagues in the final Council session by pointing out that "the experience which UNRRA will gain in dealing with this Italian problem will be of immense value when UNRRA comes to deal with much greater and more vital problems."

The problems of UNRRA are closely tied up with the organization of relief in liberated territories during the period of military responsibility. The Canadian Government has already (on 12th June, 1944) recognized its responsibility for ensuring that "Canada will participate in fair proportion with other countries in the work of military relief," which for the time being is undertaken mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom, and it may be anticipated that in due course other Governments will find it necessary to clarify their attitude to this question.

The discussion of UNRRA policy as affecting persons of German nationality who have suffered on account of their race, religion, or activities in favour of the United Nations has already illustrated the difficulties likely to arise from considering relief on a strictly interpreted basis of nationality. The Council was made conscious of other difficulties of a like nature by a Greek proposal, which was adopted, authorizing "the extension of the benefits of the Administration to the inhabitants of the Islands of the Dodecanese," most