SINISTER AIMS OF THE BAGDAD RAILWAY.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XL, Issue 12538, 8 May 1915, Page 3 (Supplement)

SINISTER AIMS OF THE BAGDAD RAILWAY.

(Dy Frederick A. Talbot.)'-

In his dreams of world conquest tl

German Emperor has been likened to ■the Great Napoleon. While in many instances the comparison is exaggerated and irrelevant, in others it is uncannily precise. Napoleon planned the capture of Egypt and India ; the Teutonic War Lord has cherished similar amotions, and his contemplated means to"_ this end reveal German intrigue, chicanery, and preparation long in advance, so as to be ii\ full readiness for "The Day." . .No other force lias i>layod such an important role in the opening up of a country, -its. development and colonisation, as thin-- railway. One has only to : reflect upon the wonderful changes that have been wrought in the Western United States, Canada, Australia, South America, China, and India during the past half-century to realise : the potential influence of this bond of steel. Under these circumstances no power is so warmly welcomed or co steadfastly supported as the railway. But there are occasions when a marked hesitancy in fathering an enterprise of this' character is displayed by those controlling the sinews of war. Such' an attitude was assumed "hen Briti-h interests as far back.as 1857 recommended the construction of a railway front the Mediterranean seaboard, across the breadth of Asia Minor to the Persian Guf, and possibly on to India. 'Thfe rosy picture painted by the advocates of the scheme left the financiers unmoved. A'cursory examination of the map revealed the salient fact that such a line would be merely a carrying channel between the extreme points: the possibilities of gaining ■•iipplementary business from the country traversed were uncertain and remote: while construction.' even if carried out upon the cheapest Sines, such .as coincides with a pioneer road, would entail heavy expenditure. Private enterprise refusing to be drawn. Government co-operation was .sought, .but though the promoters and others strove hard, the Government showed an even more icy .indifference to the.proposal than the financiers. This official lethargy at the moment was assailed bitterly. It was pointed out that, the railway would shorten the route to India and accelerate and cheapen, movement -between this, country and our Eastern "Empires, because at that time steamship traffic either had to be maintained via the Cape, or had to be : broken in favor of an overland journey between Port Said and Suez.

When : the Suez Canal was completed the last-named argument fell to the ground, and a further reason for the fulfilment of the scheme had to be created. Now the necessity of developing tlie\trade of the Persian Gulf became the slogan, but it did not prove any more effective. Turkey, with whom we were then on fairly friendly terms, favored tho .'-cheme, and. in order to drive home the narona! importance of such a line, the promoters brought forward an argument -which was sufficient to k'H it. They maintained that with such a road we should he able .to i-.onr troops and material in a steady, . continuous stream into India- whenever necessity arose. But sueh a possibility rested upon: our maintaining good relations with the unstable Turk!

When the German Empire began to oast- about for a place in the sun, covetous eyes, were turned towards the Near East. British prestige was falling in Turkey; and- Germany, waiting to profit from any political difference, established herself in Constantinople and sedulously set to work to cultivate Ottoman friend-ship and- esteem. At first it was a severe struggle, but being -c customed to rebuffs, she was content to watch and bide her time, being satisfied to sow the seeds, confident that ;n. time they would mature. Tn this anticipation the Teuton w.i= not disappointed. The Turk transferred his affections from Britain :n his new friend. Good relations wet': estblished- with Germany, who revived the- Asia Minor railway scheme, nursed <o long and so carefully by Turkey during: and after their effort to coax GreatBritain' into co-operation. Germany cunningly advanced -powerful economic and commercial reason? for the fulfilment of the scheme without delay. Tt would bring Constantinople into direct touch with the decayed provinces of Mesopotamia, where a new era of prosperity was certain to dawn when the railway was- laid down.

