The Gisborne Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1909. THE BRITISH NAVY.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXVII, Issue 2452, 17 March 1909, Page 4

The Gisborne Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1909. THE BRITISH NAVY.

To a country like New Zealand which is absolutely dependent for its peaceful existence upon the naval supremacy of Great Britain, the subject of the Naval Estimates which have just been presented in the English Parliament is one of absorbing interest. The amount which Parliament is asked to sanction, £35,000,000, represents an enormous burden for the taxpayers in the Old Country to pay for the protection of their commerce, but presumably it is the smallest than can be expended if complete safety is to be guaranteed. A Liberal government, which depends largely for its support upon Radicals and Socialists, who rarely take a broad view of national necessities, is not at all likely 'to increase its naval vote beyond what is urgently required, particularly in a period of financial depression. The estimate represents England’s answer to the policy laid down by Germany at the close of 1907. At that time a new Act was passed by Hie Reichstag which provided for an expenditux-e of £207,000,000 in annual payments extending until 1917. Last year’s share amounted to £16,000,000 and that for 1909 to £20,000,000. Under the programme laid down it is estimated that by December 1911 the German-fleet will include 10 ships of the -Dreadnought type and three of the Invincible. By that time Britain will have according to its latest programme 12 Dreadnoughts and four luvincibles. The margin is obviously so small that it is not surprising that the Government intends to ask for authority to make preparations for the rapid construction of four more large armored ships, presumably of the Dreadnought type, to be laid clown by April 1 of next year and completed by March 1912. In that event- Britain would have early in 1912 16 large battleships as against Germany’s 10, and unless the naval programme of some other nation is altered in the meantime, it can reasonably be claimed that Britain’s traditional policy of the TwoPower standard would be thus maintained. It is true that Britain will not have as many Dreadnoughts and Invincibles in 1912 as will be included in the combined fleets of, say Germany and. the United States, but her enormous preponderance in vessels which, whilst not of first-class calibre, arc still possessed of considerable fighting efficiency, will more than make up the difference. Wo are told that the London “Daily News” expresses disappointment with the Estimates on the ground that the programme is colossal. The adjective is fully justified for the expenditure of £35,000,000 in one year upon work that is non-rep reductive, whilst hundreds of thousands of Englishmen are hard put to it to earn their daily bread seems nothing but a sinful and woeful waste of money. Yet after all, national existence must be preserved and there is nothing surer than that the fall of English naval supremacy would spell the decline of the British Empire, and the dependence pi its people upon the favors of foreign nations.

Apart from the questions of national patriotism it is safe to say that the individual Radical who now bemoans liis fate under grievous burdens would bo in an infinitely worse plight if the protection of the. British navy should ever prove ineffiective. The arguments of the economists arc at least easy t-o understand, whatever the precise value one may attach to them.-. They see that within the last six years the international situation r.r.s altered enormously to Great Britain’s advantage, that old-standing enmities have been reconciled, that new and potent guarantees of peace have been multiplied, and that, except in one quarter, the menace of war, so far as human prevision can secure it, has been effectually dissipated. They see, also, that, in spite of this, the naval and military estimates continue to mount up with an appalling rapidity, that the path of social reform grows, if anything, even more congested, and that no improvement in Great Britain’s relations with foreign Powers appears to affect in the slightest degree the demands made upon •the public purse by the Admiralty and the War Office. If, they declare, the Anglo-French entente means anything at ail, then surely it means that for all present purposes France may be wiped from the list of possible enemies. If the alliance with Japan and the agreement with Russia possess any genuine worth, then surely it follows that for many years to come the Far East must cease to be an object of Great Britain’s diplomatic or strategical solicitude, and that the garrisons on the Northwest Frontier may be safely reduced. When no such consequences ensue, the conclusion is that the cabinet has been bewitched by its technical experts, who, like all experts, are utterly indifferent to economy so long as they are allowed a free hand.

The argument is a plausible one. More than that, it represents a type of reasoning which is certain to grow in popular favor. That it is opposed to and flatly contradicted by the teachings of history and experience, that it ignores the inherent instability of even the most solid-looking structures of international friendship, and that it leaves entirely on one side the suddenness, brevity, and complexity of modern warfare, and the years of infinitely detailed preparation that must go to the winning of a single battle —all this will not prevent the advocates of retrenchment, at any price from meeting with a constantly growing support among the British masses. Democracy is enthroned, is greedy of material comforts, is suspicious of all armaments, and ON not as yet by any means well grounded in the realities of national existence.

Yet it is hard to understand how England is to maintain the Two-Power standard for any great length of time. After all, it is mainly a financial question and it is difficult to see how a population of 45,000,000 Englishmen living in a country about the size of New Zealand can provide the means to build as many warships as can lie supplied by the combined population of Germany, 60,000,000, and the United States, 90,000,000. The present position is bad enough, but the problem of the future is even worse and it seems evident that the millions of British subjects in various parts of the globe must he prepared to look.somewhat to their own defences, and not rely entirely upm the strong protecting arm of John Bull. So far as the present Estimates are concerned it- is likely that chief interest will centre around the additional four battleships which the Government say may or may not he needed. It would possibly have been better to have admitted straightout that the expenditure is necessary, for it is difficult to see- how any pretence to keep up the two-power standard can otherwise be justified.