DEFENCE OF THE COLONIES.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXIX, Issue 3168, 14 March 1911, Page 5

DEFENCE OF THE COLONIES.

ADMIRAL HENDERSON SUBMITS HIS REPORTPRIMARY OBJECT OF AUSTRALIAN NAVY. LOCAL FLEET OF FIFTY-TWO VESSELS NEEDED. I UNITED PEESS ASSOCIATION-COPYEIGHT.J (Received March 13, 8 p.m.) SYDNEY, March 13. Admiral Henderson’s report on the naval defence of Australia, which is the result, of exhaustive inquiries since August last, has been published. Dealing with naval bases, ne says that although he confined his attention to the ports of the Commonwealth and its dependencies, yet it had been necessary, when reviewing the whole naval situation in the South Pacific, to give consideration to New Zealand, Fiji, and other portions of the Empire in the Pacific, and his, proposals will admit of any future developments in New Zealand and the Pacific . Islands being readily fitted into one complete scheme. He urges the. paramount importance of unity in the control of all the naval forces of the Empiio, and that the primary object of the Australian navy should be the immediate support of the rest of the Empire’s naval forces, in a determination to retain, the command of the sea. The Admiral then outlines his scheme for the Australian navy, and his recommendations include the appointment of a Naval Board; a thorough system of training for officers and men;, the protection' and equipment of naval bases as essential to the maintenance of modern warships ; and the organisation of a complete system of eommUnication and intelligence. He suggests that the completed fleet, should consist of 52 vessels'—namely, eight armoured cruisers; ten protected einisei’s; eighteen destroyers; 12 submarines; three depot ships; and one repair ship, requiring, when fully manned, a personnel of about 15,000 officers and men.

The building up of the completed fleet to extend over twenty-two years, consisting of four eras, the first of seven years, and the second, third, and fourth of five years each. The first- era* will be occupied in obtaining and manning the fleet unit already ordered, with the addition of a dejrot vessel, and three submarines, six torpedo destroyers, and providing a harbor, training establishment, the erection of naval barracks and a college at Sydney, with wireless stations at .Sulney. Fremantle, Brisbane, Thursday Island, Port Western ; also to establish depots and gunnery and torpedo schools at Sydney and Port Western. He urges the necessity for establishing railway communication between Port Darwin, Fremantle, and the centres of population required for the ana in ten ante of the fleet; also arrangements for merchant ships to meet_ the needs in war time, as fleet auxiliaries. The cost of the completed fleet is estimated in non-recurring charges at .-£23-,290,000, of which sum' £3,500,000 has already been spent or voted, leaving the balance to be spread over twenty years. Recurring charges are set down at £152,000 after 1933. The annual expenditure required to replace worn-out ships would be £1.242,000. He has also recommended that during the 20 years £5,000,000 in addition to the amounts .mentioned be expended in the replacement of ships. The annual cost of the personnel would lie £516,000 at the commencement of the four eras, growing to £2,226,000 at their determination. He suggested that for the first seven wears per annum be voted for naval defence, for the next five yea is £1,000,000. and for the succeedii)o’ five - Tears £4.500.000,- and for the fourth era £5,000,000 per anmim. The report does .not cover Ins eonfi--dential recommendations. “ON BEHALF OF AUSTRALIA.” (Received March 13. 11.30 p.m) LONDON, March 13. A commission has been granted to Captain Bertran Chambers, to visit, on behalf of Australia, the dockyards and naval establishments at Portsmouth, and the naval colleges at Osborne and Dartmouth. VIEWS OF THE “SPECTATOR.” ‘ WILL STIMULATE. INTEREST IN ~v SEA POWER.” .("UNITED PEESS ASSOCIATION—COPYEIGHT.J LONDON, March 12. The “Spectator” • comments on Mr. McKenna's memorandum. _ It- remarks: “The generosity and patriotism of the people of the "Commonwealth will be recognised throught the Empire. Ihe possession of her own fleet and pro\ision for its maintenance by Australia will greatly stimulate interest" m sea power in the. island continent. That is very necessary, for no part of the Einpire is more deeply concerned in the maintenance of our command of the .sea.” SIR JOSEPH WARD’S SPEECH. HOME PRESS COMMENTS. CARDINAL FEATURE EMPHA- . SISED. (Received March 14, 12.10 a.i n) LONDON, March. 13. The “Standard” hopes that the Imperial Government will carefully consider Sir Joseph Ward’s spirited declaration in reference to the two-Power standard, and that a fitting response will be made at the Imperial Conference. The “Morning Leader,” -in; opposing the .increase in the Estimates, characterises the speech as being fine. Tire ■paner lays eimpliasis on lus frank statement that the maintenance of the twoPower standard is becoming impossible for Britain, unaided.

