THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 85, 7 October 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

Popular attention is naturally fixed at the moment upon the peace manoeuvres which are in progress in all the enemy countries. But it is essential to realise that, while we may be on the yerge of a peace brought about by the collapse of the enemy's political unity, there is still a long way to go if the matter is left to the soldiers and the enemy elects to fight to the end. Even in the Balkans the war is not yet over, for the Central Powers may establish a new front that will <take a long time to overcome. So far as the Germane in the West are concerned, the decisive defeat upon which surrender becomes inevitable upon purely military grounds is still not in eight, because the enemy has a wide area in which to manoeuvre, and large facilities for avoiding the decisive stroke. The German Army has suffered terribly in the recent fighting; but it is still unbeaten, and it still has to be revealed whether it can be.forced to an unconditional surrender. A broad survey of the .present situation on the Western front will indicate the main features of the problems on both sides

The Canibrai-St. Quentin, battles represent a massive attack upon the enemy's centre, -while the Flanders and Cham-pagne-Argonne drives are flank attacks. In general, an-d reducing the matter to its simplest elements, it may be said that the centre attack has for its chief object the wearing away of the enemy's strength: whiles the flank attacks aim at strategical results. This simple underlying principle is much complicated by the magnitude of the operations, the complication of details, and the reflection of one movement upon another. An example of such reflex effects was indicated in these notes on Saturday; when it was pointed out that the French advance beyond St. Quentin threatens the north flank of La Fere, which in turn protects the St. Gobain forest, while this again protects the right flank of the enemy on the Laon seotor. Thus the progress of the centre attack is. actually exerting a far-reaching effect, by a species of flanking movement, upon the enemy's great Champagne front—his left flank proper in the line from the sea to Verdun. Actually, of course, Verdun is not the extremity of his line, but in the present offensive the Lorraine and Alsace fronts are virtually cut off from the great battlofieMs for the time being by the quiescence of the front east of the Woevre. The present shape of the Allied campaign makes it appear . that it is Foch's aim to make this separation real.

The situation, therefore, js that on the battle line, which runs from the sea southward, "west of Lille, just west of Cambrai, just east of St. Quentin,' closely round La Fere; past the north of Beinn, and east to the Meuse a few miles north of Verdun, is being attacked over most of its length, with intense pressure on three great sections. These are: (1) Flanders, the enemy's right flank; (2) Cambrai to St. Quentin, his centre; (3) Champagne and Argonne (Reims to Verdun), his left flank. These three pushes are all linked together in a single scheme, but each has its own problems and difficulties and its own perils forthe enemy. Either or all may fail of full success; yet any one of them, even if the others fail, may smash the German front and carry ths whole situation a stage further forward.

The Flanders offensive is in a curious condition. It appears, from such information as is available, that the drive was protably undertaken because the enemy gave the Allies a chance. The season was, when the attack was launched, much too far advanced for a .protracted battle against strongly-held positions to be "begun in the terrible conditions that prevail in Flanders in the wet months. The' Germans had been, forced to send . into the Canlbrai-St. Quentin maelstrom several ■ divisions from the northern front, and ■it gave way at the first heavy push. Had the going been good enough to permit heavy transport to follow up, this local disaster might have already had enormous effects. As it is, the Allies' advance appears to have exhausted itself in the miles of-sodden country, and the fruits of the offensive ate being shown in an advance further south, where' the enemy is straightening his_ front. The German flank is, however, in grave peril. Lille, the most important of the enemy's northern bases, is partially outflanked on the north, and in their enforced need to reduce that front again to a length they . can hold, the Germans have had to fall back to within five miles of Lille itself. They have even abandoned the southern portion of the ridge which forms the western outwork of the group of hills that make the Lille area anatural stronghold, so that the ridge as a whole is outflanked. Lille is thus no small danger; and its present degree of safety is mainly a question of the. state of the notorious Flanders mud.

The centre attack, which has produced one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of all the battles of. the war, has not yet reached the manoeuvre stage, but by the piecemeal destruction of almost the whole of the Germans' systematised fixed defence between Lens and La Fere, it threatens at any moment to reach that stagu, and to create now flanks. But it is not necessary for strategical ends, that it should do so, because the enemy's casualties in this field are continually weakening his front elsewhere, and it may serve Foch's purpose better if "the line ultimately breaks somewhere else. The centre battle is the mill in which German numbers are being worn down. So long as the enemy tries to hold his ground this mill must either break down for want of reserves, in which case the Allies will break through; or it must be fed, and they will probably get through on another sector. The only escape is retreat; and it remains to be seen whether, if retreat becomes necessary before the winter, Foch's strategy is equal to the exacting problems which it will produce.

The- smashing of a retreating army, apart from the damage which, can be done by aircraft (and we cannot assume that that would be decisive) depends upon outmanoeuvring it, and this is practically impossible- if its front is unbroken, unless a—-weak flank can be driven in upon the main body's line of retreat before the escape is made. Tho Germans may be depended upon to get their main armies into safety before the flanks fail, if it can possibly be done. As a big withdrawal is now certain either during the present' season or at the beginning of next, the condition of the enemy's flanks is thus of tho hkbcfit inacorUnce. HU vi&hi, in Flag-.

ders, is tho flank where most danger would exist if a big advance were possible ; but it must be considered unlikely, for several months. There are distinct! possibilities of the creation of a new flank by a break-through on the present' great battlefield; but the -.enemy would promptly, retire along his line! of sopplj (ol which thb chief is the St. QuentinLe Cateau - Maubeuge - Namur railway) and the chances of cutting off any very large body in this, way would be small. Even the scanty communications of the. Marne salient, combined; with the rearguard operations of the enemy, prevented Foch's first offensive from securing anything apporaching a "Sedan; and, talcing the enemy's front as a whole, it is very lavishly provided with, routes of retreat.

It is for reasons which will be- appreciated from what has been said abovrthat the Champagne and Argonne offensive requires special attention. There is little or no prospect of a drive on tin-Reims-Verdon front reaching: the St. Quen.tin-Namur railway in time to cut off a general retreat. But this portion of the German front is not so well provided with roads and railways as tbe northern sectors; and there is a prospect of the B.eimfi-Mezieres railway being readied from the south-east before long. That is the main line to the enemy's front between the Aisne and Verdun. The threat of cutting this railway will force the enemy out of Laon; otherwise he will be in peril of being surrounded on the front north of Reims. He would then find himself attacked on the Mezi-eres-Sedan-Metz railway, which the German newspapers are reported to-day to describe as one of the main objects of the "offensive. The cutting of • that railway would mean the splitting of the enemy's front into two, and to avoid that disastrous happening he would have to retire behind the Belgian frontier. But he would still, on a large part of his front, be in invaded territory; and he would have in addition the temporary advantage of a shorter front than he now holds.