EUROPE'S WAR

Marlborough Express, Volume LI, Issue 87, 14 April 1917, Page 3

EUROPE'S WAR

MAY END THIS SUMMER.

1 OPINION IN FRANCE AND GER-

MANY

DECISIVE ACTION LOOKED FOR

IN JULY

One of the most constant and overwhelming feelings one has in attempting to keep in touch with even the main outlines of the war is the extreme difficulty of reaching a safe conclusion on the most significant points. I have always believed in the untrustworfchiness of human testimony (writes .Norman Hapgood from London on 3rd March to the New York' Evening* Post), but that belief, strong as it was, has been inerotised. .

Consider the most important military question of the moment—the strength of the German line in France, on which depends the outcome of the contemplated great push. I have just come from a conversation with a man who is much more able to think than most men are, and whose official position gives him exceptional advantages. He had been -nt the German Headquarters in France recently, and in the first-line German trenches, and had made up his mind that the German lines were impregnable. He then came to England, and after he had been here two weeks be was of the. opinion that the British and French would-be able to smash through this spring,-,. The general impression counts for a great "deal in one's conclusion, and the impression is inevitably colored by one's environment. It is- also extremely difficult to get at more definite fact's, as, for example, at the morale of the German troops. We know that a certain number surrender voluntarily, more than they did befoi'a, but the numbers are not large, and it is dangerous to draw too sweeping conclusions.

IF THJSY GET THROUGH

Again, wo know" that the British' have become excellent at ordinary trench fighting and raids, but we have no way of knowing how well they can manoeuvre if . they ever get through on:a large scale. '•'Let thenr *. get through j" some German officers said-to a friend of mine; "we ask no thing better than to fiVht them in the open. lif this j trench warfare there is no difference ; to speak of-Ueoween the skilful and the stupid, buw> once the fighting gets,; beyond the trenches our military i superiority will be decisive." That we11,,, but it may be added that if the Germans believe it, I they do not take steps to lure the British and French beyond their trenches into the open. Also it is fair to say that many of the best experts believe -that a sudden breakthrough ctf several miles, with the .consequent capture of the heavy j guns, will be, decisive. ' j

THE SUPREME COMMAND

In connection with this question of skill and its relation to the' spring campaign, a certain report1 about the Prime Min:ster is interesting. It is narrated to me by one who ought to know, that Mr Lloyd George was in favor of co-ordinating the work of the West by having the whole British Army act under general directions from the French supreme command..

Lord Northcliffe was among those who opposed the measure. I asked what the' opposition w^is founded on, 'and the answer was, "Lord Northcliffe believes that Sir Douglas Haig is a very great military genius; and is thoroughly convinced that he will accomplish marvels in the spring i diive.

One is tempted to add that these'] differences of opinion about politics, and the crucial elements of the situa^ fcion, would be likely, to be 'removed when we find out how the spring drive gets on, except that experience earlier in the war gives one pause. When I was at the froiit in France in j 1915, I was given such exact informa- ' tsion by French officers and French j statesmen in charge of munitions j about what was going to happen piie month and two months hence that I am: now wai'y of drawing—and conclusions about the . decisiveness of the next few months. All that caii be reported positively is that it is the ■ preponderance -of opinion herie, in France, and in Germany that the war,' if not actually finished will be de-r cided to all intents and purposes by July

- THE FOOD QUESTION.

Besides the weight of the Spring drive the two factors that jvill do most to bring the situation to a head are, of coiirse. the situation in Germany regarding food and certain raw materials necessary to the manufacture, of munitions, and secondly, the food situation' in England, which is comfortable now and will remain comi'qrtuble 'unless the new German submarine campaign is unexpectedly successful., ,_..■'.--- I have the best of opportunities of getting information about the food situation in Germany, that is a_s thorough j}s can be ffrocurrd^ and.is also impartial. What cannot be tolfy however, by aivv'body until the test comes, is the psychology of* the German people. That the distribution of food has failed in its object of equalising the burden is unmistakable*. I have already cabled that tf?e poor, being unable to buy the meat for which t'.ioy havp tickets, are selling their ment tickets to the rich.

You might naturally ask -why the tickets sire not so made out. that they can be used ,only by the persons to whom they are issue*!, instead of being usable by the holder,, as they actually are. The answer is that the attempt to control the ultimate destination of. the food is recognised as hopeless, and that it is believed, and rightly believed, that the result would be more demoralising if the transfer were more secret and attended with more risk.. If you stopped a man from selliiig his ticket, you could not stop him from jpplling the meat after he had obtained it.