It was a tempting bait, and the Ottoman Government snapped at it oager3y; A German survey ?arty was despatched, and made a preliminary in : .spectlon of" the country. The actuai report the surveyors made has never been; revealed. An ostensible report was published, but it was never credited. The encineers of other countries had. gdne with the level and compass through the self-same territory, and athev possessed just as keen and •trained an. eve for a railway as that of the German engineers, the published communication was regarded with dubiety. ■

However, the report succeeded in its p vowed object: it appealed to the Turks, whose knowledge of railway- engineering was peculiar. But there arose a- formidable objection to the proposal. Great Britain opposed the scheme tooth and nail, nnd the ■Germans speedily recognised tint they had stjired -a hornet's nest in the political world. The Bagdad railway'became a matter of acute political controversy, and to this day has never been settled. Germanv .strove to placate ruffled Br:listi feelings, but with small success. Inwardlv the wily Teuton knew fu'l well the reasons for Britain's objection, bnt displayed an air of injured jnnccetice. After considerable hs> rnnp.ua ng between the Embassies the nulwav was cornincnced. The scheme was divided into three broad Mct'ons. The first stretched from the Mediterranean seaboard to Bulsmrlu, the second through the Tamils Mountains, which was admitted to be the most difficult and expensive link in the chain, ."'id the third to the objective upon the Euphrates. As events proved, the German na-i-'oYI was no more inclined than the British .financiers to provide A?ia Mino; with'railway facilities for the benefit or Turkey\at Teuton expense. So the Ottoman Government was persuaded: to <nibsMise construction and was mulcted in a kilomotric guarantee wlych was more than adequate to build .-noli a railway as would meet the requirements of the country. Accord ins to the financial arrangements which were laid dofrn. Great Britain, as well m other countries, were to participate in: the capitalisation and direction ■ ' the xailwav comnauy : but when, after searcfcmg analysis., it was found that Germanv was able to assume the nos:tion of dictator in its- affairs, and that the comnanv was in renlity a one-man show, represented by Germany. British | financiers decided to hold alcof. Germanv outwardly appeared to be liiV»nselv 'aggrieved at this attitude, but inwardlv it was .in exact accord with • Get-man peliev. The celenty with which, the requisite funds were announced as -beintr available pointed conclusivelv to the fact that she had_ been desirin"- and everr striviii'7 towards the withdrawal of British assistance, whici would have int-ei'fered wrrh- her own well-laid olans. The outcome wa« that Germanv undertook to build >;ne and to own it for a period o< •vecirs—no doubt the l=asj\ would .have 'ne«; converted into a freehckl within a short?.time bv some diplomatic incident —but.' Turkey footed the bill, though ff-iW to realise tire extent ot her commitments at the time. The first .section of the hue ws rrrmed to~traffic man<- yearsago, enabling trains to "ass from Constantinople' as far cs Bulirurin. where the track came to an'end. But the line was cmnleled no to the uttermost ffiTiit of tb<> section, so that Germany coTL-oliod with *-.''o strict letter, of he:nhdVtakin?. The standard of constrnctlr rniin.»diatelv aroused suspicions. Had it bren built by private interest? even with a legitimate state subsidy, the- construct'-on would have h c en carried cjit oil different lines ._ A n'ioheer- road. such tho«" loid into new and dond -.ie-iT-itarv in North Ame'•ica »nd otW would have been lui't. Such \i>. Tine -is flimsy, being built with the rninimi'TH of expense, while the rout- follows the pnth of least "resistance ar-d is" of li-dit <les'pn witn the rails and fleepers just -holding together sufficientlv to permit a train to pass at slow sueed. Commercial exigencies demand such a low standard ■of construction, It suffices for imme-

d'iate needs and- Tends itself to overhaul and improvement to meet the growing traffic. All big roads through new territories have been built upon these lines and in the case of Asia Minor the ieasoir- for such methods were the more ■emphatic. Travellers have described the Bagdad line as being a crazy road, but this is due to lack of knowledge. The line appears to be a pioneer, but those with an experienced eye can detect otherwise. The flimsincss is apparent., not real. If the need to bring the line up to date arose, .such work could be completed within a very short space of time. The line was Jaid in accordance with plans long considered by the Ger- j man Government; the appearance of bad construction was necessary to dis-

