

It also goes without saying, and further results from the silence on this point of the German memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement.

IV.

The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States, parties to the Rhineland pact, arbitration treaties guaranteeing "a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts."

France considers that such arbitration treaties would be the natural complement of a Rhineland pact. But it must be understood that they should apply to all disputes of whatever nature, and should not leave room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated in the present note. To give full effect to these treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers who participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland pact.

V.

In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind.

The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the object aimed at by the pact could not be attained nor the peace of Europe completely guaranteed.

The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves.

The arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in paragraph IV and would be backed by the same joint and several guarantee.

VI.

In the opinion of the French Government the general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be effectively assured unless the agreements contemplated in the present note form an indivisible whole.

They consider therefore that all the agreements, the observance of which should in each case be guaranteed by the signature of the same Powers, ought to be co-ordinated in a general convention registered by the League of Nations, placed under the auspices of the League and capable of forming, as suggested in the German memorandum itself, the nucleus of a still more general pacific *entente*.

Finally, it goes without saying that if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realised, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security.

Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government.

The Allied Governments would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

May 12, 1925.

No. 4.

Memorandum communicated informally by Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the French Ambassador on May 19, 1925, regarding certain Points in the French Draft Note of May 12, 1925, on the subject of Security.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN is indebted to M. de Fleuriau for the explanations of the French draft of the 12th May which he was so good as to furnish to the Foreign Office on the 18th May. These explanations answer the various points which Mr. Chamberlain raised verbally with M. de Fleuriau on the 14th May on his first cursory perusal of the French draft.

Whilst these explanations go far to clear up the particular points mentioned by Mr. Chamberlain, there are certain others suggested by a further study of the draft regarding which he is uncertain what exactly is in the mind of the French Government. In order, therefore, that the British Cabinet may be in a position to accord to the French draft that prompt and careful study which so important a document demands. Mr. Chamberlain takes advantage of M. de Fleuriau's offer to supply any further explanations that might be needed in order to elucidate these further points which are set forth briefly below.

Before passing to an enumeration of these points, Mr. Chamberlain would like to emphasise, and M. de Fleuriau will naturally appreciate, that the present informal communication is made solely with the object of securing supplementary information for his use in explaining the project to the British Cabinet. It must of course not be taken as in any sense a reply to, or final comment upon, the French draft of the 12th May; it does not pretend to deal with the questions of principle embodied in that draft, as to which the British Cabinet can naturally express no reasoned opinion until they have fully grasped the exact purport of the French proposals.