THE RIVALS.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXVIII, Issue 2749, 2 March 1910, Page 2

THE RIVALS.

THE NAVAL POLICY OF GERMANY.

FROM THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW. In all the controversy which for the past two years has raged in the press of Great Britain and Germany round the great question of navies, it has been .almost impossible to get a calm and reasonable "view of the situation from the standpoint -of Germany itself. The whole issue has been obscured by excessive bitterness and rancour on either side. In the Navy League Annual for 1909-1910, a copy of which lia* just been received from the local brunch of the Navy League, is an excellent statement- of the cause for Germany. It is by the Graf Ernst'von Reventtow, a contributor to previous annuals, and an ardent advocate of naval expansion in the -Fatherland. He writes in an extremely concise and logical manner, tracing the circumstances which led to the foundation of the new German Navy, and explaining the necessity for its maintenance and development-.

THE ORIGIN OF THE NAVY. He goes back to the middle of the nineties, when the Anglo-German intimacy, <which had'begun with the accession to the throne of the Emperor William 11., became cooler and gave place to less friendly feelings. “At that time,” says the count, “shoals of articles a/pp eared in the .British press-, and magazines, in which Germany was twitted with being- the only Power geographical! •: so situated that had no fleet, and. moreover, by reason of its great nut rim commerce was so vulnerable that England could make war against us without any risk to herself. On the day following the declaration of war, the German men-of-war would he lying at the bottom of the sea, and German trade could then be easily ■crushed by the .British cruisers, her colonies would be taken away from Germany, and, if the Empire had at the same time been weakened by a Continental war, England would say to France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia : Here is Germany, take what you want !

These threats were certainly extravagant. They threatened more than could be accomplished. Their effect in Germany has, however, been very great, for only from that time forward did the realisation of tire necessity for a German fleet- begin, to deepen and to spread with extraordinary rapidity from the north far down into the south of the Empire. . . . 1 do not believe, however, that the efforts -of the Emperor and his supporters would have had this result- bad notthe fear of England been so successfully nourished by Englishmen themselves.”

THE SECOND NAVY BILL. Tlie cotint then recalls the bitterness that grow in England from the consciousness, of -more or less successful rivalry by Germany in commerce. He refers to the lesson taught Germany in 1893 by the destruction of the Spanish fleet by America, and the loss to Spain of her overseas Empire. Then came the German Navy Bills, the second of which doubled the strength fixed by the first. The -second Navy Bill was introduced by a general -preamble, containing a sentence to the effect that tlie German Navy unust be strong enough to .make the greatest-sea-Power hesitate to attack Germany, if slio did not wish to jeopardise her international position. This sentence, the count- submits, must- be read -*ith a defensive meaning. “It is not right,” he saw;, “to reproach, the .preamble with hypocrisy, and to think that the expression of the words; is intended to cover aggressive designs.” The necessity for a large navy, and not merely- a coast-defence fleet, is explained by tlie count as due to the fact that all German commerce lias to .pass through the narrow Straits of Dover, which can be dominated by England. Local cruiser protection would be impossible and ineffective. Hence the liecossity for a fleet- of battleships. The count reiterates the enormous importance to modern Germany of her overseas commerce. He adds, however, a rider that the German Empire would certainly not- be ruined if a disastrous war were to bring about a destruction of her trade. “Therein,” says lie, “lies a considerable portion of the confidence with which we would look forward to a war with England.” BASIS OF PROGRAMME.

“There is no sense,” he continues,

“in calculating that German trade is worth s-o many .millions, and English trade worth so much, and placing against each of these figures the cost of the British Navy, and of the German Navy of the future, and then saying that 'there is a disproportion here which can only be explained by hostile

designs on the part of Germany. . .. Germany puts the question to herself, whether her trade and all that is de T pendent upon it is worth so much to the German 'nation that she will he willing to incur the necessary expenditure for it-s -protection. . A navy which is not sufficient for the purpose is altogether useless. . . If one is determined to create a re mil y effective protection by the Navy, "Then of the possible enemies, the strongest must determine the measure of the protection. Germany’s strongest possible enemy is England, and in saying this, we have come back again to the introductory words of the second Navy Bill. Alter remarking that the change for the worse in the relations of the two coutries was 'not duo to the German Navy Bill, but to commercial jealousy, Count von Reventlow turns to the question of Dreadnoughts. “Ten years ago,” ho says, “it was seen just as) clearly as to-day that it would he senseless to attempt to build a fleet of equal or superior strength to that of England. England disposes of larger financial means, and of the very largest shipbuilding and technical facilities in the world, and .possesses experience and traditions which ten years back hardly existed in Germany at all. Finally, we in Germany, are as well aware as any Englishmen, that for England the Navy means “to bo or not to be.” and therefore, of course, all available powers must be set in motion in order to retain her superiority.”

