The foregoing are actual cases dealt with in day-to-day routine and are by no means isolated.

Under the Crimes Amendment Act, 1910, it is provided that the Court shall fix the maximum having regard to such matters as the character and disposition of the offender, the nature and prevalence of the crime, and the protection of society, but the actual quantum of sentence to be served is left to a later study of the prisoner's reactions by the Prisons Board.

Under an appropriate sentence of reformative detention an offender should be able to be detained either in an institution, or afterwards on probation, for sufficiently long to enable redemptive influences to make their impression, and sufficiently long to enable the Prisons Board to gauge whether the interests of society and the interests of the offender have been served by the sentence. For example, when a person appears before the Court on successive occasions it is futile for the Court to measure out a few months' imprisonment having regard only to the last offence. The Court should have regard to the protection of society and impose a sentence that will be deterrent and allow time for the training, disciplining, and stabilizing of the prisoner, after which the prisoner will attain his freedom when he can satisfy the Prisons Board that he has reformed and seen the folly of his ways. For the unexpired portion of his sentence he should remain on probation to prove to the authorities that he has stabilized. A short sentence does not allow for this.

A principle to be observed is that the more generous sanctions of the law are not intended for crimes involving deliberation and brutality—*e.g.*, gross crimes of violence, robbery under arms, &c., should be met by salutary sentences. Where the circumstances disclose the basic pre-disposing cause as characterial defect, in such cases reformative detention would seem to be more appropriate, but it misses the intention and purpose of the law to impose a sentence of reformative detention that would be equivalent in length to a sentence of hard labour. In the generality of cases it should be substantially longer, the underlying idea being that a sentence of reformative detention shall be reviewed earlier and oftener than a sentence of hard labour and may be substantially reduced if on the offender's showing it would be in the interests of the community and the prisoner's interests that he can be released on probation. If the sentence initially is too short the Prison Board's function is stultified and all that it is left to do is to consider a short "good-conduct remission," which is a reversion to the state of affairs existing before the passing of the Crimes Amendment Act constituting the Prisons Board and instituting the reformative-detention sentence.

The greater effectiveness of longer sentences as means of protecting the community and as a means of rehabilitating criminals is exemplified by the fact that of the total number of cases, excluding habitual criminals, dealt with by the Prisons Board—and be it noted the Board only deals with cases where the sentences exceeds six months—the percentage of relapses involving subsequent conviction is approximately 25 per cent. In contradistinction it is the short-sentence prisoners who largely constitute the residual group of recidivists.

Under the Crimes Act, sections 29 and 30, there is provision for dealing with persistent offenders, but here again there seems to be a diffidence on the part of the Courts to utilize these provisions for the protection of society. By way of illustration take the case of "D," aged fifty-seven, with nineteen previous convictions, who was given on his last appearance for theft six months' imprisonment; "E," aged fifty-six, with forty-eight previous convictions, who was sentenced to six months' imprisonment; "F" aged sixty-one, a persistent "false pretences artist" with twenty-seven previous convictions involving ninety-nine charges, who, on appearing on two further charges, was sentenced to twelve month's imprisonment; and "G," aged forty-four, with ninety-seven previous convictions, on pleading guilty to three charges of false pretences