THE MARGIN OF SECURITY. 7 IS IT BEING MAINTAINED ? Writing in the “Daily Mail” on January 20, Mr. H. W. Wilson states: The most striking feature of the memorandum drawn up by the piesent First Sea Lord is its two assumntions —first, that the strength of the British Navy will be maintained on a basis of two keels

to one; and, second, that this entire force can he concentrated" in British home waters.

Is either of these assumptions justified? And, if not, what is the precise value of the memorandum ? We must look at facts as they are—not as we should like them to be. Now, the facta are that, for the five years during which the Liberal party have been in power, the British and German naval programmes in the most important classes of ships have stood as follow: —- BRITAIN.

"Whereas to maintain the standard of strength in home waters which Sir Arthur Wilson postulates we ought to have "begun 36 armored ships, 20 small cruisers, and 120 destroyers, we actually only laid down 21 armored ships, of which one is for service in the Pacific ; 18 cruisers, of which 3 are for Pacific service; and 66 destroyers, of which 3 are for the same ocean. Deducting these, our net strength for European service provided in the five years was 20 armored ships, all Dreadnoughts, to 18 German, of which 17 were Dreadnoughts ; 15 small cruisers to 10 German cruisers; and 63 destroyers to 60 German.

Even if we count the four British Dreadnoughts laid down in 1905-6, before the Liberals took office, this is not two keels to one, or anything approaching it. On the other hand, we had some advantage in torpedo-boats—-though These are not sea-going craft—as we laid down 24 to Germany’s none; and in submarines.

It is quite clear that if such a proportion of British to German ships is maintained in the British programmes of the near future, the German navy is going to draw very close to our own in fighting strength as the old ships are “scrapped.” It is in old ships that we are greatly superior to-day. Of battleships other than Dreadnoughts now on the effective list- Britain possesses 40 to the German 20, but 26 of the British ships and only 8 of the German are from 10 to 16vears old, and, therefore, on the eve of “scrapping.” But there is another consideration to take into account, even with the assumption that our entire force of armored ships, cruisers, and destroyers can he concentrated in the North Sea. At any given moment some of the battleships may be laid up by accident, or by need for repair. An enemy, having the initiative, will he able to select his opportunity; and if four of our Dreadnoughts were absent from the fighting line in .1912 or .191.3, the British strength in these ships in Home waters would he only equal to the German. Thus the first assumption of the memorandum drawn up hv the First Sea Lord is not justified except for the moment. Unless he obtains an enormous naval programme this year,-and next year—and rumor speaks of mpdest proposals—it is out of the question to assume that in powerful modern ships the British Navy will stand to the German as two to one.

If we deduct 6 Dreadnoughts from the British total for North Sea service as the minimum that will he needed in the Mediterranean in 1914, we are left with the following force of Dreadnoughts for Britain and Germany in the North Sea:—

Complete in 1914 (April). British : 25—1 for Pacific—6 for Mediterranean—lß plus programme of 1911 (unknown). German: 17 plus programme of 1911-21.

If the British programme is 5, as many anticipate, there will be only 23 British Dreadnoughts to the 21 German. Instead of our possessing two Dreadnoughts to one, two fleets each of equal strength to the German fleet, we shall have one fleet only very slightly exceeding the German force. If there are many British absentees from casualties or refits, the fleet will perhaps be actually inferior to the German. But with such a state of affairs all the conditions demanded by Admiral Wilson have passed away. There is no force double the would-be invader’s strength ready to fall on him; there is no second fleet to replace the main force should it be decoyed away. It follows, then, on the First. Sea Lord’s reasoning, that invasion will be a real and constant menace from about 1912 onwards; and that this country, unless it makes at once and without delay very large- additions to its fleet, may havee to choose between disaster in the Mediterranean or disaster in the North Sea.

Armored ships. Cruisers. Destroyers 1906 .... .. 3 0 2 1907 .... .. 3 1 5 190S .... .. 2 6 16 1909 .... .. 8 6 20 1910 .... .. 5 5 23 21 18 66 GERMANY 1906 .. 3 O 12 1907 .... .. 3 • o 12 1908 .. 4 2 12 1909 .. 4 2 12 1910 .... .. 4 • 2 12 18 10 60