THE H.B. TRIBUNE MONDAY, APRIL 14, 1930 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XX, Issue 100, 14 April 1930, Page 4

THE H.B. TRIBUNE MONDAY, APRIL 14, 1930 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE

The lengthy statement provided to us on Saturday last by Mr. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, may be taken to indicate that what will go down i'i history as the London Naval Conference of 1930 is virtually at an end so far as discussion of armaments is concerned. All that is now left to be done is to reduce to writing such arrangements as have been reached, which on Thursday next are to have signature at the hands of a final plenary assembly of the delegates. As the conference opened on 20th. January last and has been in continuous active operation ever since, it can scarcely be said that the conclusions have been in any way hastily arrived at. By the time the ultimate benediction is pronounced the time occupied wiU run to within a day or two of the full three months. The Washington Conference, which opened on 12th. November, 1921, lasted for very nearly as long, not being closed until 6th. February, 1922. But it covered an infinitely wider field than that which has como under review in London. The present Conference has been confined exclusively to the problem of adjusting naval quotas as among the Powers represented and has, after all, arrived at finality only as regards three of them, Great Britain, the United States and Japan, while the other two, France and Italy, stand just where they were before the Conference began. At Washing ton, besides relative naval strengths, many other topics camo up affecting more particularly the naval position in the Pacific Ocean and several questions touching on relations with China. It would thus seem that, having regard to the subjects to be discussed, the London Conference has been much more talkative than that held eight years ago in the American capital. The First Lord's statement dcais pretty exhaustively with al! thathas been achieved, and the first thought must be that it falls a good long way short of what Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the so san guine British Prime Minister, had led us to hope for. Ho would seem to have allowed himself to suffer from the delusion that, having by his visit to the United States secured the good will of the American President, all the rest, would be comparatively easy going. There were, however, others I clearer vision and better regard for actualities who from the outset foresaw, and warned us, that the main difiicidty would arise not between thg three bigger naval

Powers, but between France and Italy. The preliminary conversations that had been held between the two latter Powtes afforded very little hope of bringing their respective requirements into line. France had before the Conference opened stated hers with particular definiteness, and Italy had said Shat she must reserve full liberty to keep pace with France, and there, despite all persuasion and pressure brought to bear, the situation remains unaltered so far as these two Powers are con cerned. Mr. MacDonald may have genuinely believed that Franco would prove open to the influences of the Conference, but, if so, he must to-day be in this respect a badly disappointed man. All his long importunity has proved of no avail, and it may well be that with regard to France the only result will be to have aroused resentment among her people and to have emphasised the anything but friendly feeling already existing between her and her Transalpine neighbour. However, though having to confess complete failure in this direction, it may be justly claimed that as among the three major naval Powers some very definitely good ends have been accomplished. Of these the most important in the eyes of the British taxpayer will probably be the substantial trimming down of expenditure upon new construction. In this respect there was certainly no sense to be seen in entering upon a further period of rivalry with so wealthy a nation as the United States. It may be that it will not be at all palatable to the British as a people to have to resign them selves definitely to the loss of theii old dominant place upon the Seven Beas; But economic conrl’tions, if no other, dictated the virtual impossibility of maintaining it as regards the factors' of number of ships and weight of armaments. In these respects it would have been possible for America to reduce them to a position even less satis factory than the "parity” which has seemingly been secured. With regard to the effect of the Three Powers agreement reached upon the preservation of peace, it may be difficult to see that it offers any very notable fresh guarantee, for it is obvious that war is just as possible with small navies as with big. It is also noteworthy that the implications of the Kellogg Pact have held nothing but a very minor place in all these long discussions a rather disappointing commentary upon the real value that is placed upon it by the Powers associated in the Conference. Finally, it may be just as well for us to bear specially in mind what the American messages have to say with respect to possible difficulty arising in obtaining the necessary senatorial ratification, without which the treaty now in course of preparation will be so much waste paper.