The Gisborne Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 1909. GERMANY’S AMBITIONS.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXVII, Issue 2474, 13 April 1909, Page 4

The Gisborne Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 1909. GERMANY’S AMBITIONS.

One of the most persistent advocates of a strong naval-policy for England is the London “Spectator,” which in an article published about the middle of February, a few weeks before the naval Estimates were submitted to the House of Commons discusses very frankly and clearly the reason for its political faith. The relative positions of Germany and Britain are so admirably outlined as to merit the thoughtful perusal of all who have become interested in the vital matter of the Empire’s naval problem. In putting the case for Germany the “iSpeVta'to'r’'’ says:—“The final and supreme reason for Germany’s desire to possess a fleet of very great power can best be expressed by saying that she wishes to be in a position to talk diplomatically with Britain on something like terms of equality when matters involving sea power arc concerned. At present the more ambitious of the German politieans, assert—and from their point of view, by Jl'6 means unreasonably-—that while their fleet is greatly inferior to that of Britain they are always liable to be brought up diplomatically by the unpleasant reminder that (the British* Fleet is eo much stronger than theirs, and that they dare not risk a collision. ‘There are moments,’ they are inclined to say, ‘when you cannot get your rights respected unless you can effectively threaten the Power .which is ignoring these rights’. -.But wc cannot, at present, threaten Britain effectively. While our fleet is so inferior to hers l_ j

if we can menace the vulnerable spot of Britain by pointing to a fleet which, even if not quite so strong as hers on paper, is strong enough to make her very anxious, our ability to get our way with her, which is, after all, what we want, is vastly increased. We do not want to invade Britain merely for the sake of invading her, but we do want to seo her placed in a position in which, she will not feel herself, as now, absolutely invulnerable, and therefore above the reach of our diplomacy. Unless we have something like equality of sea power, our magnificent army, which could swallow the British Army at a mouthful, loses half its power to support the national and world-wide aspirations of the German State. If, on the contrary, we have a force sufficient to make Britain feel extremely uncomfortable on the score of an invasion, we should be aide to talk with her on terms of equality and do a reasonable ‘deal’ with hep-. That is, we should, without actual war, be able t-o take advantage of our opportunity, and thus be able to fulfil our destiny as a world-Power.’

“These,, in the last resort, arc thereasons why Germany wants sea power. They are not reasons which, per se, it would be- at all fair to call wicked or, from the German point of view, unreason able. They are the kind of views that ambitious statesmen and nations have always held. Indeed, it may be said that a part of our determination to maintain the command of the ftea resides in these- very arguments reversed, or applied to our own case. No doubt our intentions are in many ways much more pacific, for they are wholeheartedly for maintaining the status quo. But to this the Germans might well reply, ‘There is no virtue in your desire for peace and the status quo, because you have got all you want. It was a very different story when you were in our position and had not achieved ail you desired in the matter of empire.’ To argue on such a point as this, however, is not only unfruitful, but actually dangerous. It tends to endless recrimination and accusations, since no .man and no nation can ever be judges in their own cause.

“Whatever it costs us, we must maintain the command of the sea. But naturally, being businesslike) people, we anust obtain that command at the cheapest rate and with the minimum of sacrifice. Now, in our opinion, there can be no doubt that the line of the least sacrifice is not to be found in a policy of naval driblets, —of doing just enough, and only just enough, to keep command of the sea. The practical effect of that policy would be to lead Germany on, because it is certain to make her rulers and her people think that we are fainting in the struggle, and that if they, as the more virile, the more self-sacrificing, and the. more practical people —for such they consider themselves—make ‘just one more effort,’ we shall fall behind in the race. ‘You see he is panting and reeling already. Just- one more spurt and we shall beat him altogether.’ That is the most dangerous feeling we can possibly encourage in the German people, and it is just- the feeling we are encouraging by tlio policy of driblets. If, on the other hand, we increase our pace so much as to place a very great distance between ourselves and our German competitors, and at the same time show unmistakable powers of staying, then there is good ground for believing that it will be the Germans who will grow faint in the struggle, become depressed, and abandon the race. Already there are signs in Germany that people are saying:—‘The game is not worth the candle. We shall never catch up with the British, and wc are therefore exhausting our strength uselessly in trying to do so.’ That is the feeling wo want to encourage, and we can and shall encourage it if now —for now is the moment—we make a. really great effort and show the whole world that we are absolutely determined, no matter what the cost, not merely t-o keep just ahead, but to place a great and impassable interval between us and our chief competitor for the command of the sea.”

Judged from this standpoint the action of the New Zealand Government in offering a Dreadnought and two if necessary, was justified in the highest degree as a well-timed demonstration of Imperial unity.