PROPOSALS FOR A PACT OF SECURITY (PAPERS RESPECTING THE) MADE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON THE 9th FEBRUARY, 1925. Note.—Translations of the German and French Versions are printed.

Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1925 Session I, A-05d

A.—6d

1925. NEW ZEALAND

PROPOSALS FOR A PACT OF SECURITY (PAPERS RESPECTING THE) MADE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON THE 9th FEBRUARY, 1925. Note. —Translations of the German and French Versions are printed.

Laid on the Table of the House of Representatives by Leave.

Papers respecting the Proposals for a Pact of Security made by the German Government on the £th February, 1925. No. 1. Memorandum communicated on February 9, 1925, by the German Ambassador in Paris to M. Herriot, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Strictly confidential.) In considering the various forms which a pact of security might at present take, one could proceed from an idea cognate to that from which the proposal made in December, 1922, by Dr. Cuno sprang. Germany could, for example, declare her acceptance of a pact by virtue of which the Powers interested in the Rhine —above all, England, France, Italy, and Germany—entered into a solemn obligation for a lengthy period (to be eventually defined more specifically) vis-a-vis the Government of the United States of America as trustee not to wage war against a contracting State. A comprehensive arbitration treaty, such as has been concluded in recent years between different European countries, could be amalgamated with such a pact. Germany is also prepared to conclude analogous arbitration treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of juridicial and political conflicts with all other States as well. Furthermore, a pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status (" gegenwartiger Besitzstand ") on the Rhine would also be acceptable to Germany. The purport of such a pact could be, for instance, that the interested States bound themselves reciprocally to observe the inviolability of the present territorial status on the Rhine ; that they furthermore, both jointly and individually (" conjointement et, separement ") guaranteed the fulfilment of this obligation ; and, finally, that they would regard any action running counter to the said obligation as affecting them jointly and individually. In the same sense, the treaty States could guarantee in this pact the fulfilment of the obligation to demilitarise the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken in articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. Again, arbitration agreements of the kind defined above between Germany and all those States which were ready on their side to accept such agreements could be combined with such a pact. To the examples set out above still other possibilities of solution could be linked. Furthermore, the ideas on which these examples are based could be combined in different ways. Again, it would be worth considering whether it would not be advisable to so draft the security pact that it would prepare the way for a world convention to include all States along the lines of the " Protocole pour le Reglement pacifique de Differends internationaux " drawn up by the League of Nations, and that, in case such a world convention was achieved, it could be absorbed by it or worked into it.

No. 2. Memorandum handed by the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ilerr von Hoesch, German Ambassador in Paris, on February 20, 1925. The memorandum communicated to the French Government on the 9th February by His Excellency the German Ambassador has been examined by them with interest and with a determination not to

I—A. sd.

A.—si>

neglect anything which may contribute to European and world peace. The German Government will understand that the examination of these suggestions cannot be continued until France has submitted them to her Allies and has come to an agreement with them for the establishment of a system of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles. Paris, February 20, 1925. \

No. 3. The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. —(Received May 14.) Sir, —■- Paris, May 13, 1925. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the draft note proposed to be sent by the French Government to the German Government in reply to the latter's memorandum of the 9th February. In forwarding this document to me, the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated that M. de Fleuriau had been instructed to hand a copy of it to you. I have, &c., Crewe. Draft Reply to the German Memorandum. As they have informed the German Government in their note of the 20th February last, the French Government have studied, in common with their allies, the suggestions contained in the memorandum forwarded to them on the 9th February by his Excellency M. von Hoesch. The French Government and their allies regard the step taken by the German Government as an earnest of pacific intentions which agree with their own. Wishing to give to all the States concerned supplementary guarantees of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, they have examined the German proposals with all the attention that they merit in order to judge what elements they may afford for the consolidation of peace. Before embarking, however, on an examination in detail of the German note, it has appeared desirable to set out clearly the questions which it raises, or may raise, and on which it is important to know the views of the German Government because a preliminary agreement concerning them appears to be the necessary basis for any future negotiations : — I. The memorandum only mentions incidentally the League of Nations. Now the Allied States are members of the League of Nations and are bound by the Covenant of the League, which involves for them clearly defined rights and obligations with the object of maintaining general peace. The German proposals no doubt lay claim to the same ideal, but no agreement could be achieved unless Germany on her side assumes the obligations and enjoys the rights laid down in the covenant of the League. This agreement, then, can only be conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations under the conditions laid down in the note from the Council of the League of Nations, dated the 13th March, 1925. 11. The search for the guarantees of security which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the peace treaties. The agreements to be concluded ought not, therefore, either to imply a revision of these treaties or to result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses. Thus the Allies cannot , in any case give up the right to oppose any failure to observe the stipulations of these treaties, even if the stipulations in question do not directly concern them. 111. The memorandum of the 9th February contemplates first of all the conclusion between the " Powers interested in the Rhine " of a pact which might be inspired by the following principles :— (1.) Repudiation of all idea of war between the contracting States. (2.) Strict respect for the existing territorial situation in the Rhineland, with a joint and several guarantee by the contracting States. (3.) A guarantee by the contracting.States of.the execution of the obligations concerning the demilitarisation of the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken under articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. The French Government do not fail to appreciate the value to the cause of peace, side by side with a renewed affirmation of the principles inscribed in the Treaty [of Versailles], of a solemn repudiation of all idea of war (an undertaking which, moreover, ought not to contain any time-limit) between the contracting States. Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly named in the German memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested.

2

A.—sd

It also goes without saying, and further results from the silence on this point of the German memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement. IV. The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States, parties to the Rhineland pact, arbitration treaties guaranteeing " a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts." France considers that such arbitration treaties would be the natural complement of a Rhineland pact. But it must be understood that they should apply to all disputes of whatever nature, and should not leave room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated in the present note. To give full effect to these treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers who participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland pact. Y. In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind. The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the object aimed at by the pact could not be attained nor the peace of Europe completely guaranteed. The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves. The arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in paragraph IV and would be backed by the same joint and several guarantee. VI. In the opinion of the French Government the general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be effectively assured unless the agreements contemplated in the present note form an indivisible whole. They consider therefore that all the agreements, the observance of which should in each case be guaranteed by the signature of the same Powers, ought to be co-ordinated in a general convention registered by the League of Nations, placed under the auspices of the League and capable of forming, as suggested in the German memorandum itself, the nucleus of a "still more general pacific entente. Finally, it goes without saying that if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realised, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security. Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government. The Allied Governments would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace. May 12, 1925.

No. 4. Memorandum communicated informally by Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the French Ambassador on May 19, 1925, regarding certain Points in the French Draft Note of May 12, 1925, on the subject of Security. Mr. Chamberlain is indebted to M, de Fleuriau for the explanations of the French draft of the 12th May which he was so good as to furnish to the Foreign Office on the 18th May. These explanations answer the various points which Mr. Chamberlain raised verbally with M. de Fleuriau on the 14th May on his first cursory perusal of the French draft. Whilst these explanations go far to clear up the particular points mentioned by Mr. Chamberlain, there are certain others suggested by a further study of the draft regarding which he is uncertain what exactly is in the mind of the French Government. In order, therefore, that the British Cabinet may be in a position to accord to the French draft that prompt and careful study which so important a document demands. Mr. Chamberlain takes advantage of M. de Fleuriau's offer to supply any further explanations that might be needed in order to elucidate these further points which are set forth briefly below. Before passing to an enumeration of these points, Mr. Chamberlain would like to emphasise, and M. de Fleuriau will naturally appreciate, that the present informal communication is made solely with the object of securing supplementary information for his use in explaining the project to the British Cabinet. It must of course not be taken as in any sense a reply to, or final comment upon, the French draft of the 12th May ; it does not pretend to deal with the questions of principle embodied in that draft, as to which the British Cabinet can naturally express no reasoned opinion until they have fully grasped the exact purport of the French proposals.

