UNUSUAL ACTION

Manawatu Standard, Volume LVII, Issue 209, 4 August 1937, Page 2

UNUSUAL ACTION

LAW REFORM ACT CASE. SEQUEL TO COLLISION. Peculiar circumstances were 6een in the Supreme Court yesterday afternoon, when a case was heard in which the plaintiff’s claim had been cancelled by a decision in another case immediately preceding it. However, a I counter-claim proceeded. Whereas the plaintiff had originally been the principal party, events made him the defendant. In the first case an action was before the Court, His Honour, the Chief Justice, Sir Michael Myers, being on the Bench, in which a girl of 17, a pillion rider on a motor cycle, took proceedings against the driver of a car for damages following a collision last Christmas Day. The driver of the car, acting under the provisions of the Law Reform Act. 1936, a. measure which was passed by Parliament in its last session, then proceeded against the rider of the motor cycle, alleging negligence and seeking a complete indemnity for any amount on which he was adjudged liable. Previously the law' allowed the pillion rider to take action against the oar driver and, securing satisfaction in that action, leave the rider of the cycle free of liability, even though he might have been just as responsible for the collision as the car driver. Under the Law Reform Act it is now possible in such cases to join the other party if the Court deems it justifiable. In yesterday’s second action, that taken under the Law Reform Act, the rider of the motor cycle counter-claim-ed to the indemnity claim, seeking the sum of £lO4 os 6d as damages (£oO being general damages), but the jury on returning their verdict.in the fiist case found for defendant. That absolved the car driver from liability, so his claim for indemnify was not required. • , , c Eric Phillip Tapp, a cycle dealer, of Wellington, was the person seeking the indemnity in the event of the decision going against him in the pillion l'ldei s claim, and his counsel, Mr G. R. 1 owles, of Wellington, accordingly advised His Honour on the return of the jury of the relinquishing of the claim for indemnity, there being no need for it. The other party, the rider of the motor cycle, wa6 Janies McGill, a joiner’s apprentice, of Palmerston North, and Mr T. F. lie lmg, acting for him, said that he felt that, in justice to his client, lie should proceed with his claim for the £lO4 os od. The evidence of the former case was admitted, the driver of the car again cross-examined, the rider of the moto cycle recalled for further evidence, and other evidence called to substantiate his claim for loss of wages. After argument had been presented. His Honour said that if it was at all reasonable to find for plaintiff, juries did so, likewise .Judges. If they found for defendant, then they must have a good reason for doing ,so. lhe jury ill the intinl case had not had any undue persuasion from him to find as they had done. He could not help feeling personally that the jury must have felt that the collision had been the fault of the motor cyclist. Mr Relling: Personally, I cannot see how they arrived at their decision. It is mv opinion that the car driver did riot keep a proper lookout. His Honour: I am satisfied that the cyclist did not either, when it conies to expressing my own personal opinion. If I thought the jury were wrong 1 would not hesitate to say so. I am not prepared to say so. The onus is on you to prove negligence on the part of the car driver. T Mr Relling: I do not see how 1 can take it further. His Honour: You certainly cannot. It would have been much more satisfactory- if tile pillion rider had sued both parties. She did not want to do that, because she wanted to exculpate the driver of the motor cycle. It would he quite contrary to my experience, and of every other Judge, in a ense of this kind, to find for defendant, (the car driver) unless I conscientiously felt bound to do so on the evidence. Judgment was entered for the car driver, thus cancelling the second claim against him. '