The experience in Belgium has been exactly th« same. The more difficult is made the sale of food tickets, the ,worse has been the result. The sale has not. been decreased, but the demoralisation has been greater. The same, principle has applied to a larsre ■■■extent, both in Germany and in Belgium, to maximum prices. It is. inK 'possible to maintain them absolutely,but tiliev nan-be more nearly maintained when food tickets-are.transfer-vMo. IN ROUMAXIA. The Germans are hoiriug much froni the Roumanian harvest. They have rt-.ni one of th.o ablest 'men in tho Empire, a General from the Western {'rm;b. to Roumania, and under his cliroction-the plr.ntius has been of the very first order. They . have taken equally effective steps in Serbia. Nevertheless, it is extremely probable that even if they tide ever the time

1 .between now and September they will ; not be much more comfortable after ' the new crops come in than in the i meantime, because of the terrific t strain that they are under on account ■ of the. shortage in so many important | 'directions j If Germany feels' the way the South- | era States felt in the hist part of the ■ Civil War, it is the best opinion that ■ she can go on for two or three years, iby gradually retiring, and by being ! prepared to wear herself out com- ! pletely. If, however, her spirit is j different, and she would rather yield i as soon as her people are widely conI vinced that they are domed to defeat ] and in danger of prostration, then much thn most probable. time for * that, conviction is next summer or '•- autumn, if in the meantime the sub- ! marine campaign proves insufficient Ho make England anything like as un- | comfortable as Germany is. EFFECT OF SUFFERING AND

SACRIFICE.

! One of the restilts of warfare that ', have interested me most is the effect • of suffering and sacrifice on the heart , that- hears them, and here again we-* • come against the qualities'' of getting j| our quantities right 1' There was a i fivo in oue pi the factories in EngI land some time ago. It was not a j big fire, but the workers in the fae- '■ tory were naturally excited. One very old woman worked ahead, never I paying the slightest attention to the j cpinmotion. After it was over somej one spoke to her, and asked her if j she had not .knbwn there was a fire. ! She inclicated, in" bitter words that liave escaped my memory, that she had noticed it, but that it; could make no difference to her. She had lost'three sons—all her sons—and-she wnß doing her little bit towards manufacturing material to punish those (who had slain them. Blind hate was all that remained in her. A conflagration around her meant nothing. Life itself meant nothing, except revenge. : 1 told this story to one of the most distinguished men in contemporary literature, who himself had lost a son. . "No," was his .comment, '^that story is not fair; it is not those who have lost sous who hate the Germans. We feel trio deeply. We know that thjj Germans h::ve also lost sons. Hatre'cf is expressed by those-who sit around; the feasting table in the fashionable"; mstauraiits, not by those who reach •aown into the realities." I desired to believe this, _and carried it around with me. . A while later the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced that the British v colonies would keop the territories they had conquered. This was a startling speech- The Premiers of the colonies had already been invited to London to talk over all the large questions, iind Great Britain also was bound,;to talk them over with her Allies, when the time for making peace terms should come. So I tried to.find out what wits the explanation of this aberration. by Mr Long, and the prevailing explanation was that he had lost his son two days before. ; * A man who knows the personnel of the House of Commons perhaps as woll »s anybody in -it, told- me that the members who were 'most relentless ■ in their attitude towards peace terms and toward Germany were those whose ..sons had been killed.. I called his attention to the fact that Mr Asquith's son had-been killed. I have hoard Mr. AsquJth speak in the House since that loss and been struck with the gentleness of his voice and manner. ; ; "Mr Asquith,'- was the reply, "is .a bior mini It does not affect the big men fihafc. Wav,- but it does so affect , 'the large majbrity." ; I atri-not. bigoted "enough ts, think I 1 can answer this question, of whether pufferinp; the loss of those near to us more often softens or hardens the . heart, but I want to mention one case I know of—that of a man who was not. a pacifist before he lost his son, j and has become one since. . I "NATIONALITY." J A word that everybd:3y is using just now is the word "Nationality." We tiro sunj)o«ed to do evei-ything on na- ! tionalistic lines. That conception is put to the front in most of the great geographical and political changes j that the Allies plan. That', it is an, . extrenielv' important fact to consider I do hot' doubt, but like /other facts it cannot usefully: be considered alone, and it is easy to exaggerate it. v ; We know, for example that there is a great outburst of nationalistic feeling in Russia. We know that it is so strong, notably in the army-, that it keeps the country from going in / the direction of separate peace, and a150..? that it is the explanation of the vacillation in the Capitol about the composition of the Cabinet, the machine putting in one man after another because he is, or is supposed to be, sympathetic with their point of view,_ ■and then speedily throwing^.him "out because they are alarmed at the in- ; dignation caused in the nation by his inefficiency. : ; This increase of nationalism in Rus- .. sia is unmistakably 1 one of the biggest developments of the war, and yet it would be a great failure in imagination to conceive the Russian people sas being wholly made over in three

! years... ' 1 The year 1917 and probably the ; year 1918 are going to be spent in j making the world over. The task ! for any one country of carrying on i its share merely in conducting the I war, seenas superhuman. The task sof conducting the war and keeping j open one's mind' and heart is still ; more superhuman. In addition, we :l have the immense difficulties of ob- \ taming real knowledge. i , \ Against all these obstacles what I kind of a record is going to be made ;by the little race of man? Imperfect 'at the best. ,- .Better, let us hope, . because of our own" participation. ' At least all liberals over here believe it will be better because of us. Every day I feel overwhelmed by the bigness of the problems and the shortness of _ human vision, and yet every day, as I think of what will soon fall on a. few men, I still, cling to the belief that it is possible to make out of the settlement something good enough to pay for its cost. To realise all the difficulties and the imperfections of our information is not to be discouraged. It is to be prepared.