3

A. —5d

The further specific points on which some additional elucidation would be of assistance are, then, the following : — (1.) The present draft, though in the form of a note from the French Government to the German Government, is so couched as to commit the Allied Governments concerned as a whole to the proposals which it contains. Is it the intention of the French Government that the note shall be an expression of the views of the French Government alone ? Or, as the present text infers, a communication to the German Government from the French Government, acting in concert with and in the name of the interested Allies ? The answer to the above question must largely determine the angle from which His Majesty's Government approacli and eventually comment on the document. (2.) The third paragraph of the preamble refers to the desire of the Allies to give to the interested States supplementary guarantees of security " within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles." It is doubtful what exactly this phrase means ; is it not, for example, perhaps a little misleading when applied to a proposal which, as His Majesty's Government understand it, is to be put forward as supplementary to and outside the existing framework of the Treaty of Versailles ? It is presumably the intention of the French Government that the proposed pact shall not in any way weaken or infringe the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. But the phrase is not free from ambiguity, and Mr. Chamberlain would be grateful for such explanations as can be given him. (3.) The meaning of paragraphs 2 and 3of Section II is distinctly obscure. For example, it is expressly stipulated in Section 111 that the pact shall not affect the clauses of the treat} 7 concerning the Rhineland occupation or the execution of the provisions of the Rhineland Agreement; it is not understood what other provisions of the Treaty of Versailles the French Government can have in mind under Section 11. It would be of assistance to learn what precise object the wording of Section II has in view, and what danger it is designed to avoid. (4.) Mr. Chamberlain notes that the French Government welcome the suggestion of treaties of arbitration guaranteeing the peaceful settlement of juridical and political disputes. But what exactly do the French Government understand by the term " arbitration " in this respect ? Is it contemplated that there shall be a settlement of a judicial nature in every case to the exclusion, for instance, of the procedure of settlement by the Council laid down by the Covenant of the League of Nations ? Or do the French Government include " conciliation " in the general term " arbitration " used in their draft ? (5.) The French draft contains the phrase that the arbitration treaties " should leave no room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated "in their note of the 12th May. But even in the latter case the French Government can hardly contemplate actual coercive action without a preliminary reference to some procedure for peaceful settlement, such, for example, as the Council of the League of Nations, in accordance with the general provisions of the Covenant 1 This is an important point, and one on which Mr. Chamberlain would be more particularly grateful for further information. (6.) What exactly is.meant by the phrase " the joint and several guarantee " which, under the French draft, is to be given to the contemplated arbitration treaties ? What actual obligation would devolve upon the guarantor ? This is a point on which His Majesty's Government are in great doubt as to what is intended. Does such a guarantee involve an obligation on the guarantors to resort to force, and, if so, in what circumstances ? (7.) Again, the exact import of the reference in paragraph 3 of Section V to the existing rights and obligations of the Allied Powers under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties of peace is not clear, and a more precise indication of the objects of this passage would be welcomed. (8.) What exactly does the French Government mean in Section VI by the phrase " placed under the auspices "of the League of Nations ? Is any procedure thereby contemplated which would entail an obligation on the part of an individual member of the League who was not an actual signatory of the agreements reached ? Mr. Chamberlain feels sure that M. de Fleuriau will forgive his raising the various points set forth in the preceding paragraphs. His doing so does not necessarily mean that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is desirable to amplify or modify the actual wording of the French draft. That can only be decided at a later stage. His present object is merely to learn for the confidential information of his colleagues and himself the precise import of the French proposals in order to remove any danger of a misunderstanding of the French draft of the 12th May before attempting to formulate the views of His Majesty's Government upon it. Foreign Office, 19th May, 1925.

No. 5. French Reply to Mr. Chamberlain's informal Memorandum of May 19, 1925, regarding certain Points in the French Draft Note of May 12, 1925, on the subject of Security. —(Communicated by the French Ambassador May 25.) Before embarking upon a detailed reply to the various requests for enlightenment made by the British Government it is well to make the following remark : — The French draft note is drawn up on the following plan : First of all come general observations and reservations comprised in the first two sections, then observations peculiar to the different

4

A.—sd

questions and proposals contemplated by the German memorandum, the latter being the subject of sections 3 et seq. 1. The intention of the French Government was not to reply in the name of their allies, but in their own name in agreement with their allies. Such an agreement is necessary because the German proposal of the 9th February, 1925, is for the conclusion of a pact in which England and other allies would participate. That is why, when acknowledging the receipt of the German memorandum on thj 20th February, the French Government informed Germany that they were submitting it to their allies. From that circumstance has arisen the present exchange of views which will, so the French Government hope, result in establishing that community of views exists between the Allied Governments. The French Government are, moreover, ready to word the text of their note in such a way as to leave no doubt in this respect. They will therefore replace the expression " the French Government and their allies " or the term " the allies " by " the French Government in agreement with their allies." 2. By the words " within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles " the French Government meant to specify that the pact proposed by Germany cannot in any way contradict, infringe or weaken the Treaty of Versailles and represents an offer of complementary guarantees. The points which are defined by the French reply are to be found in embryo in the treaty or in the Covenant of the League of Nations. 3. The object of section II is to state a reservation of general scope concerning the whole of the clauses of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Peace Treaty so as to make it clear that the agreements contemplated in the German memorandum must not impair them in any way whatsoever. Especially is this the case with the clauses concerning frontiers and with the special provisions designed to ensure the observance of the treaty. The reservation thus stated in paragraph 2 is laid down in paragraph 3, with special reference to the clauses which do not directly concern the Allied Powers and thus specially covers Austria and Sleswig. Taking account of German public opinion and certain susceptibilities, the French reply expressly makes no mention by name of Austria, Poland, &c., as, according to German politicians and diplomats, such mention would have made it impossible for Germany to continue the negotiations. The French draft note then enters upon a discussion of each of the agreements contemplated in the German memorandum. It is for this reason that section 111, which relates to the project of a Rhineland Pact, contains a passage expressly referring to the conditions of occupation of the Rhineland and the execution of the Rhineland Agreement. 4. The French Government have taken the word " arbitration " in the most general sense, meaning by it an attempt to exclude solutions by force. As to the means of attaining this object, it is only during the negotiations of the eventual agreements that it will be possible to define them. In all cases the obligatory nature of settlement by peaceful means must be specially; affirmed and enshrined. There is, moreover, no question of encroaching upon the prerogatives of the Council of the League of Nations. The only condition which appears essential to the French Government is that the pacific solution obtained shall have the character of an obligatory decision. 5. It is necessary to distinguish two cases : — (1.) Failure to observe the conditions of treaties or agreements, other than treaties of arbitration, existing between the parties. In this case failure to observe the conditions of these treaties or agreements cannot give rise ipso faclo to coercive action except in virtue of a special provision of the aforesaid treaties and agreements contemplating such action. (2.) Failure to observe arbitration treaties : the object of these is assuredly, as has been said above, to exclude solutions by force ; but if such treaties are not observed it is necessary to recognize that their violation appears to be a possible justification for coercive action appropriate to the nature of the violation. 6. (a.) By " joint and several guarantee " is meant thai the guarantee is given by all the signatories who must in principle act together, but that each individual signatory is nevertheless bound to act, " even in the case where one or several of the co-signatories default; thus, on the occasion of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany in 1914, Austria defaulted, but the other guarantors were bound to act and did not hesitate to honour their signature. (b.) A distinction must be drawn between a territorial guarantee and a guarantee given to an arbitration treaty. The first applies in case of the violation of a territory and necessarily involves resort to force in defence of that territory. The guarantee of an arbitration treaty, on the other hand, does not necessarily take that form. It infers any means, diplomatic or other, appropriate to the nature of the violation. We have purposely avoided defining its nature or extent. It goes without saying that in such a case each of the guarantors acts in such measure as he is able. If, for example, Germany were to violate the Arbitration Treaty with Poland, Great Britain could not be automatically drawn in to a greater extent than is involved, in the first place, by the guarantee which she has given to the Arbitration Treaty under the conditions laid down above, and, in the second place, by her capacity as a member of the League of Nations. In return, France could not be deemed to violate the Rhineland Pact if she should be called upon to help Poland. This very example demonstrates the necessity of making simultaneous the eventual conclusion of a Rhineland Pact with the conclusion of arbitration treaties between Germany and the neighbouring Allied States, as indeed Germany herself proposes.

