The Gisborne Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING MONDAY, JULY 29, 1907.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXV, Issue 2144, 29 July 1907, Page 2

The Gisborne Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING MONDAY, JULY 29, 1907.

WHAT THE PEACE CONFERENCE MIGHT HAVE DONE. From the brief cablegrams that have readied us of the proceedings at the Hague Conference it is not possible to form a decided opinion upon the results achieved, ihe best features- of the past conventions which dealt mainly with methods of modifying the brutality of war and restricting operations to the principals in the national quarrels appear to have been confirmed, but no such effective project in the prevention of war as the limitation of armaments was seriously discussed. The most important proposal making for the peace of the world was that put I onward by the United States, namely, that hereafter the private property of belligerents;not being contraband ol< war, should be exempt from capture at sea. It would appear on the surface that Groat Britain would have had much more to gain than lose by the passing of such a proposal. No country in the world depends to so dangerous an extent on the receipt of food supplies from oversea as .England. To is manifest that, if the private property of a belligerent were immune from capture on the ocean, the transportation of food' staples from Britain’s purveyors in British bottoms would, even in war times, be uninterrupted. Thenceforward she could never be confronted with the risk of being starved into submission by , a coalition of European Bowers. However, Britain was one.of those which helped to defeat tho motion having this object in view, but there were doubtless considerations in regard to which, we are in tho dark which actuated her representatives ill taking tho stand they did. Outside of such proposals as this, however, there is another suggestion which tho so-called Peaco Congress might have made with some prospect of securing for it‘ consideration at The Hague. Tho economical argument against war has never been presented in an international conference with adequate fulness and force. As a rule, the advocates of arbitratioi have limited themselves to holding up the portentous aggregate of the sums annually expended by the principal Powers on military and naval armaments, together with pensions to soldiers and sailors; and the interest on that great part of their national debts which was incurred in war. That aggregate has been computed with more or less accuracy at three billions of dollars. If diplomatists have not been profoundly impressed by these figures, it is because the aggregate' wealth of the same nations is estimated at 400 billions of dollars, and three-fourths of one per cent thereof seems to them no exorbitant percentage for use by way of insurance. A few of the more long-headed champions of international peace supplement the argument just named by an attempt to estimate the amount that might have been added to the wealth of the nations concerned had most of the skilled or unskilled labor of adult males now diverted to military service been employed in peaceful industries. It is probable enough that the capitalised product of the labor thus diverted exceeds in value the whole sum annually allotted to expenditure for war purposes, actual and inherited. There is, however, a third argument, seldom, if ever, put forward in an official conference, which far outweighs in cogency the two that we have named. That argument 1 , which has decisive weight with bankers, ought also, if properly submitted, to have tremendous influence upon statesmen and diplomatists. The visible cost of war, even when supplemented, as it should be, with the loss incurred by the subtraction of the combatants from the ranks- of labor, is really trivial compared with the enormous shrinkage of values caused by the drop in the quotations of securities on the stock exchanges of the world. The dislocating effect is due to two causes, which would be duly appreciated by statesmen and diplomatists if they could be taught to 'know as much about the fundamental conditions of modern commerce and finance as constitutes, so to speak, the elementary premise from which a competent banker reasons. The two facts ore, first, that ‘modern commerce and business, thereby differing radically from their medieval and ancient counterparts, are transacted almost wholly—apparently ninety-five per cent, is a just estimate —on credit. The second is, that capital has long ceased to be localised within the boundaries of a particular nation. It has become internationalised world - pervasive That is to say, the civilised ..world, though still politically divided, has become an economic unit. In our day a revolution in Russia, if accompanied by a repudiation of that country’s foreign debt, would inflict an immense if not irreparable injury upon the invested capital of the French people. A similar catastrophe in Argentina would convulse' the London Stock Exchange, and bring about a series of failures like that of the historic firm of Baring Brothers. Even the temporary failure of a country, which had been a large borrower, to pay interest on its foreign debt, owing to financial burdens of war. would spell disaster all over tho civilised world. Tho financial crisis which would be provoked would almost certainly be followed by an industrial crisis. That is why great financiers already are the niost ardent advocates of international peace and welcome with enthusiasm any substantive progress made in that direction. It only remains for diplomatists and statemen to recognise facts which to bankers have long been patent