STRENGTH OF THE TURKISH FORCES.

Gisborne Times, Volume XLV, Issue 4006, 12 August 1915, Page 7

STRENGTH OF THE TURKISH FORCES.

COMPOSITION DECIDEDLY .. doubtful: THE COLONIALS THROUGH TURKISH SPECTACLES. A VERY INTERESTING TIVEWriting to the '‘Gisborne Times" from Sidi Bishr Trooper Foster, formerly on the stall' of this journal, .says: The strength of_ the Turkish forces between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea has been variously estimated at 200,000, 300,000 and even 400,000 effectives. Their composition, is also decidedly doubtful. A number of new divisions described as 8.1.5. divisions have been formed apparently by combining- Nizam (first line) troops with Red if (reserve) troops of the j older classes. From such information as is available it would appear that each Nizam Army Corps of Western and Syrian commands has given perhaps 15 per cent of its effectives for tile formation of new divisions, the surplus numbers being found by the Redif while the latter take the place of transferred Nizam in the Nizam Army Corps. Whether any Reserve j or 8.1.5. Army Corps have been form- j cd is still doubtful. At the beginning j of November when Turkey went to ! war with the Allies Enver Pasha was j unable to arm more than 000,000 men | at the outside of 800,000 who had been j mobilised. The defeats in Caucasus J have cost the Turks a large number ; of rifles together with their other war j material and though a certain number of Mansers have reached Constant!- J nople from the north since the out-j break of war, it is extremely improliable that Yon Der Gollz and Pasha’s • 1,200,000 ‘-men in buckram'’ have all j received magazine rifles. The scarcity j of officers is also likely to have pre- j vented any extensive doubling of j existing units. It is therefore doubt- j ful whether more than a dozen 8.1.5. [ divisions at the outside have been ; formed. These are all apparently at- ; I taehod to the first five (Thracian and , i Anatolian) Army Corps and to the two j j Syrian Army Corps—Nos. VI. and : j VIII. The reserve troops in Eastern j I Anatolian and Kurdistan seem only to j j have formed one new division (No. 39 ' | 8.1.5.) The remainder have doubtless j | been required to fill up the enormous j gaps left by the nraetieal annihilation ! lof the 9lb (Erzcrum) Army Corps at ■ ! Sarykamysli and the heavy losses in- | flicted -on the 10th (Erzindjan) and 11th. (Van) Army Corps at Ardalian and the Kara Urgan Pass.. Divisions of Ist (Constantinople), 2nd (Adriauople), 3rd (Rodost-o) and oth (Angora) Army Corps have been at different times reported as at the- Caucasus front or on their way thither, and the 10th (Smyrna) Army Corps was engaged in company with troops of Bth (Damascus) Army Corps on the Suez Canal. The enemy’s forces in the Western theatre of war in the Near East—Thrace, tlic Bosphorus, and Dardanelles regions and Smyrna —are probably composed more or less as follows :

At 12,000 effectives per division of nine battalions, from four to six field batteries and the usual complement of engineers, divisional cavalry and train, an dadding some 30,000 effective men of throe or four cavalry brigades stationed in this region, the corps artillery of first six army corps, and the strong fortress artillery and engineer units, stiffened by large German contingents who hold the two entrances to the Sea of Marmora, we have a total of about 275,000 men. A certain number of Mustafix (Laudsturm) and depot troops will also be available to make good losses in the field. For defensive operations this is unquestionably a formidable force. The positions which some of its' groups bold are of great natural strength, 'flic Turk, if nowadays loss efficient in offensive warfare than in Janissary times, is still a- stubborn defender of prepared positions, and his useful, if none 100 popular German ally has unquestionably improved his transport and commissariat services. There must be no question of failure for the Allies. A serious setback would have evil conse-

quences in tho middle East and perhaps in tho Balkan Peninsula but we must not expect to reach Constantinople without a severe struggle and must pay the Turkish Army the compliment of believing till we have proof.to the contrary that it will die game. Turkish prisoners who have recently arrived in Egypt say that the Ottoman losses in the lighting in tde Gallipoli Peninsula have been terribly ■heavy. The 20th Regiment was almost annihilated, its colonel alone oi its officers, escaping death or capture. Almost equally severe losses were borne by tho loth and 56th Regiments. The loss in officers had generally been very heavy and the gaps were being filled by naval officers and cadets from tho Military School. Men of every military class, Nixnm, Redif and Mustaliz were now to bo found in the same unit. The attacks on the KritJna position early in May lliUl 1)0011 lllOSli costly operations for the Turks. Ordered by Tinian Pasha to attack with empty magazines and with the bayonet only -by night, the assaulting columns were repeatedly caught by the Allies . flares and searchlights in close forma- j tion and terribly punished at pointblank ranges by machine gun and rifle 1 fire. Only 120 men could be collected j out of ‘a regiment originally some | 3,000 strong after the attack was ; over, said a captured officer who wit- , nessed one of these charges. He add- j cd that the Allied mountain .spins on, more than one occasion caught the Turks as they wore assembling at night for ./the attack and assisted by searchlights kept them for some minutes under a heavy rafale of shrapnel, ’inflicting heavy losses. “The landing, said an Arab officer who is among tho prisoners, “was costly and difficult, but it was boldly carried out and your troopesoncc established on the Peninsula it was our turn to suffer heavier losses in a series of desperate but unavailing counter-attacks. I was made a prisoner a fortnight ago. We had then lost at least 40,000 killed and wounded.” It was further stated by prisoners that two Turkish battalions bad attacked one another by night near Gaba Tepe, losing heavily and ultimately stampeding in spite of efforts of their officers to rally them. Prisoners say that the firing of British machine guns was particularly well-directed and violent find that the in the vicinity of the heaviest shell bursts were frequently, so dazed, and pun DTjflej WAutf A'q.W exp u;

naval guns at times wore most effective. Men who were in Llie trendies lalaat Boy went to war while others curse the Germans most heartily.

At •my Corps with Pc ace Headquarters Divisions Approximate Station ]. Constantinople! 1,2. 3 BIS. Bosphorus (Europe) >2. Adrianople -1, 5, fi BIS. Southern ' 'brace Rod os to in, Bis.. 1L. 12 Gallipoli 1 eninsula 4. Sinvnni 13.11. do BIS. Dardaneik s, Aivali. etc. 5. An'corn 10, 24. 2G Bosphorus (Asia) 0. Adana 19 Chataldja Lines and Gallipol y. 1 ndepondent 20 Peninsula Divisions (nowlv ? formed) 21 BIS. Smyrna Official number of BIS.vJ'division doubtful. A BIS. division of 8th Damascus Army Corps may also be present.