5

A.—5d

7. The preceding paragraph explains as requested the import and object of the third paragraph of section V. In fact, if arbitration treaties were not concluded between Germany and the Allies who do not participate in the Rhineland Pact, this latter pact might be invoked by Germany to impede any assistance given to those Allied States in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations. 8. In placing the whole of the guarantee pacts and agreements under the auspices of the League of Nations, it is not our object to create for the other members of the League of Nations the same obligations as for the signatories of the agreements. Our intention was merely to place the agreements to be come to under the high moral authority of the League of Nations in order to enable the League, in case of need, to establish the legitimacy of action undertaken in accordance with the terms of these agreements and the conformity of such action with the Covenant, and the very principles on which the Covenant rests. May 22, 1925.

No. 6. Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris). My Lord, — Foreign Office, May 28, 1925. I have received your Lordship's despatch of the 13th May, enclosing the draft of the reply which the French Government propose to send to the proposals for a pact of security made to them by Germany on the 9th February last. The subsequent explanations of this draft reply so courteously furnished by the French Government through their Ambassador in London at my request have greatly assisted His Majesty's Government in its examination, and I am now in a position to give their reasoned comments on the document, which they have considered with all the care that the importance of the subject demands. 2. It will be convenient to set out first of all the point of view from which His Majesty's Government have themselves approached the German proposals and the principles by which they have been guided in examining both those proposals and the suggested French reply. 3. The point of departure is to be found in the reasoned statement which I made on behalf of His Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the 12th March last, in which the view was expressed that the best way to carry out the programme of security, arbitration, and disarmament was, with the co-operation of the League of Nations, to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special needs. These arrangements should be purely defensive in character, and should be framed in the spirit of the Covenant, working in close harmony with the League and under its guidance. 4. Secondly, in my speech in the House of Commons on the 24th March I indicated that, while His Majesty's Government could not accept an extension to every frontier of obligations of the most serious kind, they could properly undertake such obligations in that sphere with which British interests are most closely bound up, namely, the frontier between Germany and her western neighbours. 5. The basic principle, then, by which His Majesty's Government are guided in their approach to the matter now under discussion is, and must be, that any new obligation, which they undertake shall be specific and limited to the maintenance of the existing territorial arrangement on the western frontier of Germany. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to assume fresh obligations elsewhere in addition to those already devolving upon them as signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Peace Treaties. At the same time, it may be well to repeat that, in seeking means to strengthen the position in the west, His Majesty's Government do not themselves question, or give any encouragement to others to question, the other provisions of the treaties which form the basis of the existing public law of Europe. 6. With these preliminary declarations I turn to the French draft. In the first place, His Majesty's Government would wish to express their appreciation of its conciliatory tone, which is in complete harmony with the spirit that inspires the policy of His Majesty's Government. The evident desire which it displays to maintain peace and to facilitate the peaceful solution of disputes is a happy augury of the success of the negotiations .to which it forms a preliminary. 7. The substance of the note, however, goes in certain respects considerably beyond what His Majesty's Government could for their part endorse consistently with the principles enunciated above. Section IV, for example, contemplates the conclusion between the signatories of the proposed Rhineland Pact of arbitration treaties which would apply to all disputes of whatever nature, and would be guaranteed jointly and severally by the signatories of the Rhineland Pact. Section V suggests that the same joint and several guarantee should be given by the same powers to similar arbitration treaties between Germany and States other than the signatories of the Rhineland Pact. 8. I hasten to repeat what I have already said in my statement of the 12th March to the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva, that His Majesty's Government naturally look with sympathy on any effort to improve the international machinery for maintaining the peace of the world. They therefore welcome any treaties of arbitration or conciliation which the continental Powers concerned may be prepared to enter into, provided only that such treaties do not affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the Covenant. But the position of His Majesty's Government is somewhat different from that of those Powers. In view of the position of the British Empire, with its world-wide responsibilities, His Majesty's Government are bound to regard the question of participation in treaties of this description from a different point of view to that of Powers whose interests lie mainly or exclusively in Europe. And as regards the proposals for the

