Provision for the appointment of staff is contained in Article 83, and Article 85 specifies that the responsibilities of the Director-General and the staff, including the Members of Commissions, are to be exclusively international in character and that they shall not be subject to any authority external to the Organization.

Two subjects concerned with administration on which the Preparatory Committee is presenting a choice of texts for consideration by the World Conference are voting in the Conference and composition of the Executive Board.

So far as voting in the Conference is concerned, it will be noted that Article 72 includes three texts. The points of difference between them are:—

- (1) Alternative A provides that each Member shall have one vote in the Conference,
- (2) Alternative B provides that each Member shall have in the Conference the number of votes allocated to it in pursuance of the provisions of an Annex to the Charter which will contain a schedule of votes ascribed to each Member under a system of weighting, and
- (3) Alternative C provides in the first instance for each Member to have one vote in the Conference, but there is the further provision that, at the instance of any Member, any decision on certain matters yet to be specified (which decision is reached by the Organization under the procedure of each Member having one vote) is to require corroboration by a second vote taken by a simple majority of votes cast in accordance with the plan of weighted voting which, if adopted, is to appear as an Annex to the Charter.

The attention given by the Preparatory Committee to this subject has been confined mainly to the principle involved in the issue of one Member one vote as compared with weighted voting. Accordingly, little consideration has been given to the merits of alternative systems of weighting. An Appendix to the Geneva Draft contains two formulæ. They are similar to the extent that both include external trade and national income as elements. They differ in that Formula A includes population and also the percentage of external trade to national income, while 100 basic votes are accorded to each Member. Formula B, on the other hand, does not include population directly as an element, but only by relating the total of external trade to total population, and it accords only 10 basic votes to each Member. Formula A is described as a system of "light" weighting because the highest number of votes its use gives to a Member in the illustration is 399 against 100 as the least. Formula B is described as a system of "heavy" weighted voting. The highest and the lowest numbers of votes in the illustration are 378 and 10 respectively.

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