points and mythical readings of the Legislature Act which were utterly irrelevant, and had no bearing on the case. In fact, Mr. Skerrett was "playing to the gallery"—that is to say, his speech for half an hour was entirely for the benefit and edification of Mr. C. H. Mills and Mr. R. McCallum as lawyers.

It takes an expert to catch an expert. When Mr. Skerrett resorted to those tactics I, as a veteran, knew that in his own mind he recognized the tide was running at flood speed against the respondent; and, notwithstanding the brave face Mr. Skerrett presented to me and to others up to the hour he left for Wellington, I felt sure in my own mind that he, as a lawyer, was assured the "game was up."

The decision of the Court that A. McCallum did not stand in the shoes of R. McCallum on the night of the 11th December at the meeting of the No-license League was utterly wrong in law, but I had as an officer of the Court to be loyal to the cloth and bow to the ruling of the Court, no matter what opinion I as a lawyer held firmly in my own mind. It is not the first occasion in which I have been right in my law and a Judge of the Supreme Court has been wrong in his law, and I hope it will not be the last.

The Judges applied the common law of agency to the position between R. and A. McCallum, and in doing so they erred palpably and grievously. The law of agency in election matters is totally different to the common law of agency, and is more flexible and far-reaching.

Coupled with the criminally suppressed letter from R. McCallum and the correct application of the law of agency in election matters, the Court could not have escaped the fact that A. McCallum was R. McCallum's agent for all purposes on the 11th December, and from the position that as such agent A. McCallum admitted in the presence of fifty persons that drink was on the 7th December consumed by electors of the Wairau Electoral District in his office at Grove Road, that being the gravamen of the charge brought against R. McCallum at the meeting when he was so ably and appropriately represented by his brother, who was, naturally, his strongest supporter.

The case is one which ought to be reviewed by the Privy Council. There is no appeal from the Election Court, but I venture to think the object can be attained in another way, and that is as follows: Let a petition be presented to Parliament signed by the petitioners, attaching to the petition a copy of the notes of evidence as taken by the Judges' Associates, praying for the removal from office of the Judges on the ground that the judgment is not justified by the evidence, and on the ground that the petitioners have had to pay costs which they would not have had to pay if the judgment had been in accordance with the evidence. This can be done in a respectful manner, and the petition can embody a prayer that Parliament will be pleased to refer the decision of the matter to His Majesty's Privy Council.

The matters at issue are too grave to be allowed to rest as they are. The conduct of all future elections in the Dominion depend upon the correct laying-down of the law. If the Grovetown affair is to be applauded as the correct thing and the last word in the purity of elections in this country, then men like Carnegie and Rockefeller can dominate the elections of New Zealand, if they wish to do so, in the interests of the Standard Oil Company or the International Harvester Company, and the elections in New Zealand can be manipulated by Tammany Hall from New York, and the electors of New Zealand can be bought and sold like bullocks at Smithfield. That is what the judgment of the Election Court amounts to. The principle is vicious, and should be fought at once to the bitter end.

Yours faithfully,

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