6

A.-~sd

maintenance of peace which are now under discussion, His Majesty's Government feel that, while for the continental Powers concerned the conclusion of the suggested arbitration treaties forms, as is stated in the French draft reply, the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact, this is not equally the case with Great Britain. 9. For the same reasons, while His Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be in the best interests of peace if the Rhineland Pact and the various arbitration treaties between Germany and her neighbours were to come into force simultaneously, yet they cannot support the proposals made in section VI of the French draft that all such arbitration treaties of the Rhineland Pact should form an indivisible whole and be co-ordinated in one general convention. 10. Nevertheless, though His Majesty's Government are not prepared to go so far as the French Government suggest, yet they are prepared in principle (and, of course, subject to a careful examination of the actual terms ultimately proposed) to give a guarantee, flowing logically from the territorial guarantee of the Rhineland, of arbitration treaties which may be concluded between Germany and her western .neighbours, signatories of the pact. The type of guarantee which they have in mind would operate in the event of a failure on the part of one of the parties to refer a dispute to arbitration (using the term in its widest sense to cover both judicial awards and conciliation tribunals) or to carry out an award, if such failure were coupled with a resort to hostilities. The guarantee would be, so to speak, defensive ; it would not entail upon His Majesty's Government —as they conceive it —any obligation to resort to force elsewhere than in the areas covered by the proposed Rhineland Pact; and would not operate in any event in favour of the party which had refused arbitration or had refused to give effect to an arbitral award. 11. It is clear from the four preceding paragraphs that the French draft as it stands cannot be accepted as accurately conveying the extent and character of the obligations which His Majesty's Government are ready to assume and that its terms require amendment if they are to express not merely the views of the French Government but, as the French Government suggest, the common policy of the Allies. 12. His Majesty's Government do not desire to suggest that the form of the note should be changed so as to make it clear that it commits the French Government alone to the views and proposals which it contains. Rather, recognising to the full the great value and importance of an agreed statement of views common to the Allied Powers, they would strongly recommend that an effort be made so to amend the draft as to achieve agreement. 13. With that object in view, His Majesty's Government have ventured to remodel the French draft in such a way as to confine it to such a statement of policy as they believe is common to both countries and thus to avoid raising particular points of principle in which this country cannot ab initio concur. A copy of this recast draft is enclosed (printed side by side, for convenience, with a translation of the original French draft), and, in communicating it to M. Briand, I request that your Lordship will lay emphasis on the fact that my object has been to produce a statement of general principles without in any way committing either His Majesty's Government or their allies to exact phraseology or to particular proposals whose exact shape can only be determined when the time is reached for considering a draft instrument to give effect to these general objects. 14. Having said so much as regards underlying principles, it only remains to deal in detail with the French draft paragraph by paragraph, explaining where necessary the views of His Majesty's Government and giving the reasons for such alterations in the original draft as are now submitted to the French Government. 15. The preamble and the first three sections of the French draft remain unaltered in the revised version. But while accepting them as they stand, His Majesty's Government feel bound to point out that they are couched in terms so wide that His Majesty's Government must reserve their liberty to define more precisely at the proper time the interpretation which is to be placed upon them. This of course necessarily applies to the whole document; with this general reserve, His Majesty's Government only desire to make two specific remarks concerning the first three sections. 16. First, it is understood that the effect of section I is that Germany's entry into the League is an essential but not a prior condition of the agreement contemplated. The agreement would, however, be so framed that it would only become operative on Germany joining the League. 17. Secondly, His Majesty's Government desire specifically to endorse the observation in section 111 that Belgium ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested. Without her inclusion the proposed pact would obviously be incomplete. This is so self-evident that the omission of Belgium's name from the German proposals can only have been due to an oversight, as, indeed, the German Government have since explained. 18. In section IY the first paragraph of the original French draft remains unaltered, it being simply a summary of a portion of the German proposals themselves. The broad reasons for the amendments made in the remainder of the section will be apparent from the exposition of principles contained in the earlier part of this despatch. The second paragraph has been considerably modified and amplified. In the first place, as it reads in the revised version, it refers only to a possible Franco-German arbitration treaty, thus leaving the other Allies free to decide whether or not to conclude a similar arbitration treaty with Germany. At the same time, the hope is expressed that Belgium will be disposed to enter into a similar treaty. If, as His Majesty's Government feel should be the case, the draft is submitted to the Belgian Government before despatch and is subsequently sent with the approval of that Government, it will no doubt be possible to redraft the phrase regarding Belgium in a more positive sense. 19. Next, the latter half of the second sentence in the second paragraph of the same section has been redrafted in such a way as to make clear the meaning which, according to the explanations offered to me, the French Government attached to it.

7

A.—sd

20. Thirdly, in place of the third sentence of the second paragraph a new paragraph is added retaining the idea of a guarantee of an arbitration treaty, and making clear the implication of such a guarantee. 21. The alterations made in section V are two in number. In the first place, the words in the second paragraph " the object of the pact could not be attained " have been omitted because it was felt that they were unnecessarily pessimistic. The idea which the words were presumably intended to convey has been retained, however, by the insertion of words to show that while the Rhineland Pact is an essential step towards the attainment of European peace, that peace cannot be completely guaranteed if the Rhineland Pact remains unsupported by other regional settlements. 22. The second alteration in this section consists in the omission of the final paragraph of the original draft. The paragraph provided for the guarantee by the signatories of the Rhineland Pact of arbitration treaties between Germany and her other neighbours. This, for reasons already explained in this despatch, is unacceptable to His Majesty's Government. 23. A new section has been inserted at this point, numbered VI. Its only object is, clear statement, to prevent misunderstanding. There can, of course, be no question that it expresses a view on which the Allied Governments are unanimously agreed. 24. Section VII is based on the original section VI in the French draft. The first two paragraphs of the latter section were in contradiction with the principle of limited obligations which His Majesty's Government have adopted, and were therefore unacceptable. They have been replaced by the first paragraph of section VII which expresses the view that the various agreements in contemplation, whether relating to the Rhineland or to the other frontiers of Germany, should come into force simultaneously. 25. The rest of the original section VI is reproduced in section VII, with only one alteration, viz., in the last paragraph the phrase " French Government " has been substituted for " Allied Governments " as being more in accordance with the form of a note which is to be sent to Germany by France alone, but in agreement with the Allies. 26. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the French Government will see their way to accept the modifications proposed above. It is, of course, far from being their intention to suggest that the French Government should renounce those ideas in their original draft, which His Majesty's Government have been unable to accept, and an acceptance of the modified draft would not be construed by His Majesty's Government as a renunciation by the French Government of those ideas. His Majesty's Government are solely actuated by the consideration that it would be of great advantage if at this stage a note were sent to Germany setting out the basic principles on which the Allies are in agreement. They urge this course because they believe that it will serve a more useful purpose than the despatch of separate notes which, while having the advantage of showing the maximum limit to which each Allied Power was prepared to go, would have the disadvantage of laying undue emphasis on such divergence of views as may exist between the Allies. 27. I request that, in communicating to M. Briand the enclosed revised draft, your Lordship will read this despatch to him and leave with him a copy. I am, &c., Austen Chamberlain.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Draft Re-ply to the German Memorandum. As they have informed the German Government in their note of the 20th February last, the French Government have studied, in common with their allies, the suggestions contained in the memorandum forwarded to them on the 9th February by his Excellency M. von Hoesch The French Government and their allies regard the step taken by the German Government as an earnest of pacific intentions which agree with their own. Wishing to give to all the States concerned supplementary guarantees of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, they have examined the German proposals with all the attention that they merit in order to judge what elements they may afford for the consolidation of peace. Before embarking, however, on an examination in detail of the German note, it has appeared desirable to set out clearly the questions which it raises, or may raise, and on which it is important to know the views of the German Government because a preliminary agreement concerning them appears to be the necessary basis for any future negotiations : —

Suggested Alternative Draft. [ .B. —The passages which- differ from the French draft are printed in italics.] As they have informed the German Government in their note of the 20th February last, the French Government have studied, in common with their allies, the suggestions contained in the memorandum forwarded to them on the 9th February by his Excellency M. von Hoesch. The French Government and their allies regard the step taken by the German Government as an earnest of pacific intentions which agree with their own. Wishing to give to all the States concerned supplementary guarantees of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, they have examined the German proposals with all the attention that they merit in order to judge what elements they may afford for the consolidation of peace. Before embarking, however, on an examination in detail of the German note, it has appeared desirable to set out clearly the questions which it raises, or may raise, and on which it is important to know the views of the German Government because a preliminary agreement concerning them appears to be the necessary basis for any future negotiations : —

