

authority. Even if it were desirable, no general permeation of Japanese life by inspection is a practical possibility, and it would be important to ensure not only that inspection is definitely related to specific provisions in the peace treaty, but also that these provisions themselves are specific in form and no more in number than are really necessary to achieve our objectives.

It does not seem reasonably possible to contemplate continuous and detailed inspection for an extended period of control except of provisions directly related to physical security. A limitless field of dissension amongst the supervisory Powers and with the Japanese Government might be opened up, leading to a breakdown of the whole arrangements and jeopardizing the vital security objective, if an attempt were made to enforce more intangible provisions whose implementation in the last resort depends upon the Japanese people themselves.

There is, however, in the directives issued by SCAP, an important series of obligations already binding on the Japanese Government, and many of these should obviously remain binding for a long time. Examples are the "purge" directive, and the directives issued pursuant to the Far Eastern Commission's policies on trade-unions and education. The peace treaty or, alternatively, some document issued at the time of the peace settlement, must perpetuate the Japanese Government's obligations under such directives, but the supervisory authority should not in general be concerned with their detailed implementation. The situation could be met by giving the supervisory authority the general right of inspection of all Japanese institutions and records, and it could then be left to the supervisory authority to exercise that right according to circumstances.

(d) ENFORCEMENT

The control system will not operate successfully unless the instructions of the supervisory authority can be enforced. The simplest method of ensuring their enforcement would be for the supervisory authority to have military forces at its disposal, but, while force must be the ultimate sanction, it will be advisable, owing to the difficulty and uncertainty of its application, to provide for some sanctions in addition to that of force, or even the threat of force.

One method of doing this would be to exercise some control in connection with Japan's application to join international bodies. The supervisory authority could very well report on the fitness of Japan to join such bodies. The intense desire