

When Mr Malik (*Soviet Union*) objected that his delegation's resolution was radically different from the joint resolution, Sir Alexander pointed out that it would be equally illogical to adopt a resolution which conflicted with one already adopted. The draft resolution was rejected by 6 votes in favour, 23 (N.Z.) against, with 9 abstentions.

The General Assembly was unable, owing to pressure of business in the concluding days of the Paris meeting, to consider this item in plenary session. It will therefore take up at the second part of the session the resolution adopted by the Committee, which read :—

“ The General Assembly

“ Having considered the report of its Interim Committee upon the problem of voting in the Security Council, and

“ Exercising the authority conferred upon it by Article 10 of the Charter to discuss any question within the scope of the Charter or relating to the functions of any organ of the United Nations and to make recommendations to the members of the United Nations and to the Security Council thereon,

“ 1. Recommends to the members of the Security Council that, without prejudice to any other decisions which the Security Council may deem procedural the decisions set forth in the attached Annex¹ be deemed procedural and that the members of the Security Council conduct their business accordingly.

“ 2. Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that they seek agreement among themselves upon what possible decisions by the Security Council they might forbear to exercise their veto, when seven affirmative votes have already been cast in the Council giving favourable consideration to the list of such decisions contained in Conclusion 2, Part IV, of the Interim Committee's report.

“ 3. Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council, in order to avoid impairment of the usefulness and prestige of the Security Council through excessive use of the veto,

“ (a) To consult together wherever feasible upon important decisions to be taken by the Security Council.

“ (b) To consult together wherever feasible before a vote is taken if their unanimity is essential to effective action by the Security Council.

“ (c) If there is not unanimity, to exercise the veto only when they consider the question of vital importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole, and to state upon what ground they consider this condition to be present.

“ 4. Recommends to the members of the United Nations that in agreements conferring functions on the Security Council such conditions of voting within this body be provided as would to the greatest extent feasible exclude the application of the rule of unanimity of the permanent members.”

¹ Not printed. These decisions may be found by reference to Part 4, Conclusion 1, and Part 2 of the report of the Interim Committee (General Assembly Official Records : Third Session, Supplement No. 10, Document A/578).