

It should be remembered, too, that, unless there is some such relationship, the control or supervisory authority for Japan might have its jurisdiction challenged inside the United Nations by a State which is not party to the peace treaty. Nor should the danger be ignored that at some future date the authorities of the United Nations and the supervisory authority might be played off one against the other. Moreover, if it becomes necessary to take enforcement action against Japan for breach of the treaty, it might be desirable for the Governments concerned to be assured by an arrangement made in advance that they would have the assistance of the full Security Council, or at least that the Security Council would not oppose enforcement action by the treaty-making Powers.

The relationship with the United Nations should be arranged in such a way as to ensure that the United Nations can not be used to obstruct—*e.g.*, by the veto—the operation of the treaty and that as far as possible it assists the operation of the treaty. If this general objective is accepted there are various ways in which it could be arranged under the Charter of the United Nations—for example, under Article 29 or Article 53.

If, moreover, it is intended that the United Nations should assume any specific obligations under the peace treaty, such as those arising from the acceptance of the supervisory authority as an “organ” of the Security Council, the appropriate United Nations body should be consulted in advance and formally asked to consent. Alternatively, the relevant provisions of the treaty should be conditional upon such consent. Independently of the above action, there might be advantages in submitting all the security arrangements to the Security Council for its information and observations.

Finally, it seems appropriate that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be invited to be represented at the Japanese Peace Conference for purposes of consultation and liaison.