

(e) A *Polish* resolution reaffirming the 29 November resolution as the basis for the settlement of the Palestine problem and instructing the proposed Commission to proceed with its task accordingly. This also was subsequently withdrawn and the substantive parts moved as amendments to the revised United Kingdom draft.

(f) A *Soviet* resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from Palestine.

(g) A *Syrian* resolution asking the Commission to make recommendations for the establishment of a unitary State in Palestine on a cantonal or federal basis.

(h) A second *Syrian* resolution aimed at requesting an opinion from the International Court of Justice with regard to the powers of the General Assembly on the Palestine question and the international status of Palestine on the termination of the Mandate.

The discussion of and voting on these various resolutions and amendments was particularly complicated. The numerous amendments which had been proposed were all rejected by the Committee with the exception of some (as, for instance, the *Colombian* amendment concerning Jerusalem) which were accepted by the *United Kingdom* and a number of others, or which were withdrawn (as, for instance, an *Australian* amendment regarding the admission of Israel to the United Nations).

*New Zealand* voted in favour of the *Australian* amendments. On the defeat of these amendments it voted for the various paragraphs of the revised United Kingdom resolution on the grounds that the difference between the United Kingdom and Australian texts was, in practice, more apparent than real (although the latter was clearer and simpler) and that it was vitally necessary for the Assembly to set up the Conciliation Commission. Before the vote, however, Mr Fraser, after analysing the United Kingdom proposal, asked for a clear definition of its purposes. He understood that the Commission would be empowered to call the parties together, to initiate negotiations between them, to assist in promoting agreement by making suggestions and proposals to them, to report to the General Assembly in the event of success, or to make recommendations (regarding boundaries, &c.) to the Assembly in the event of failure, and that it would be a Commission of conciliation with no powers of arbitration. The *United Kingdom* representative in reply gave an assurance that in general this was an accurate definition of the powers accorded to the Commission under the United Kingdom resolution.

When the various paragraphs of the revised United Kingdom resolution were put to the vote, the most important section (dealing with the power of the Commission to consult with the parties and seek a final