The Gisborne Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21. 1907.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXV, Issue 2043, 21 November 1907, Page 2

The Gisborne Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21. 1907.

THE ANGtLO-RUSSIAN • CONVENTION. A few weeks ago wo ' received news by cable of an agreememt that had been entered imto .between Britain and Russia, in regard to their respective interests in Asia. The English mail just to hand contains full details Of till© arja.ngean.eoit toge,tliier with the comments of -the chief London -papers. These are practically umia-ndmous in praise of Sir Edward Groy, Minister for Porciigu Affairs, on his success in ariunging a convemtion that will not only prove of decided advantage to Britain but will also make for the .peace of tlio world. As already notified in the brief summary cabled out the Convention does not make any material altenatiom in the existing conditions as between the two nna.tiions but tiro vital point of the ■aimnigemeinifc is that tftno present position, is formally recognised by both Powers, and the facts are set- dowui in black and white. In the posit it lias been an inherited belief on the part of the 'Britishers the world over, that Russia was stealthily and fireac-lileiro-usily endeavoring to nindermime Britain’s position in India by secret operations in Persia and Afghanistan. It is, of course, true that Russia Unas been using eviery opportunity to find an outlet to a Souilhe-rn pout whereby hear goods could be shipped a.t all time's of the year, and ill that effort she has constantly been conning into conflict with British interests. Wiban England protested it was difficult to obtain satisfactioai for the reason that the respective spheres of influence e.f -Hie two countries were not elclar•Jw defined, and tiie Czar’s advislors coiikl, with some show o,f rms'oai, claim tfli-a.t they were not infringing pin Britain's rights. It docs 'net follow that because the Convention .referred to has been signed-, that Russia will give up her design an, in port in Southern Europe or Asia* and that til© conditions may not be broken, but if such a step sJko-ul/d be. taken, the- act would have tall the force of a broken treaty. The Oonveinlbion is set forth under three hands: ■(!) Persia; (8) Afghanistan.; (3) Tibet, Both Governments undertake to respect the integrity and indeipendcroco of ■ Persia iaaid .maintain equal opportunities for comm arc© for all' ri-i.tio.ns. But they agree to divide the country into two spheres of influence—a Russian, spiliede in. tllio North and a British fiphero in the South.—with a neutral region between them. (Britain undertakes not to seek comnncn-ci.nl or -political concessions in. the Russian sphere, or to support demands floatconcessions made, there by any third Power. iS'li.c- also promises not to oppose, diircetly or indirectly, ir.c-------q-uests for oO'iiceisEiioins 1 supported by the Russian'Goveriiauent. Russia .promises the same in.respect to the British sphere. .In the event of ir,regularities in tlio redemption or payment- of uTitereat on the Persian loans ccH-tracted with the Brit-isJli or Russian banks, either Britain or Russia may assume control of the 'ri,venue in flier own sphere of -influence. With regard to Afgfliiamis.fcni, Britain' will hot change the political position of that country, nor encourage it in designs against Russia. Russia in return recognises l-l Hit ■ A'f.gJliiM.ni/ita.n, is outside hler sphere of influence, agrees not to maintain' agents there, and promises to act with Afghan,istimi th.uoulgh the ii-iter.uiedia.ry cf ’the British Goverjinionit, Russia a-nd Britain agree to respect the territorial "integrity of Tibet and to recognise China's snisrerninty. They agree to 'tre-a-t with Tibet only thron-glb the Obioert Go-vennm-ent, and to -abstain, from biter volition. Conunenibing on ithesa provisions tflie London “Spectator” points out tlki.t. as tlxe scope of tlio Convention is confined to Asia its ratification, 'is not KkeJy to have any recognisable effect on tho balance of power in Europe. Proceeding to

deal 'will tllio probaiblo ofTeate it says: — ' ' On o [ lir sklo, at nil events, tlieConvonitron means chiefly a prospect ox a less exili.aiutiting military expenditure in India, and a new and mow welcome sense of security in. tlio Pelt-sin ll Gulf. The spectre of the ltussian d'ainge.r on our lndttani irontier is Mill. If tlio Convention had compassed nothing more tllmui tins, it would stilt bo a memorable compact. For many yelws every , ,. l P, r ■in India bias bad bis ears Mlled wiith rumors of tllio scliemings of lUissian , a gouts. These agents _ were in At.eJlia uiiisfca.ii: they were ml 1 ensun baluidliiistun; they pulled wires, they ba tidied plots, they wore here, ’there, and overyiwlh'are. They supplied tlho mysterious background of tllio picture iii' wliicdi a coiiioonitration ot itmssian troops could easily be, and frequently was, painted into tto

