INVASION OF ENGLAND.

Gisborne Times, Volume XLV, Issue 4003, 9 August 1915, Page 4

INVASION OF ENGLAND.

WHAT ARK HER MANY'S’ PLANS. f NTKRESTING DISCLOS Uit E=. Dot's Germany still mean to attempt Hie invasion of Britain? Th o .heavy fighting in the region of Flanders would apparently show that Germany is still aching to hark her way through to the coast. Once bv the sea, would she endeavor to cross to lined and '■ An amazingly interesting book. ‘‘Truppenlandungeii in England.’.' by Major Ms von .Sehreibershofen, which has just found its way to England from Leipzig, is one of a series which are being published with Government aid Whenever the Government _ want* the German people to think in any particular way a pamphlet^or two are published, a number of articles appear in hireling journals, and soon the people think to order. This book deals with the possibility of invasion. It is a sober production by a soldier who has studied the matter. His argument is that an invasion of England is theoretically essential, as otherwise we can never be beaten. ••'Even a defeat/" he writes. “of the British Expeditionary Corps in. France would not be a blow at Britain’s life veins or nerves. For this reason it would be worth while examining if it would not be possible to carry the war into England's own territory and to strike the island Power at her very heart. "It would be then possible for Germany to besiege her hard-necked opponent and impose on her her own terms/' These are good enough reasons, argues the major, to make an expedition worth while, but how many ships would be necessary? As the result of innumerable experiments. both in England and Germany, the following formula has been fount 1 ; to be the absolute minimum: J battalion 3.800 1 squadron 2.300 1 horse batterv 3.000 1 light munition col. 2.000 SHIPS THAT ARE WANTED. In other words, in order to transport one infantry division on a journey la- ting not more than one week {including amnmiiion columns and field hospitals), shins totalling 8-5.0*00 tons would be necessary. During a series of experiments in Germans it took a battalion on the average—despite the fa •: that everything had been repeatedly rehearsed — from one to one and a-half hours to embark. PROBLEMS OF EMBARKATION. But if embarkation is going to present problems, the question of disembarking the troops when they get to Kraland is still move difficult. When the major turns to* the difficulties of an invasion of England ho becomes a veritable Jeremiah. He points out that an absolute sine qua non for an invasion is surprise. Without surprise nothing can be done. Assuming, however, that surprise were possible, he goes into a long detailed, description of what- is to be done on landing. •Cavalry patrols must immediately be sent out to cut railway and postal connections and get information as to the movements of the population. Cyclists should also be dispatched for the purposes of reconnaissance, and these must h; furnished with explosives (Zorstorungsworkzeugen) for t-ho purpose of damaging property . LANDING PARTIES' BOMBS. • ; lf you are fortunate enough by the throwing of bombs to break up the railway line it will be all the better, as it will facilitate landing operations. •‘As to -further operation's." he writes, “these must depend on purely 1 oca 1 cir: u instance s. ” In the most favorable circumstances 25,000 infantry, 1.100 horsemen and GO guns can be landed in six hours. Where could the Germans land? The major thinks the South Coast mightbe best. “With further victories Dunkirk ami Calais will fall into the hands of the Germans. This will give a splendid basis for operations against the South Coast.” Nevertheless, ’Major von Schroibershoien is not optimistic. He thinks that Britain's naval defences would he far too effective, quite apart from the risks of any transports being met by submarines or’othcr ships. On the whole, ho thinks that an invasion would not be more than an interesting. hut risky. experiment. Which seems, common sense and a tribute to the British Navy.