

6. SUBSIDIARY ORGANS

The work of the subsidiary organs (the Military Staff Committee, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Commission on Conventional Armaments) is of first importance to the development of a system of collective security, but progress in all three bodies has, so far, been impeded by disagreement on fundamental questions between the U.S.S.R. and other members. A general survey of the period under review reveals that there are no very satisfactory prospects that agreement will be reached on the subjects dealt with by the subsidiary organs before the beginning of the third session of the General Assembly.

The *Military Staff Committee*, set up under Article 47 of the Charter, has continued discussions on the fundamental question of the establishment of Forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The Committee published a report on 3 May, 1947, on the basic principles which should govern the organization of United Nations Armed Forces, but the Security Council, to whom the report was submitted, has been unable to reach agreement on certain vital issues raised in the report. Points on which there is disagreement include the question of the proportion of forces to be contributed by the five major Powers, and their location between periods of action. The Committee's report is still before the Security Council.

Discussions in the *Atomic Energy Commission* have made little progress as a result of what appears to be fundamental disagreement between the representatives of the Western Powers, on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. on the other, on the question of the control of atomic energy and the establishment of an International Control Agency. This disagreement is illustrated by a comparison of the proposals submitted to the Commission by the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America, the essential differences of which were that, while the United States, supported by the majority of the Commission, required that an effective system of safeguards be established before stocks of atomic weapons were destroyed, the Soviet Union would not agree to establishment of a system of ownership, management, and licensing by an International Agency which would interfere with its domestic jurisdiction. At March, 1948, no agreement on this question was in prospect.

The *Conventional Armaments Commission*, established as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council in February, 1947, proceeded to consider the formulation of proposals for the general control and reduction of armaments and armed forces. A Working Committee was established in July, 1947, but effective progress was held up for some time by protracted discussions on the question of the Commission's