foreground on the slightest pirovocation. Tllio suspicions on tlio Bnbisli aid® of the frontier waro gone-rally exaggerated, but that docs not in tllio least ailltor the important fact that tlio suSupicioiiß existed. Arutes ate created and paid for, hot only to defeat other amines in tllie field, but to emswflo tSioso ™o pay toil' them against quite vague.perils,— to save ’tllilcinx front tlio discomfort of perturbed or sleepless nights. Jbo sine of the army is in direct ratio to tlio alarms of the epumtuy. Now tiluaib Russia 'litas promised to sciiut 1110 moro agents to Afgbiuuisivtn in oixlcu* to sow wild ideas in tine- b'naun or tlio Amir, and lias also promised to keep her bands off that triangle of Persian 'territory ’through which ill 10 might have turned the flank of our position in India, our expensive suspicions are curdled. It is ]y satisfactory >to think that the crisis of this long disease of anxiety about ltuisi.au intentions is over. For moro than lialf-a-century Russia refused to give us the assurances wo askod for —.and suspicion bdoko out afresh with every refusal 'but at luat sh® has given them. These assurances, as wo said,have not been obtained without sacrifices. What are tho sacrifices? Alt first sight it looks as though wo Iliad agreed to recognise Russian predominance in far too large a slice of Persian territory. Her sphere _ of

influence is roughly about tiwortils of the coumlbry, while our own is nioit only small but is "the poorest dlstriob. The Russian sphere Hates _in nearly alii tiro large towns, including tlie capital, and tllio lino of demarcation dives arbitrarily towards tlie south tio include Yezd, for example, which one nriglht IraVo thought would remain outside. But, o-n tire whole, t;ho bargain only recognises, or “fixes,” tire stato of tilings as it actually was when the Genvc.nit'ion was signed. Russian iniiuenice already pervaded practically all the district which is assigned to lier. It may bo said that wo coulhl have recovered lost ground; that the Persians trusted 11s, and would rather lia.vo us than the Russians controlling the larger part of their couuitry. AVe cannot enter into the question whether wo forfeited through lethargy tnidie interests which ought to be ours. The fact is that they were not ours at tlie critical moment, and if we have renounced adivantages _ which w 0 might well have gained in the future —though it so very far from certain that we should have done so—we gain im security elsewhere as ir. noil as we have tost in material interests in the Russian sphere in Person. Onily oiu© master remains _to _ be men tionecl, —oair niglrts in tlio I feu - atari Gailif. .For a hundred years we have acted on the conviction that we had fundamental interests there, and these have been jeopardised by the policy of Kiussia. over and over again, yet no nienltnon is made ot the matter in the Convention, the explanation is contained in a brief despatch which Sir Edward Grey sent to Sir Arthur Nlicliolson on tlie dn.v tlio Convention was signed, 'llliis despatch not only makes itclear that our interests 1.11 the J tiaian Gulf are not affected by ilm Convention, but that they aie definitely recognised. This is a point of the first imixn-tance. In the recent negotiations the K<u«3*. & verJimc.nf “explicitly stated that they do not deny the special interests of Great. Britain in tlio 1 ersnan Gulf ” And to make qniite sure that Russia understood' 'the full memiinig of- •wftuafc siho &aid, tuio -bill•bisili Governaneiiib drew a-titeoiimoiv to 1 ‘ipTevious dtaolla rafio-us o-r_ JJirrtiLSLii nolicy.” These declarations are clear enough. LordT Jan < S < ? 5 fi example, said in 1903: AVe should l'calni'd the establislmienit of a naval ■bale or of a fortified port m.tho Persian Gullf by any other I ower as a Very grave menace to British interests, audl wo should certainly n-esist it with all the means at ouir disposal ” There is no equivocation there "Henceforth', we mlay take it, there will be only one policy in the Pen-aim Gulf for both the great political parties in Britain. No doubt ■in the last fern- months Sir Ed win'd

Grev has tried to got more concession's fro-m Russia tihlam he has got. AV© sup-pose he reached a point when, flic had to sa.y to liimseiltf: ‘‘ls tire credit sido of out accoun'tf-idil enough ni-o-w to make it worth while to sign a Convenltiion; and relieve ourselves of most, of owr harassing anxieties

in the Middle East? Or shall I haggle further, and risk not coming to am agreememit at alii ?” Ho decided rtlia.t the momenlt fliiad come, —-that tine grea-t enids to he served justified flics sacrifices. -Oil reviewing all tllie cii'cumstaiiiices, w© camno-t resist th-e aam-o concl-usion.