AFTER THE DREADNOUGHT. German men-of-war were.,at first limited in size by the conditions of the Baltic Canal. Then England began to increase the size and power of her battleships. Germany had to follow suit, and practically consign to the scrap heap her original Navy of 13,000-ton battleships. The inferior value of the small and medium battleship, as compared with the large ones, could no mere be denied than the- truth of assertion that individual ship-power never could be made up by the increase in the number of small vessels. “It appears to me,” declares the Count, “that any impartial person .must admit that after the “Dreadnoughts” began to be built, the question for Germany could only he: Either to build vessels of equal power, or to lay down l no more battleships and armoured cruisers at all. . . . “The enormous advantage which the English Fleet had over the German Fleet, when we began about 1900 to build regularly, has only been somewhat diminished by the Dreadnought era. Was it unfair ror Germany to make use of the advantage she gained by the rapid obsolence of earlier ships?”

THE REAL GERMAN POLICY. The Count then proceeds to discuss the actual /policy of the Germany Navy. “Should war break out-,” he says, “sooner oy later, we would be unable, even assuming conditions most favorable to us, to directly protect German commerce so long as tile war lasted. Our trading vessels on the oceans would be a .prey to the British cruisers, and we would have no means of doing anything for their probe< - urn. The few German foreign cruisers would not exist for long, and, besides, they would have no stations at which they could voai and execute repairs. . . . In the North Sea, England will tyidoiaivor to carry on the (fight- asj rapidly as possible—Germany will desire to draw it out. The stronger the German Fleet, and the floating means of coast defence, the better will Germany succeed in this plan. A wellconducted active defence, behind which is ranged -a strong licet of battleships, while both -have the support of a coastline favorable to us, cannot he overcome at a single stroke. . . The relation between -our licet pregiamme and warfare itself we might in broad lines describe in the following words: -- “It is sufficient for us Germans if England recognises that she cannot in tho long run carry out a blockade- of the German coasts This object of ours is thus a purely defensive one." INVASION ALL NONSENSE.

In the talk about invading England, the Count has absolutely no faith. He refers to the uneasiness and apprehension of prominent British politicians and experts. “None of these prominent and experienced men,” lie declares, “will ever have believed in the nonsense about invasion, excepting perhaps a lew fanatics. It is, after all. only a right of -politicians if in England the spectre of invasion is made use oi' for purposes of agitation, or in order to influence public opinion in favor oi the navy: it becomes a wrong, where it produces gerater harm than good. . . We in Germany argue that the greater and stronger the Germany navy the more , s -hips and money will, in event of a war, have to bo staked By England as a dead less, in order to destroy that German fleet. Tho chances of success of the weaker side increases with the absolute strength of its fleet. It it is a- question of four ships against eight, then the position is dev ami simple; but in the ease of forty against eigthy everything wiii not- be decided by a single blow. We know the fleet to be created by tlie Navy Bill is urgently requisite for our defensive needs.”

“So long as we are strong on the Continent it will never be possible to end a naval war against Germany by forcing a peace on us,” declares the German writer, and adds the disadvantages of the British position, as a power encircling the whole globe would soon be .apparent. The nnere suggestion that the time had come might cause the oversea nations and races suddenly to revolt. FUTURE RELATIONS.

“Why did not- England destroy the German navy before it was strong?” asks the Count, suggesting that there are in England quite a number of people who consider a preventive war -very desirable. A perfectly clear and simple answer, he says, cannot be given. The Radical Government evidently desires (peace. ’Whether we .should st-ill have peace if the Conservative Ministry had remained in office we cannot cay. -Should it, however, again take the helm,before long, as seems probable, it will have to face a situation that has altered considerably in favor of Germany. For this reason we can ealmlv look forward to- coming .politic-a-l changes in England. And just for

this reason, too, the naval ■policy of Germany 'will remain exactly what ‘it has been hitherto. It need scarcely bg emphasised that we Germans desire sound political relations with England. Every clear-sighted Englishman will, however, I think, comprehend that Germany will never purchase such good relations with England at the cost of her naval programme or of her future navy. . . Germany has none of those fantastical soli ernes which are incessantly attributed to her. But, in addition to the reasons already enumerated, she requires a strong fleet in order to he able, in the midst of the general economic rivalry, to display the necessary authority. Sir Edward Grey said last spring: '"’A strong navy would enhance Germany’s prestige, her diplomatic influence, and her power to protect her trade.” . . . Diplomatic influence, prestige ,and power to protect the trade are not articles of 'luxury, but necessities, to a country claiming to rank as a great Power. I consider that only thus can sound friendly relations between England and Germany persist in the long run. We Germans are very anxious for solid friendly relations with England, and this politically quite apart from the great personal sympathy which all cultivated ■Germans have for Britons and for everything British. Economically and politically, even," healthy nation worksonly for its own advantage. This 'gives rise to competition, the earth unfortunately does not expand, and thus mutual strength is necessary to render. equilisation of power and consequently a pacific equilibrium 'possible.