8

A.—sd

I. The memorandum only mentions incidentally the League of Nations. Now the Allied States are members of the League of Nations and are bound by the Covenant of the League, which involves for them clearly defined rights and obligations with the object of maintaining general peace. The German proposals no doubt lay claim to the same ideal, but no agreement could be achieved unless Germany on her side assumes the obligations and enjoys the rights laid down in the Covenant of the League. This agreement, then, can only be conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations under the conditions laid down in the note from the Council of the League of Nations dated the 13th March, 1925. 11. The search for the guarantees of securities which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the peace treaties. The agreements to be concluded ought not, therefore, either to imply a revision of these treaties or to result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses. Thus the Allies cannot in any case give up the right to oppose any failure to observe the stipulations of these treaties, even if the stipulations in question do not directly concern them.' 111. The memorandum of the 9th February contemplates first of all the conclusion between the " Powers interested in the Rhine" of a pact which might be inspired by the following principles :— 1. Repudiation of all idea of war between the contracting States. 2. Strict respect for the existing territorial situation in the Rhineland, with a joint and several guarantee by the contracting States. 3. A guarantee by the contracting States of the execution of the obligations concerning the demilitarisation of the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken under articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. The French Government do not fail to appreciate the value to the cause of peace, side by side with a renewed affirmation of the principles inscribed in the Treaty [of Versailles], of a solemn repudiation of all idea 'of war (an undertaking which, moreover, ought not to contain any time-limit) between the contracting States. Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly named in the German memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested. It also goes without saying, and farther results from the silence on this point of the German memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement,

2—A. sv.

I. The memorandum only mentions incidentally the League of Nations. Now the Allied States are members of T the League of Nations and are bound by the Covenant of the League, which involves for them' clearly defined rights and obligations with the object of maintaining general peace. The German proposals no doubt lay claim to the same ideal, but no agreement could be achieved unless Germany on her side assumes the obligations and enjoys the rights laid down in the Covenant of the League. This agreement, then, can only be conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations under the conditions laid down in the note from the Council of the League of Nations dated the 13th March, 1925. 11. The search for the guarantees of security which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the peace treaties. The agreements to be concluded ought not, therefore, either to imply a revision of these treaties or to result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses. Thus the Allies cannot in any case give up the right to oppose any failure to observe the stipulations of these treaties, even if the stipulations in question do not directly concern them. 111. The memorandum of the 9th February contemplates first of all the conclusion between the " Powers interested in the Rhine" of a pact which might be inspired by the following principles :— 1. Repudiation of all idea of war between the contracting States. 2. Strict respect for the existing territorial situation in the Rhineland, with a joint and several guarantee by the contracting States. 3. A guarantee by the contracting States of the execution of the obligations concerning the demilitarisation of the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken under articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. The French Government do not fail to appreciate the value to the cause of peace, side by side with a renewed affirmation of the principles inscribed in the Treaty [of Versailles], of a solemn repudiation of all idea of war (an undertaking which, moreover, ought not to contain any timelimit) between the contracting States. Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly named in the German memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested. It also goes without saying, and further results from the silence on this point of the German memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement.

9

A. —5d

10

IV. The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States, parties to the Rhineland Pact, arbitration treaties guaranteeing " a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts." France considers that such arbitration treaties would be the natural complement of a Rhineland pact. But it must be understood that they should apply to all disputes of whatever nature, and should not leave room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated in the present note. To give full effect to these treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers who participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland pact. V. In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind. The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the object aimed at by the pact could not be attained nor the peace of Europe completely guaranteed. The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves. The arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in paragraph IV and would be backed by the same joint and several guarantee. VI. In the opinion of the French Government the general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be effectively assured unless the agreements contemplated in the present note form an indivisible whole. They consider therefore that all the agreements, the observance of which should in each case be guaranteed by the signature of the same Powers, ought to be co-ordinated in a general convention registered by the League of Nations, placed under the auspices of the League and capable of forming, as suggested in the German memorandum itself, the nucleus of a still more general pacific entente. Finally, it goes without saying that if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realised, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security. Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government. The Allied Governments would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace. May 12, 1925.

IV. The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States, parties to the Rhineland Pact, arbitration treaties guaranteeing " a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts." Prance considers that an arbitration treaty of the Tcind proposed would, be the natural complement of a Rhineland pact. But it must be understood that as between herself and Germany it would apply to all disputes of whatever nature and should not leave room for coercive action save where such action may be taken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the ■parties. It is hoped, that the Belgian Government will be disposed to enter into a similar treaty. To give full effect to these two treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland pact, so as to ensure that any failure to refer a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an award would, if coupled with a resort to hostilities, bring the guarantee into immediate operation. In tthe absence of a resort to hostilities, the Council of he League shall propose what steps shoidd be taken to give effect to the treaty. V. In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind. The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace of Europe, towards which the pact is an essential step, could not be completely guaranteed. The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves. VI. Nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present note would affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the covenant. VII. The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured unless all the agreements aimed at in the present note come into force simultaneously. Finally, it goes without saying that, if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realised, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security. Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government. The French Government would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

A. —5d

No. 7. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. de Fleuriau, Ambassador of the French Republic in London. Paris, June 4, 1925. The British Ambassador, acting on instructions from his Government, has communicated to me a despatch (of which a translation is enclosed) addressed to him by Mr. Chamberlain on the 28th May last. This despatch formulates the views of the British Government on the French draft reply to the German proposals of the 9th February for a pact of security. Annexed to it is an amended text of the French draft reply. The French Government much appreciate the frank and friendly tone of the British reply. They do not fail to recognise the effort made by the British Government to meet the French point of view. They desire especially to record their high appreciation that the British Government still hold to the idea which found expression in 1919 in the signature of the guarantee treaties, and recognise the importance for the cause of peace of a close collaboration between the two nations. They have observed with particular gratification that the views of the British Government correspond with their own as regards the necessity for France to send a reply to the German proposals setting forth the views common to the Allies. In our desire to achieve so important an agreement between France and England we have made a fresh effort to meet the objections of the British Government and to reconcile the anxiety which they evidently feel regarding any general extension of the joint guarantee of the arbitration treaties. We realise that in present circumstances the fact that the constituent elements of the British Empire are scattered throughout the world leads His Majesty's Government to limit their undertakings on the European continent to those which they consider essential, even when their interests are indistinguishable from those of the continental Powers. Mr. Chamberlain's despatch to Lord Crewe makes it clear that His Majesty's Government feel themselves unable to assume fresh obligations regarding the situation created in Europe by the peace treaties except in so far as concerns the maintenance of the existing territorial arrangement on the western frontier of Germany. The French Government are glad to note, however, that the British Government do not thereby intend either themselves to question, or to encourage any other Power to question, the provisions of the treaties which form the basis of the public law of Europe. Further, we fully understand that their refusal to bind themselves definitely in advance except as concerns the Rhineland means only that the British Government, without disinteresting themselves in what might happen at other points, merely reserve their full liberty of examination and decision. For their part, the French Government consider that their anxiety to maintain the general peace and the liberty of all the nations of Europe as well as the exigencies of their own national defence, preclude them from limiting their preoccupations to solicitude for their own security alone. Their view is that any attempt to modify by force the state of affairs created by the treaties would constitute a menace to peace to which France could not remain indifferent. That is why, in their draft reply to the German proposals, they consider it essential to preserve their liberty to go to the assistance of States to which they deem it necessary to grant their guarantee without it being possible for the provisions of the proposed Rhineland Pact to block their way and thus ( to be turned against them. The verbal explanations which have reached them from the British Government have given them a firm assurance of this. In our eyes this is an essential condition of the proposed pact; and in view of the capital importance of this reservation for the maintenance of peace it is indispensable that it should be clearly expressed in the reply to Germany ; to keep silence on this point would be to risk giving rise to wrong interpretations of the Rhineland Pact and encouraging dangerous aspirations. Such is the object of the new wording proposed for paragraph 2 of section IY and of the restoration of paragraph 4 of section V, appropriately amended. In paragraph 2 of section IV the new French formula lays down, with this object, that the eventual Franco-German arbitration treaty must allow of coercive action being taken not only where such action shall be taken " consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties " (which corresponds to the idea contemplated by the British Government), but also " in the case of failure to observe a treaty guaranteed by the parties or by any one of them." France intends in this way to reserve her action in the case of a violation of an eventual arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland, for example, or between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Paragraph 4 of section V, while leaving England and the other Powers signatory of the Rhineland Pact quite free to withhold their guarantee from arbitration treaties between Germany and her eastern or southern neighbours, aims at giving France the right to guarantee these treaties herself so as to ensure their full effectiveness and to remove still further the possibility of forcible intervention. The other changes introduced into the British wording represent nothing but what appears to be in French a clearer expression of our common views. Thus the idea contained in section VI of the British draft is expressed and transferred in the form of an addition to paragraph 3 of section V, where it fits in naturally. The British section VII thus becomes section VI, and at this point the French Government, while agreeing to replace the idea of the co-ordination of the agreements by the idea of making them simultaneous, as proposed in the English text, think it nevertheless necessary in conformity with the general idea which pervades the whole draft, to restore the principle that the agreements to be come to ought to be registered by the League of Nations and placed , under its auspices. This is, moreover, the idea expressed by Mr. Chamberlain in his speech of the 12th March last to the Council of the League of Nations and also in his despatch of the 28th May to Lord Crewe. As regards the projected arbitration treaty between Belgium and Germany, we have inserted straightaway a positive formula subject to the consent of the Belgian Government which we have reason to believe will probably be forthcoming.