arm suspicion. Adequate proof of this fact was forthcoming. Upon a x>ioneer road tho financial expenditure upon sta-

tions is reduced to tho very lowest figure: invariably the building at this point comprises a mere shed. But upon tho Bagdad line the stations were of

substantial design, wrought in stone, and impressive as well as spacious. To prove that the commercial outlook of the road was no adequate reason for ■its construction, and that it would not pay for axle-grease for several decades to come, it is merely necessary to

point out that the average revenue from traffic upon the first section did not exceed £IO,OOO per year, while maintenance expenses ran away with a round sum of .-£25,000 annually.- Then Turkey had to find a matter of" £BB,OOO per annum to defray the interest upon I the loan which was raised as capital for construction. Altogether the unlucky Ottoman had to pay away about £IIO.OOO per year for participation in the Bagdad, railway, so that to him the line was certainly an expensive luxury. When Bulgurlu was reached construction was suspended, and some years elapsed before the issue was revitalised. Meanwhile another important railway development occurred. The Sultan was struck by a brain-wave. The unfortunate subjects making the

holy pilgrimage to the birthplace of the Prophet, and who were compelled to traverse the length of Lonely Palestine to fulfil their ambitions, were exposed to clangers untold, sufferings indescribable, and often to death. Marauding" Bedouins held up the caravans unless they were, strongly escorted, waylaid sm;ll parties, and looted individual travellers. The Faithful must he protected, urged the Sultan.; the pilgrimage must he made in safety, comfort, and with speed. What else but a- railway would meet the circumstances so completely ? But the Treasury was empty and railways cost money. Then another bold idea assailed him. The Faithful should subscribe to build a Holy Railway. He !called upon Mohammedans throughout the world to support the Grand Idea, and within a very short time sufficient money was available to complete the. -cheme. The line was to stretch from Damascus southwards through Palestine to Mecca, and then on to the Red Sea. The selection of Damascus as the northern terminus appeared to be somewhat inexplicable, as it was a dead end, notwithstanding the importance of tho city. But at that time a railway ran

from Beirut northwards to Aleppo. Junction could be effected therewith. By continuing the Beirut-Aleppo railway some thirty miles northwards to ICillis the route of the Bagdad Railway could be tapped. This left a gap of some 200 miles of the latter line botwee Killis and Bulgurlu. The completion of this link would ensure through railway communication between Con-

stantinople and the Red Sea.. The Hedjaz Railway, as the line running from Damascus to Mecca and on to the Red Sea is called, was a magnificent conception, but at this date it is ssrfe to assert that both the great idea and the method of raising the money were inspired. In its suggested form the project appeared to be absolutely innocent- of any strategical or diplomatic significance, but a little investigation revealed the fact that the projectwas open to considerable criticism. The location of the line in itself was suspicious. One would have thought that such a line would have been carried

through the settled portions of Pakltine, linking up the various towns and existing sections, of the country. But

it was not so. The location was well to the east of the Jordan and the Dead Sea, and for the most part ran through unprofitable country. Facility of "construction was offered as the explanation to this decision. /The work was taken in hand and. contrary to general expectations, was pursued with lemarkable energy, being completed in almost record time.

The construction of this railway served to offer a convincing reason for oroceeding with the original Bagdad Railway. The Taurus Mountains had been responsible for the suspension of the railway advance to the banks of the Euphrates. They certainly offer ■■: serious physical obstruction, and even the German engineers admitted that construction through this range mwt be slow, exasperating, and expensive. L'ut Teuton persuasion overcame Ottoman objections, ami to such effect that an increased subvention per mile t.'ireugh this obstruction was obtained. The German company urged that once the line was pushed forward as far as Killis revenue traffic would rise rapidly, as there would be the heavy pilgrimage, business to swell the coffers of the company. Pilgrims would b? able to proceed by rail from Turkey direct to Mecca, ami would prefer the all-rail route to the steamship journey to Bei-

rut or Haifa, whence a branch line had been run through the mountains to connect with the Hedjaz Railway at Deraar. The argument was so logical ami attractive a« to be irresistible, and forthwith Turkey approved cf continuing the Bagdad" Railway, especially as Germany undertook to push forward in an easterly direction from Killis to Bagdad sinui'ltaneously with the Taurus Mountain section, as constructional material could be sent up country from both Beirut and Haifa over the .Syrian railwav via A!c_ - j.

