Manawatu Evening Standard. TUESDAY, SEPT. 17, 1929. BRITAIN’S FOREIGN POLICY

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLIX, Issue 247, 17 September 1929, Page 6

Manawatu Evening Standard. TUESDAY, SEPT. 17, 1929. BRITAIN’S FOREIGN POLICY

The one satisfactory feature of the British Labour Socialist Government’s foreign policy—the stand taken by Mr Philip Snowden on the reparations question as proposed for settlement by the Young Plan—has been sadly overset by its action in other directions, notably in the recall of Lord Lloyd from Egypt, the “cuts” in the British naval programme, and Mr Henderson’s efforts to re-establish diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Government at Moscow. In each of these three directions there has been a distinct lowering of British prestige abroad. Lord Lloyd’s recall from Egypt was a blunder of the first magnitude. His term of office as High Commissioner was marked by a peiiod of tranquillity, following the orgy of assassination which threatened to develop into civil war in Egypt, tacitly connived at by the Waitlists, the objective of which was the eviction of the British from Egypt and the Soudan.

Mr Henderson, on assuming office as Foreign Secretary, knowing* nothing of Egypt and having had no dealings with His Majesty’s representative in that country, seems to have taken exception to the outspoken opinions of Lord Lloyd, as contained in a dispatch received within a few days of his taking charge of the Foreign Office, and, early in July, he sent a telegram to Lord Lloyd, which he himself described as “of such a character that I think most people would have accepted it as an invitation to terminate their position.” He thus practically forced the High Commissioner’s resignation, as no man of honour holding the very responsible office that gentleman did- could have continued to accept instructions from a Minister so plainly out of sympathy with his policy. The debate on the subject, initiated by Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords on July 25, sufficiently disclosed Mr Henderson’s intentions, although it by no means satisfied the members of that Chamber of the wisdom of the new policy, which was to be introduced in Britain’s dealings with Egypt. It only elicited the vague statement that there had been proceedings which might have caused Lord Lloyd to feel that he was “out of harmony with the Government,” and dispatches were referred to from Sir A. Chamberlain, which Lord Parmoor was neither prepared to read out nor produce, suggesting

that Lord Lloyd was out of touch with the Foreign Office. The following day, however, Mr Baldwin, speaking in the House of Commons, reviewed Egyptian affairs since the critical period of 1922, and generously paid ,a tribute to the services rendered by the late High Commissioner, warning the Government that “terrible events had sometimes followed hasty conclusions, but if bloodshed comes the politicians always escape.” The dismissal of Lord Lloyd has been followed by tragedy in Palestine, where the racial war between the Arabs and the Jews may be regarded as one of the reactions that have followed the advent of the British Labour Government—a reaction which has lowered the prestige of Britain in the eyes of the outer world, and the seeds of which were sown in Egypt, where the agents of the Soviet are working insidiously for the overthrow of British authority. The man who had succeeded in re-establishing tranquillity in Egypt, and who remained the best authority on the questions arising out of British relationships with that country, appears to have been ignored in the “conversations” with Mahmoud Pasha, conducted behind his back.

Not less damaging to the peace of the Empire are the “cuts” made by Mr MacDonald in the already attenuated navy. Work on the 10,000 ton cruisers, Surrey and Northumberland, has been suspended, and a submarine depot ship and two submarines have been struck out of the programme, previously reduced by the Baldwin Government to meet the susceptibilities of President Hoover and his navy advisers. That Mr MacDonald has gone further in his “conversations” with Ambassador Dawes to placate America has been sufficiently indicated, but we now learn that there has been a hitch over the question of the cruisers —the same old trouble apparently as that which led to the failure of the Geneva Conference on naval disarmament. Here, again, there is evidence that concessions already made have given rise to the belief that further concessions can be made, and British interests may be expected to be sacrificed to those of socalled “naval parity,” and America’s big navy, the advocates of which are still busily engaged “educating public opinion” in the United States upon the necessity for America’s naval supremacy. On the third point, the restoration of diplomatic relationships with the Soviet, the insistence of the latter that such resumption shall be unconditional, would have deterred any sensible Foreign Secretary from continuing negotiations with a country ruled by a Communist Government, whose avowed purpose is the destruction of the British Empire, and which has declared implaeahle war upon all so-called capitalistic governments.