BIG BAY CRASH

Manawatu Standard, Volume LVII, Issue 208, 3 August 1937, Page 2

BIG BAY CRASH

3.45 P.M. EDITION

RESULT OF INQUIRY. RECOMMENDATIONS MADE. Per Press Association. WELLINGTON, Aug. 3. The conclusion that the Big Bay air tragedy of December 30 last year, when a passenger was killed and others injured was duo to llie negligence of the pilot, Mr A. J. Bradshaw, was reached by the hoard of inquiry appointed by the Government to investigate the circumstances. The board of inquiry recommends that no petrol other than that in approved petrol tanks ho carried in aircraft carrying passengers; that a direction l>e issued to -si 11 pilots making cross-country flights that they send a telephone, telegraph or wireless message to their destination notifying the expected time of arrival; also that they should leave a route card with a responsible officer at the home aerodrome ; that the provisions of section 18, part 2 of schedule 2 of the regulations governing aircraft employed oil a regular line of service of public air transport be extended to include a provision for the certification by the pilot that the load is suitably secured ; that aero clubs and companies owning or hiring aircraft he advised that thev should appoint some person who will be responsible for notifying tlie Controller of Civil Aviation of accidents to their aircraft. The report says : Mr Bradshaw was issued a commercial pilot’s license i.n June, 1934. He arranged to take, with himself as pilot, four passengers from the Myross Bush aerodrome to Wailio Gorge. A party of trampers was at Big Bay and one of the four passengers was to be landed there to join th's party. When about to land the machine stalled and fell into the sea 75 or 100 yards from the shore. There was no telephone in or about Big Bay and it was impossible for him to get exact information as to the landing conditions, hut he had flown over the dividing ranges that morning and had observed that the weather conditions on that portion of the West Coast were satisfactory. The pilot said the beach was well known to him and, when not carrying passengers for hire, he had landed there 12 or 18 times. The report said that according to tlie evidence the machine was overloaded 151 b. 2oz. as to passengers and 301 h. 2oz. as to commercial load when it took off. and by the time it had reached Big Bay this would have been reduced by approximately 93H0--petrol and 3ilh. of oil. . Mr Bradshaw did not actually weigh his passengers. He gave instructions that they were to weigh themselves before arriving at the aerodrome. He said that one gave his weight at 10.7, whereas three weeks before he was 12-2. The pilot also had a loose four-gallon drum of petrol weighing about o6lb. The report, dealing with the actual approach to the landing at Bi<; Bay, finds that the machine stalled through insufficient speed, and finds also that the pilot’s practice of a low-speed glideapproach with the use of a little engine power to the landing left a small safety margin. Even assuming, as the pilot thought, that the air speed indicator developed a fault, an experienced airman knew by his air sense when the speed was such, as if not increased, a stall would occur. The hoard is satisfied on the evidence that there was no failure of the indicator. The aero club’s pilot instructor, Mr Smith, gave 80 m.p.h. as the minimum safe air speed and Mr Bradshaw admitted that he was instructed by Mr Smith, who had trained him, that with a load of 4201 b lie was to glide in at 70 to 75 m.p.h. The pilot said that the indicator gave 70 at the time of the tragedy, but, taking into consideration the rapid deceleration of the ’plane and tlie lag of tlie air speed indicator, it would be quite normal for the actual speed to be 65 when the indicator was showing 70. Mr Smith said that in the machine concerned he always approached landings by means of a glide without using the engine and he so instructed his trainees. Mr Bradshaw, on the other hand, used little engine power and reduced the gliding speed. He admitted that, in approaching, this machine “squashed” and was therefore \n a nartiaily stalled condition. This method always had been looked on with d'sfTivour l>y experienced pilots in smgle-en-gined machines. Allien .at the critical time approaching Bi" Bay. there was evidence of the machine being in a stalled condition. There would be a tendency to spin through having a little engine on. The pilot at this stage misused the controls bv easing the stick back a fraction. The effect would be to force the machine into and maintain a spin. .-iii In the board's opinion it bad b.en possible to avoid a. sniii or even to correct, a developed spin it the pilot had taken the correct action immediately, i.e., stick forward and fu’l tlirottl“. . ... The report says Hint to comp v with the requirement? the should £ taken up onlv three passenger* I hat morning, also, he had landed at Aly-oss Bush with four passengers and Imtl noticed that the machine did not behave well, but lie forgot about the incident till after the accident. the incident should, however, have warnet. him that when gliding in be should increase the margin of safety. He had failed to exercise that care and skill which the circumstances demanded. , „ , , • Because this was the first tornial inquirv into an air accident, because the pilot was liable to pay £BOO, the value of the machine, because he was incapacitated for a length period through injuries and because. . although seriously injured and suffering much pain he liy almost superhuman efforts, had brought the three pas Ecnpers ashore and so probably saved their lives, no order was made against Mr Bradshaw for payment of costs. It was also recommended that Ins license be not cancelled, but that it be en dnrsed with the material particulars of the accident. The view was expressed that in tlie future be should pay more regard to the opinions of more experienced pilots, conform to the regulations and directions and provide a larger margin of safety in his flights.