Evening Post. MONDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1929. EUROPEAN TARIFF UNION

Evening Post, Volume CVIII, Issue 151, 23 December 1929, Page 10

Evening Post. MONDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1929. EUROPEAN TARIFF UNION

One of the most interesting aspects of Lord Beaverbrook's movement for

"free-trade within the Empire" (with protection against the outside world) is that it pre-supposes the possibility of a European Customs union, or similar combination of European countries differing in race, language, and culture. In an address in Wellington last week His Majesty's Trade Commissioner (Mr. L. F. Paish, 0.8. E.) recalled that M. Briand had rather astonished Europe by suggesting something of the kind at Geneva last September. Mr. Paish said: It is difficult to understand precisely

■hat was in his mind; but, apparently, ie idea is to form in Europe a union f nations which should impose a lower ltornal tariff for trade between themslves and .a higher external tariff! for racle with other nations. In other •ords, they should adopt a system imilar to the system of Imperial preeronee which is adopted in many parts f the British Empire. 'icking up the thread of the story fhere it touches the Beaverbrook rusade, Mr. Paish said: It is urged that Great Britain, rather han enter a European economic union, hould unite economically with the ither nations which form the British Jommonwealth of Nations, so as to ;onstitute a large economic unit better ,ble to compete with the United States if America and with any European inion which may be formed. 3ut to what extent has the idea of a LJnited States of Europe gathered :orm? According to the Trade Comnissioner, "any [European] union iuch as that proposed seems extremely mlikely to materialise. But there s no doubt that industrialists in Europe, particularly in the basic rades like iron and steel, are drawng closer together." In iron* anc steel, and also in potash, the alignment ■of French and German interests is now reported to be' complete md it is one of the architects thereoi who is credited with the plan of giv ing this commercial entente a poli :ical expression. According to Sisle) Huddleston in "The New Statesman,' propaganda both in Germany and ir France is being carried on by Arpolc Rechberg, of whom Mr. Huddlestor writes:

Chiefly he is connected with the stash industry, and he effected a union ' French and German potash interests hieh give them a«vivtual monopoly in urope. In the samo way ho concerned Ltnself with the iron and steel cartel, nd with the arrangements of the reneh and German chemical magnates, hese industrial alliances, in. his view, lould prepare the way for a military nd political understanding. vTiile not endorsing his proposals, L'Avenir," which is reputedly suported by powerful economic inlersts, gives Rechberg the hospitality f its columns. At first sight it may be said that conomic considerations will never ver-ride, or even tame, the historic 'ranco-Prussian feud. But is "never" do strong a word to use in a rapidly hanging world? Hitherto in the nilitary history of Europe commerialism has appeared to be but the ail of the dog. But if the economic irge, in. its modern phase, is still the ail, it is a remarkably powerful ail, and may even be equal to waging the dog. Moreover, the advo:ates of a politicalisation of FrancoJerman industrial alliances will" not >ut the idea forward as being in ipposition to French plans for securty, but as being a new (and cheaper) >asis for security. So much is made ;lear from the following summary of 'the Rechberg plan":— The liaison of the essential industries of Francd and Germany has already been realised; it should be folowed by a military accord by which Prance and Germany would, guarantee )ach other's European frontiers, and by which the French and German armies ivould be in the proportion of 500,000 men to 300,000 men. There should be i common headquarters staff, with the right to inspect the French and German troops, and elaborate military plans. The Belgian, army might be af&liated. The late Marshal Foch, according to Rechberg, favoured such an alliance on the ground that it would render a Franco-German, war impossible, and would guarantee European peace. The first impression that arises is that while the industrial alliances in nowise get away from the League of Nations ideal, their politicalisalion on the lines of exchange of military guarantees would certainly do so and could not be reconciled with the plans of Geneva. It is not necessary, however, to go to the military lengths suggested by Rechberg. The young idea of a Franco-German rapprochement is more likely to walk, if it walks at all, in line with what is being done by the League of Nations. Prudence would seem to suggest this, even if "military teeth are to be cut at a later age. The ideas of a Franco-German rapprochement, and of a United States of Europe, are. not confined to European journalistic speculation or to propagandist footnotes to Beaverbrook literature. This subject has also attracted a good deal of attention in the United States, where German and French newspaper opinions are quoted in detail. For instance, "Koelnische Volkzeitung" insists that Germany wants the Rhineland back as wholly and solely her own, yet that (it is added) does not mean thai Germany is unwilling to get together with France, provided always thai it be on a basis of equality; further, "as the war is gradually liquidated in a political sense, together witli all its alliances, France will have tc decide whether she will continue hei policy of so-called security or adopi

a policy of rapprochement with, regard to Germany." On which "Figaro" comments that this evolution, in line with Locarno, "means noth-l ing less than the eventual complete demolition of the Treaty of Ver-! sailles, and 'then where are we?'" The prospect of a Europe no longer bound by the chain of the AngloFrench Entente was rather pessimistically touched on in a recent article contributed- to the "Evening Post" by a writer who is convinced that the Entente cannot be done without. But the Anglo-American naval conversations and their reception in Europe show that things have changed much : since the British Conservative Go,--iernment's defeated attempt to reach la preliminary naval agreement with France. The gap between the Europe of then and the Europe of to-day reflects itself in the Franco-German comment on the possibilities of the new rapprochement.

In its widest conception, the Franco-German movement is too ambitious to be taken seriously at the present moment. But in its industrial aspect, it is a thing certainly not to be ignored. If it develops along the political lines of the Rechberg plan, the result will be either no United States of Europe or a militarised edition thereof. But a Franco-German alignment, minus the military embroidery, might become the basis of a new Europe reorganised on liberal lines. And if that Europe became a Customs union on its own account, the urge for a British Empire trade unit standing betwebn the American and the European would be strengthened. Of such a possibility the promoters of the Beaverbrook crusade are entitled to make propagandist use. But it remains still a possibility— not a certainty nor even a probability. It will come again under review no doubt when the conference on a tariff holiday is held.