

*Garrison Artillery.*

110. As with the Field Artillery, the permanent cadre of the Garrison Artillery is used in such a manner that the Territorial Force gets the best value both from the point of view of efficiency and of economy. Enough Permanent men are employed to keep the material in the forts in running-order and to provide instructors.

The work of the garrison gunners is often heavy and requires men of good physique. The men of the New Zealand Garrison Artillery whom I inspected were a powerful lot of young fellows of the right stamp.

I saw some practice from the forts; it was fairly good, but should improve with more training. It would be an improvement if the run of the target could be made to approximate more closely to the probable run of an enemy's ship. In most cases the guns would be confronted with a ship running in towards them, the range changing rapidly; the practice target as a rule is run as a ship moving across the front, and changing range very slowly, if at all.

I approve entirely of the system under which the searchlights are run by a section of the Garrison Artillery.

*Engineers.*

111. The Engineers I saw in the field were men of high intelligence, and they were doing good work. A bridge that they had made over a rapid stream near one of the camps was very well constructed, and was—as is not always the case—thrown across the obstacle at a place where it was of real use. I consider that the field companies are best employed during training in carrying out this sort of work. They should not as a rule occupy themselves in siting or constructing trenches for the Infantry, who should be self-sufficing in such elementary works.

In another camp the bad weather gave the Engineers an opportunity to volunteer for some particularly hard, disagreeable duties, which they carried out in trying circumstances with great spirit and determination. Altogether this is an excellent branch of the New Zealand service.

*Infantry.*

112. I saw the whole of the Infantry, including the coast-defence troops, at field-work, in most cases in combination with the other arms. The higher leaders showed aptitude and training: evidently they had thought and pondered over the problems with which they were faced. The junior officers were keenness personified, but a proportion—perhaps one-half—had neither a thorough grip over their men nor a mastery of the situation, nor, again, a practised eye for country. These young officers proved, first, that the system had not yet enabled them to get into intimate touch with their subordinates; secondly, that, as might be expected, their ordinary business avocations had not granted them sufficient leisure for any “out-of-school” study of soldiering.

Still, on the whole, I think there is good promise for the future even in cases where there is now much room for it. Enthusiasm is after all the greatest of assets, and the capacity shown by many of the seniors and a proportion of the juniors is good augury for the time when the presence of the Duntroon Cadets should make itself mightily felt. Several times when I set a commander a little problem requiring nerve and initiative, I found that the troops were deployed for action quickly and in a manner that would make for success. On other occasions, no doubt, more imagination would have led to better results, as, for instance, when troops advanced under a heavy fire up a level, open valley, when there were well-covered fire positions in the foothills on both sides. But it is easy to criticize at manœuvres, and, as I began by saying, there is very good promise in the New Zealand corps of officers of Infantry.

113. Often private soldiers, when questioned, were able to give me a clear account of what was going on around them, showing some knowledge and much intelligence. Others had no idea of what was happening. This was, most probably, not their fault but that of their superiors. The deployment for attack was usually carried out quietly and with intelligence, and officers and non-commissioned officers taken to commanding ground to have the situation explained were kept well under cover. In the early stages, where artillery fire only is to be feared, it is not necessary to begin alternate rushes; it is usually possible to get forward in more or less concentrated formation with the men well in hand. At extreme Infantry range it will probably be found that some of the ground will be exposed to rifle fire, other areas be dead to it. Clearly the men must dash across the open spaces at top speed, and must be halted and re-formed under the first cover they attain. Here, too, alternate rushes are useless, and unnecessarily distract the men from their prime business of pushing forward as rapidly and with as little loss as possible. Coming closer still to the position and getting within effective rifle range, it is difficult to continue the advance until the enemy themselves are brought under rifle fire at that moment. Hence the progress by alternate rushes. But even here ground must in each case be the determining factor.

114. Commanders, on several of the manœuvre operations I have seen, had a tendency to advance by rushes of a fixed distance whatever were the conditions of ground and cover. In real war the captain of a company would give most anxious thought to his men and to the lie of the ground before he resolved upon the best method of working forward. “Is that rise in front occupied by the enemy?” “Will my men have a good chance of using their rifles if they can get there?” “Will they be able to get cover?” These and similar questions will exercise him deeply. There will then be no question of making rushes of any fixed length of 30, 40, or 50 yards. And to do such things in peace time is bad training.

115. Scouts are not always judiciously handled in the attack. Half a dozen men move out at wide intervals and precede the battalion by two or three hundred yards. When they see the enemy they