THE KHARTOUM FAILURE.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXVII, Issue 2646, 30 October 1909, Page 3 (Supplement)

THE KHARTOUM FAILURE.

A SCRAPEGOAT VINDICATED

In reviewing the life of Major-Gen-eral Sir Charles Wilson (by Sir. Charles Watson) “The Times” refers, as was inevitable, to the part played by the subject of the- biography after tlie death of Sir Herbert Stewart and others left him m command of tlie Desert Column despatched for the rescue of Gordon. The spring at Khartoum had already failed hopelessly, but the general public did not, at the time, realise- that, and lias hardly done so 11 °Wilson’s share hi the Gordon Relief Expedition (writes “The Times ieviewer) was only an episode m Ins life The services for which his country owes him an eternal debt was done at other times and in other lands. Blit it were idle to ignore the fact that that episode will always be the most canvassed and the best remembered. Milson had nothing to be ashamed of m tlie matter, nor have we, Ins countrymen, except the official, attempt to put shame on him for it at all. Without the least responsibility for -a long chain or other, men’s .follies and errors, vv hiclx Gradually converted an easy venture into the most hopeless of forlorn hopes, JVilson found himself unexpectedly put in diarge of the situation tney had made at its last and most desperate stage. When the Desert Column got, down to Gubat, oil J-anxiary. 21, everything had gone wrong with it, short ot annihilation, and for everything others had been responsible. Its lack of transport which could so easily have been provided, caused delay at Jakdul halfway. That delay gave time for the Alahdists to take Omdurman, to line both banks o-f the Nile with batteries, and to despatch the fighting force which met the column when it did advance, broke its squares at Abu Klea, killed its commander, and lef tit with a i yi’rliic victory. So far from Wilson havmg been over prudent, when it fell to lnm to take up the heritage of all these misfortunes, he showed, as Sir Lmtoin Simmons bore witness, an almost reckless courage. Having done no more than was barely necessary to secure his isolated and broken force from annihilation in its unsupported lager on the Nile, he embarked in ancient and rotten steamers manned by dubious crews, and ran the gauntlet for over a hundred miles more through rocks and shoals and between unci fortified banks, for a hope whicn had become the shadow of a shade, the wonder is~tiiat he ever tried to go on to Khartoum at all, the greater wonder that he got there, and the greatest ‘that he came back alive. He knew, what was carefully concealed from the British public afterwards, that, even if he should still find Gordon holding out in Khartoum, tho chances of Ins own arrival making any difference to the ultimate result were not one m a hundred. He knevv._as we know now, that Gordan would never leave the city, if he had to leave behind those whom he had so long defended. He knew, as the British public did not know then, but learned in time, that the Mahdists had long ceased to be a disorderly mob which would run -at the sight of a few red-coats. He knew there was nothing to eat in Khartoum as it was, and that if he threw himself and his small force into the place, it would probably die of famine or disease before further relief would come. He knew that the remains of the Desert Column were immovable at Gubat, and that they could nob attempt to come on to Khartoum. He knew that the mam body of the expedition was still in its boats far below Berber, and would not arrive for weeks. Many things might nave been that were hot. The one thing that in all human likelihood could never have happened, whether the steamers had started three days earlier or three days later, was the rescue of Gordon himself; and the one thing which in all human probability would have happened, had the steamers reached Khartoum while the Egyptian flag still flew! was that Wilson himself and his British officers and men would have died there equally with Gordon. Painfully obvious is all this now, but neither at the time nor for many years was it made obvious to the public. A commander-in-chief made responsible for many errors not his which had long' ago made ultimate success well-nigh impossible, had still hoped against hope for some result which would save the credit of the expedition. A Government fiercely attacked for its lack of, foresight in the beginning-had to save its -face as much as npssible by blaming the end. Dust was'thrown in the eves of the public, and-an effort was made to shift all the burden of sin on to a single scrapegoat. -The effort practically failed. Wilson’s own corps and colleagues, many of those in the highest places who best knew the f ac t s j and those of the public' best able to hid«© of them for themselves refused to sacrifice a. gallant victim of the muddle to its 1 authors. But semper aliquid haeret and calumination of VVilsbn. in ihisfhiatter has died hard.