At this date it is possible to obtain a. more convincing perspective of Teuton cunning and i;:irip:iie. The Hedjaz railway yeas .-■•■ceasibly the Sultan's idea, but th" ; ,no doubt, bearing in

mind Abdul .-.umid's extreme incapacity and rapacity, that while his was the voice, Germany was the instigator. livorything points to such a conclusion. One has only to recall the characteristic Ottoniai: dlkitoriness and graft to realise that Teuton influence must have been the power behind the throne. Every penny subscribed towards * the Hedj'az railway was devoted to the cause, and the line was carried through at high messure from beginning to end. It is'evident that a. powerful organisation and financial power must have been' behind the scheme: the Turks never could have achieved such a performance upon their own initiative. Nor is this all. The Hedjaz Railwaywas built bv Germany. A German engineer ran the survey, located the line, doubtless in accordance with Imperial wishes, and with a German staff supervised construction. Every ounce of the necessary material was purchased from German "firms and there were no invitations to tender! The bridges - were built to German specifications, while the rolling Stock and the. whole of the equipment hailed from the Fatherland. Upon the completion of the Holy Railway Meissner Pasha, who had supervised the whole enterprise and is admittedly mi accomplished railway constructional engineer, was dispatched northward? without delay, and entrusted with the wrestle with Nature among the Taurus Mountains, while he was enjoined from high circles to push forward with this line with the same energy as had characterised his work upon the Holy Railroad. There is. anotner incident which is worthy of mention and which throws an interesting sidelight upon-Imperial machinations. It was- admitted that the railwav from Killis to Bagdad could he completed in far less time than that through the Taurus range to Bulgurlu. In order to facilitate the movement of traffic between the interrupted railheads. Meissner Pasha was commanded to overhaul the read through the mountain pass. It would serve as a- linkbetween the advancing railheads while the tunnels were under way, and would enable material ia ' lie transported for the inter veil big sections of the line. In vie>v of the fact that- railway contractors invariablv lav down such roads to facilitate their work this was'u perfectly harmless suggestion upon the face of it'. But when contractors carry out such a preliminary. the expense thereon is reduced to the minimum. As the i'Ofld merely has to serve their own

ends and falls into desuetude when the railway is completed, it exists more in iinine- than reality, it is a rough track with steep grades and sharp curves, the path ot" least resistance again being selected.- But the highroad through the Taurus range i.-, no contractors' highway. It- is well built, of great width, with easy grades and curves* and is capable of carrying the very heaviest traffic conceivable. The standard of construction upon