11

A,—sd

In conclusion, the French Government desire to repeat that, in thus replying to the German memorandum, they have been careful to regard the German offers as made with a sincere desire for peace, and that they in no way fail to appreciate the difficulties created for the German Government, not only by German public opinion, but also by the preoccupations caused by their relations with Russia, who is endeavouring to turn Germany away from the League of Nations. We trust that the British Government will agree with the French Government in thinking that it is of the greatest importance that the reply to the German proposals should be addressed as soon as possible to the German Government, who await it with impatience. Briand. P.S. —I request you to hand to Mr. Chamberlain the following documents (enclosed) : (1) A copy of the present despatch ; (2) the text of the British amendments and the French modifications in two columns ; (3) the revised final text of the draft reply to Germany. Enclosure 1. Amendments introduced into the Draft Reply to the German Memorandum. Pre amble. [Unchanged.] Section I. [Unchanged.] Section llj [Unchanged.] Section 111. [Unchanged.] Section IV.

British Amendments. Paragraph 1. Unchanged. Paragraph 2. France considers that an arbitration treaty of the kind proposed would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that as between herself and Germany it would apply to all disputes of whatever nature and should not leave room for coercive action save where such action may be taken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties. It is hoped that the Belgian Government will be disposed to enter into a similar treaty. Paragraph 3. To give full effect to these two treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which (also) participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact, so as to ensure that any failure to refer a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an award would, if coupled with a resort to hostilities, bring the guarantee into immediate operation. In the absence of a resort to hostilities, the Council of the League shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty.

New French Text. Paragraph 1. Unchanged. Paragraph 2. France considers that an arbitration treaty of the kind which Germany proposes would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that as between France and Germany such a treaty ought to apply to all disputes and ought not to leave room for coercive action save where such action shall be undertaken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties or in the case of failure to observe a treaty guaranteed by the parties or by any one of them. An arbitration treaty of the same kind between Belgium and Germany would be no less necessary. Paragraph 3. To give full effect to these two treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which also participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact, so as to bring this guarantee into immediate operation, if one of the parties, refusing to submit a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an arbitral award, resorts to hostile measures. Where one of the contracting parties without resorting to hostile measures fails to observe its undertakings, the Council of the League of Nations shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty.

12

A.—sd

Section V. Paragraph 1. Unchanged. Paragraph 1. Unchanged. Paragraph 2. The Allied Governments note Paragraph 2. The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even con- this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements sider that in the absence of such agreements bebetween Germany and those of her neighbours ween Germany and those of her neighbours who, who, without being parties to the suggested without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, Versailles, the peace of Europe, towards which the the peace of Europe, which the Rhineland Pact pact is an essential step, could not be completely tends to consolidate and of which it is to constitute guaranteed. an essential element, could not be completely guaranteed. Paragraph 3. Unchanged. Paragraph 3. The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves; nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present note can affect these rights and obligations. Paragraph 4. Entirely omitted. Paragraph 4. These arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in Section IV. The powers signatories of the Treaty of Versailles and of the proposed Rhineland Pact would have the option, if they so desire, of constituting themselves the guarantors of such arbitration treaties. Section VI. Paragraph 1. Nothing in the treaties contem- Paragraph 1. (The British paragraph should plated in the present note would affect the rights be omitted since the idea which it expresses is and obligations attaching to membership of the more appropriately placed in paragraph 3 of League of Nations under the Covenant. Section V, which has been extended in this sense. Section VII of the British amendments thus becomes once more Section VI.) Section VII. Paragraph 1. The general guarantee of security Paragraph 2. The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured unless all the agreements aimed completely ensured unless all the agreements at in the present note come into force simultaneously, aimed at in the present note come into force simultaneously. These agreements, in conformity with the Paragraph 2. Unchanged. Covenant, ought to be registered by the League Paragraph 3. Unchanged. of Nations and placed under its auspices. Paragraph 4. The French Government in place Paragraph 3. Unchanged. of " Allied Governments." Paragraph 4. Unchanged. Paragraph 5. The English text accepted. The rest unchanged. June 4, 1925.

Enclosure 2. Draft Reply to the German Memorandum (complete amended text). As they have informed the German Government in their note of the 20th February last, the French Government have studied, in common with their allies, the suggestions contained in the memorandum forwarded to them on the 9th February by .His Excellency M. von Hoesch. The French Government and their allies regard the step taken by the German Government as an earnest of pacific intentions which agree with their own. Wishing to give to all the States concerned supplementary guarantees of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, they have examined the German proposals with all the attention that they may merit in order to judge what elements they may afford for the consolidation of peace. Before embarking, however, on an examination in detail of the German note, it has appeared desirable to set out clearly the questions which it raises, or may raise, and on which it is important to know the views of the German Government because a preliminary agreement concerning them appears to be the necessary basis for any future negotiations : — I. The memorandum only mentions incidentally the League of Nations. Now the Allied States are members of the League of Nations and are bound by the Covenant of the League, which involves for them clearly defined rights and obligations with the object of maintaining general peace.

