

armaments, and the resolution of December, 1946, which had recommended the establishment of a system of control and inspection within the framework of the Security Council. The Baruch plan, which formed the basis of the majority proposals, postponed everything essential; it made the central aim of the 1946 resolutions—the elimination of the atomic bomb—dependent on a series of difficult and time-consuming conditions. The unwillingness of the United States to terminate the manufacture of the bomb was shown by their attitude to inspection: the United States had at first insisted on inspection as the most effective method of control, but when the Soviet Union submitted a control plan providing for inspection, it then seemed that inspection was not really so important and could not be effective unless coupled with other measures, such as ownership of raw materials. The majority plan would provide not for international control but for an international trust dominated by the United States through the voting majority on which they could always count. The proposed control agency was contrary to the Assembly's resolution of December, 1946, since it would itself take action against violations by majority vote, and would thus be outside the framework of the Security Council.¹

Mr Vyshinsky denied that his delegation had ever said that a ban on atomic weapons was enough; Generalissimo Stalin himself had declared that a strict and effective control organ was necessary. His delegation did consider that control over all stages of production should be concluded simultaneously and, therefore, found both the majority proposals and the Canadian resolution unacceptable. In an effort to reach agreement, however, the Soviet Union was prepared to agree that prohibition of atomic weapons should likewise be imposed simultaneously.

¹ The reports of the Atomic Energy Commission do not in fact attempt to spell out the exact relationship to be established between the proposed control authority and the Security Council. The following extracts from Part III (Recommendations) of the First Report are, however, relevant:—

"The rule of unanimity of the permanent members, which in certain circumstances exists in the Security Council, shall have no relation to the work of the international control agency. No Government shall possess any right of 'veto' over the fulfilment by the international control agency of the obligations imposed upon it by the treaty nor shall any Government have the power, through the exercise of any right of 'veto' or otherwise, to obstruct the course of control or inspection.

"The judicial or other processes for determination of violations of the treaty or convention, and of punishments therefore, should be swift and certain. Serious violations of the treaty shall be reported immediately by the international control agency to the nations parties to the treaty, to the General Assembly and to the Security Council. Once the violations constituting international crimes have been defined and the measures of enforcement and punishment therefore agreed to in the treaty or convention, there shall be no legal right by 'veto' or otherwise, whereby a wilful violator of the terms of the treaty or convention shall be protected from the consequences of violation of its terms.

"The enforcement and punishment provisions of the treaty or convention would be ineffectual if, in any such situations, they could be rendered nugatory by the 'veto' of a State which had voluntarily signed the treaty."