

economic reconstruction and the procedure which it was necessary to follow would have made it in any event difficult to discover any suitable point in relation to which serious consideration of these issues could have been introduced. Even on some of the smaller, but immediately pressing, short-term issues the Conference did not get so far as a formal vote, most of the complex problems arising from the cession of Italian territory to Yugoslavia and France being referred back without comment to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Even, however, where votes were recorded they did little more, except on the important question of compensation for damaged United Nations property in ex-enemy territory, than crystallize positions already well known. The United States, indeed, came nearer to the United Kingdom position in relation to the Danube than it had been prepared to do at an earlier date, but for the most part the variations of opinion within each of the so-called blocs did not amount to very much. The divergence of view between the United States on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and France on the other, on the percentage of compensation upon which it was proper to insist has already been noted. On the Soviet side, perhaps the most interesting variation was that of Czechoslovakia on the same issue, the Czechs, no doubt with an eye to their own property interests in ex-enemy countries, joining the United Kingdom and France in voting for 75 per cent. compensation. None of the deviations on either side from "the party line" holds out much hope for the establishment on any important issues of intermediate positions which might later become the basis for generally acceptable compromises. All the economic issues associated with the peace treaties still await their solution.

---