13

A.—5D

The German proposals no doubt lay claim to the same ideal, but no agreement could be achieved unless Germany on her side assumes the obligations and enjoys the rights laid down in the Covenant of the League. This agreement, then, can only be conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations under the conditions laid down in the note from the Council of the League of Nations, dated the 13th March, 1925. 11. The search for the guarantees of security which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the Peace Treaties. The agreements to be concluded ought not, therefore, either to imply a revision of these treaties or to result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses. Thus the Allies cannot in any case give up the right to oppose any failure to observe the stipulations of these treaties, even if the stipulations in question do not directly concern them. 111. The memorandum of the 9th February contemplates first of all the conclusion between the " Powers interested in the Rhine " of a pact which might be inspired by the following principles : — (1.) Repudiation of all idea of war between the contracting States. (2.) Strict respect for the existing territorial situation in the Rhineland, with a joint and several guarantee by the contracting States. (3.) A guarantee by the contracting States of the execution of the obligations concerning the demilitarization of the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken under articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. The French Government do not fail to appreciate the value to the cause of peace, side by side with a renewed affirmation of the principles inscribed in the Treaty of Versailles, of a solemn repudiation of all idea of war (an undertaking which, moreover, ought not to contain any time-limit) between the contracting States. Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly named in the German memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested. It also goes without saying, and, further, results from the silence on this point of the German memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement. IV. The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States parties to the Rhineland Pact arbitration treaties guaranteeing " a peaceful settlement of judicial and political conflicts." France considers that an arbitration treaty of the kind which Germany proposes would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that, as between France and Germany, such a treaty ought to apply to all disputes, and ought not to leave room for coercive action save where such action shall be undertaken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties, or in the case of failure to observe a treaty guaranteed by the parties or by any one of them. An arbitration treaty of the same kind between Belgium and Germany would be no less necessary. To give full effect to these two treaties, their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which also participate in the territorial guarantee contained 'in the Rhineland Pact, so as to bring this guarantee into immediate operation, if one of the parties, refusing to submit a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an arbitral award, resorts to hostile measures. Where one of the contracting parties, without resorting to hostile measures, fails to observe its undertakings, the Council of the League of Nations shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty. V. In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind. The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace of Europe, which the Rhineland Pact tends to consolidate and of which it is to constitute an essential element, could not be completely guaranteed. The Allied States, in fact, have under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves ; nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present note can affect these rights and obligations. These arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in section IV. The Powers signatories of the Treaty of Versailles and of the proposed Rhineland Pact would have the option, if they so desire, of constituting themselves the guarantors of such arbitration treaties.

14

A.—sd

VI. The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured unless all the agreements aimed at in the present note come into force simultaneously. These agreements, in conformity with the Covenant, ought to be registered by the League of Nations and placed under its auspices. Finally,, it goes without saying, that, if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realized, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security. Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government. The French Government would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

No. 8. Mr. Austen Chamberlain to M. Briand. Your Excellency,'— Geneva, June 8, 1925. Shortly before my departure for Geneva the French Ambassador in London, acting on your Excellency's instructions, was good enough to communicate to me a copy of a despatch, dated the 4th June, which he had received from you concerning the proposals for a pact of security made by the German Government to the French Government on the 9th February last. This document has been carefully examined by His Majesty's Government, who note with pleasure that the French Government are ready to accept in the main the modifications in the French draft reply to the German proposals suggested in my despatch to Lord Crewe of the 28th May, a copy of which was handed to you by bis Excellency, The effort which this acceptance represents on the part of the French Government to achieve the greatest common measure of agreement between themselves and His Majesty's Government is highly appreciated. His Majesty's Government, fully alive to the advantage of despatching the reply to Germany at the earliest possible moment, are happy to find that the further amendments now proposed by the French Government are of such a nature that their consideration need not delay matters. For their part, His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept them, with only one exception. The French Government suggest that section VI of the British counter-draft should be omitted. This section stipulated that nothing in the proposed treaties should affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the Covenant. The view of the French Government appears to be that this section is rendered unnecessary by the sentence which they now propose to add to the third paragraph of section V, which, in effect, stipulates that nothing in the proposed treaties should affect the rights and obligations of the Allied Powers under the Covenant of the League and the peace treaties. But if the amended section Vis carefully compared with section VI of the British counter-draft, it will be seen that they do not quite cover the same ground. For, whereas the latter is widely drawn so as to safeguard all rights and obligations under the Covenant, the former is restricted to the rights and obligations of the Allied States. His Majesty's Government therefore desire that section YI in their counter-draft should be retained. They are inclined to agree with the French Government that it is superfluous to retain both section Yl and the amended third paragraph of section V, since the idea conveyed in the latter is contained in a wider form as regards the Covenant of the League ,of Nations in section VI, and as regards the peace treaties in section 11. At the same time, if the French Government prefer to retain the third paragraph of section V, His Majesty's Government have no difficulty in accepting it. There is only one other point raised in your Excellency's despatch to M. de Fleuriau to which His Majesty's Government desire at this stage to refer. The French Government are right in assuming that His Majesty's Government recognize that the proposed Rhineland Pact cannot operate as a barrier to prevent France from taking action in conformity with such guarantees as she may have given to arbitration treaties between Germany and Germany's neighbours, and they therefore concur in section IV of the proposed reply as at present drafted. His Majesty's Government, in fact, regard this proposition as self-evident and as applicable equally to all States signatory of the proposed pact. It is one to which, if rightly understood, there should be no difficulty in obtaining the ready assent of any of the parties concerned, for it is a particular application of the general theory which, in the interests of all the parties, must be at the base of the mutual settlement now in contemplation. It would clearly be inequitable that the proposed Rhineland Pact should in any circumstances operate in favour of any signatory Power which subsequently broke the treaty obligations into which it had entered. The pact and its cognate agreements must necessarily be so drafted that, on the one hand, they will give the fullest possible security to all the Powers concerned so long as they abide by their treaty undertakings, and that, on the other hand, they cannot be invoked by a guilty Power to protect it from the consequences of a wilful breach of its treaty obligations. It is subject to this statement of principle, which not only appears to His Majesty's Government right in itself, but also, as I am happy to think, expresses the views and intentions of France, that His Majesty's Government welcome the present proposal and concur in the terms in which it is now expressed. I have, &c., Austen Chamberlain.