tho later sections of the Bagdad, Syrian, and Hediaz Railways is very much higher than that of tho first section of the first-named line. The permanent way is heavily ballasted, while f'.tpel sleepers and the heaviest metals for the gauge are used.. The bridges are equally substantial, 'being either wrought in masonry or in steel. Such .structure:-; would scarcely be installed upon a new road if it complied; with pioneer conditions. As a matter of fact the lines have been buiit so as to carry the heaviest traffic at a high speed. Moreover, upon the Hedjaa Railway tho railway stations are o; impressive, masonry construction-and fitted with every convenience, while at regular intervals and strategical points the station buildings are supplemented by imposing blockhouses This latter provision was made, it is said, to offer resistance to the- marauding Bedouins and Arabs, but .seeing that the latter are armed with .antiquated rifles and possess no artillery, it- is somewhat difficult to recognise such solid defences with the explanation, seeing that sandbag ramparts hurriedly thrown up would be sufficiently effective, while the station buildings themselves would be adequate against native attack. At intervals along the railway extensive siding facilities are provided—quite out of proportion to any peaceful traffic which the line may be called upon to carry. This is -particularly the case at Ma'an, which is near the borders of the Sinai peninsula- and from which point, it may be mentioned, the caravan route extends westwards to Egypt. It was Ma'an which was selected as the jump-, ing-off point for the ill-stani d Turkish expedition for the invasion of Egypt, and in tho light of these events the reason for laying out the elaborate sidings •at Ma'an station is obvious. Furthermore it was stated that the Turks were engaged in running a light military railway from Ma'an towards the Egyptian frontier. No matter from what point of view Teuton railway building activity in Asia Minor is regarded, military necessities dominate every other consideration. Everything points to the fact that the lines have been laid down more for the movement o: troops than the conveyance of harmless pilgrims or commercial trains. The very location of the Hedjaz Railway is suspicions.. It is comparatively safe from hostile attack.' If ah attempt, were made to cut this line of communications the conquest of Palestine would be the firsf essential, while the invading force would be faced, with a long march through difficultcountry to consummate its end. Undoubtedly the "Day" has dawned somewhat previously for Teuton machinations. Had the Taurus Mountains link in the Bagdad Railway been completed Germany would have held a stronger position. Munitions, troops, guns, and supply could have been sent direct from Berlin to strategical points in Asia Minor, and when one recollects how skilled Germany is in the utilisation of railways in connection with military tactics, as has been revealed in Europe, it will be seen that a through direct line to the Euphrates in touch with the European railways would'have proved invaluable, and would have rendered the invasion of Egypt a simpler matter than it has proved under present conditions. The road through the Taurus chain has proved the weakest link: movement over this break is slow and difficult. A blockade of the coast of Asia M:

_.: nor would have been somewhat difficult inasmuch as tho railway system, had it been completed, would have had outlets at Smyrna, Morsin, Beirut, and Haifa as wolf as on the Red Sea. The movement of i'orees would have been tolerably easv. concentration at different points bring readily feasible. Again it would have-"facilitated the TurkoGerman occupation of Bagdad and the command of tho Euphrates as far as Basra, while, if the conquest <of Egypt had not beon actually attempted, a sufficient force could hare been concentrated upon the Persian Gulf to have compelled a change in the British plan of campaign, and the retention of adequate forces in India to be ready for any emergency.

There is no doubt that Germany in her wiliness w ; k counting upon the supineness of Britain. Upon the completion of the Hed.iaz Railway, the construction of a line from India to Egyptwas advocated very strenuously in certain quartern. The route of this projected road was planned from a junction upon the Egyptian system through Ismailia to Ma'an. there effecting a junction with the Hediaz Railway, and then cutting across country to Basra, and on to the Indian frontier. When the project was advanced Turkey supported it whole-lieartediv, no doubt at the instigation of her Teuton masters, but fortunately for the British Empire, the- authorities regarded the scheme with indifference if thev did riot actually kill it. Had such a line been in existence to-dav. the safety of Egypt and India would have been imperilled to a degree which it is. impossible to realise. The seizure of the last-named line would have been an immediate corollary to the declaration of hostilities, and the invasion of both India and Effvpt would have become a certainty. No matter from what aspect the railway programme of Turkey in Asia Minor is considered, the military value overshadows all other considerations. The network is too complete and the country traversed is so unremunerative that commercial arguments cannot prevail. These railroads were constructed with ulterior motives, and were undoubtedly aimed against British interests:. It is a fortunate circumstance that we have possessed Governments who were able to see through GermanOttoman cunning. As events are proceeding there is every evidence that the control c: these railways will pass out of tlie hands to which they at present belong,, and will then be turned to the purposes 'for which they'.were ostensibly designed—the facilitating of commercial intercourse and the development of settlement and industry.