15

A.—sd

No. 9. Note from the French Government to the German Government handed to Hen Stresemann by the French Ambassador at Berlin on June 16, 1925. As they have informed the German Government in their note of the 20th February last, the French Government have studied, in common with their allies, the suggestions contained in the memorandum forwarded to them on the 9th February by his Excellency M. von Hoesch. The French Government and their allies regard the step taken by the German Government as an earnest of pacific intentions which agree with their own. Wishing to give to all the States concerned supplementary guarantees of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, they have examined the German proposals with all the attention that they merit in order to judge what elements they may afford for the consolidation of peace. Before embarking, however, on an examination in detail of the German note, it has appeared desirable to set out clearly the questions which it raises, or may raise, and on which it is important to know the views of the German Government, because a preliminary agreement concerning them appears to be the necessary basis for any future negotiations I. The memorandum only mentions incidentally the League of Nations. Now the Allied States are members of the League of Nations and are bound by the Covenant of the League, which involves for them clearly defined rights and obligations with the object of maintaining general peace. The German proposals no doubt lay claim to the same ideal, but no agreement could be achieved unless Germany on her side assumes the obligations and enjoys the rights laid down in the Covenant, of the League. This agreement, then, can only be conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations under the conditions laid down in the note from the Council of the League of Nations, dated the 13th March, 1925. 11. The search for the guarantees of security which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the Peace Treaties. The agreements to be concluded ought not, therefore, either to imply a revision of these treaties or to result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses. Thus the Allies cannot in any case give up the right to oppose any failure to observe the stipulations of these treaties, even if the stipulations in question do not directly concern them. 111. The memorandum of the 9th February contemplates first of all the conclusion between the " Powers interested in the Rhine " of a pact which might be inspired by the following principles : — (1.) Repudiation of all idea of war between the contracting States. (2.) Strict respect for the existing territorial situation in the Rhineland, with a joint and several guarantee by the contracting States. (3.) A guarantee by the contracting States of the execution of the obligations concerning the demilitarization of the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken under articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. The French Government do not fail to appreciate the value to the cause of peace, side by side with a renewed affirmation of the principles inscribed in the Treaty of Versailles, of a solemn repudiation of all idea of war (an undertaking which, moreover, ought not to contain any time-limit) between the contracting States. Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly named in the German memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested. It also goes without saying, and, further, results from the silence on this point of the German memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement. IV. The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States parties to the Rhineland Pact arbitration treaties guaranteeing " a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts." France considers that an arbitration treaty of the kind which Germany proposes would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that, as between France and Germanv, such a treaty ought to apply to all disputes, and ought not to leave room for coercive action save where such action shall be undertaken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties, or of the Rhineland Pact or in virtue of the guarantee given to an arbitration treaty by the parties or by any one of them. An arbitration treaty of the same kind between Belgium and Germany would be no less necessary. To give full effect to these two treaties, their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which also participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact, so as to bring this guarantee into immediate operation, if one of the parties, refusing to submit a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an arbitral award, resorts to hostile measures.

16

A.—sd

Where one of the contracting parties, without resorting to hostile measures, fails to observe its undertakings, the Council of the League of Nations shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty. V. In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind. The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace of Europe, which the Rhineland Pact tends to consolidate and of which it is to constitute an essential element, could not be completely guaranteed. The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves. These arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in section IV. The Powers signatories of the Treaty of Versailles and of the proposed Rhineland Pact would have the option, if they so desire, of constituting themselves the guarantors of such arbitration treaties. VI. Nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present note should affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the Covenant of the League. VII. The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured unless all the agreements aimed at in the present note come into force simultaneously. These agreements, in conformity with the Covenant, ought to be registered by the League of Nations and placed under its auspices. Finally, it goes without saying, that, if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realized, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security. Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government. The French Government would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

Reply of the German Government to the Note handed to Herr Stresemann by the French Ambassador at Berlin on June 16, 1925, respecting the Proposals for a Pact of Security. Your Excellency,— German Embassy, London, July 20, 1925. On behalf of my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the note from the German Government which Herr von Hoesch, the German Ambassador, is this day handing to the French Government in reply to the French note of the 16th June. I venture to enclose a translation of the German reply in the English language, but have the honour to observe that the German text is to be regarded as decisive. I have, See,., Sthamer. Enclosure. Tits German Government have thoroughly examined the reply to the German memorandum of the 9th February, which was delivered by His Excellency the French Ambassador M. de Margerie on the. 16th June. They gather from it with satisfaction that the French Government and their allies are disposed in principle to co-operate with the German Government for the consolidation of peace by way of mutual understanding and to enter into an exchange of views about the matter. Before, however, embarking on an examination in detail, the Allied Governments wish the questions touched upon in the German memorandum to be further elucidated and for their part make a number of concrete proposals, upon which they ask the German Government to state their view. Although these proposals are based on the suggestions of the German memorandum, yet they give them another direction on important points and also add to them new constructions. The German Government, animated by the same spirit of goodwill and peaceful understanding which prompted their own suggestions, will state their opinion about the Allied proposals as follows. In doing this, however, they believe that they should confine themselves to a general statement on some questions of principle and reserve their attitude on points of detail for the final negotiations to come.

3—A. sd.

17

A—si>

I. The Allied Governments, in their note of the 16th June, emphasize that the settlement of the question of security must not involve a modification of the treaties of peace. The German Government cannot clearly make out from what is said in the note about this point what the intentions of the Allied Governments are. The conclusion of a pact of security as outlined in the German suggestions does not represent a modification of existing treaties. There should therefore be no need for special statements in this respect. The German Government consider as self-evident that it is not meant to exclude for all future time the possibility of adapting existing treaties at the proper time to changed circumstances by way of peaceful agreement. They may point out that even the Covenant of the League of Nations allows for such necessities. If the Allied Governments emphasize for instance that the pact of security must not affect the treaty provisions in force concerning the military occupation of German territories, it is correct that the German memorandum has not made the conclusion of the pact dependent on a modification of those provisions. But should the Allied Governments intend to set those provisions up as sacrosanct for the future, the German Government would, in answer to this, like to point out that the conclusion of a security pact would represent an innovation of such importance, that it could not but react on the conditions in the occupied territories and the questions of occupation in general. 11. Under the system outlined by the Allied Governments for the security pact in their note of the 16th June, a prominent part is assigned to the treaties of arbitration which Germany would have to conclude with her neighbour States, who are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles. The construction of the treaties of arbitration within this system leaves room for considerable doubts which need further elucidation. The German Government contemplated treaties of arbitration such as have been concluded during the last few years by Germany as well as by a number of other Powers. Treaties of this kind, modelled on the corresponding terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, exhaust, in the opinion of the German Government, the possibilities existing under present conditions of bringing about, with prospects of practical results, the arbitral settlement of conflicts among State?. The Allied proposals appear to contemplate a different system. What chiefly attracts attention are the cases of exception provided for by the Allied Governments in which coercive action by one State against another State is to be permitted. In this respect, the German Government, judging by the terms of the note of the 16th June and the correspondence published between the French and His Britannic Majesty's Governments cannot but assume that in those cases, in the opinion of the Allied Governments, coercive action can take place without any regular procedure laid flown in advance, either by arbitral or some other international procedure. If this is correct, the result would be that the Allied Governments, for instance, would not wish to subject the decision on the question of the admissibility or inadmissibility of reprisals on account of reparation obligations to a regular procedure, but would leave the decision to their own unilateral discretion. A further result would be that the German Government would by treaty have to concede to the Allied Governments the right to take military measures against Germany without any preceding regular procedure, whenever they are of opinion that Germany had infringed the provisions regarding the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Just as serious would be the consequences which might result from the form, as proposed by the French note, of the guarantee for the treaties of arbitration, the conclusion of which is suggested.' Although the intervention of the guarantor would be dependent upon definite conditions, he would nevertheless be entitled to decide on his own free judgment whether, in the case under consideration these conditions, in fact, exist. This would mean that, should a conflict arise, it would be for the guarantor to decide which of the two contracting parties to the treaty of arbitration is to be considered the aggressor, and be would have the right, to decide, even if he was bound to one of the contracting parties by a special alliance. It is quite clear that the system of guarantees would, by such constructions, be invalidated to the sole detriment of Germany. Real pacification as aimed at by the German Government in concert with the Allied Governments would not be reached. The German Government, therefore, hope that their misgivings concerning these points can be removed by the Allied Governments. They believe that they can all the more expect this, as otherwise the guarantee system could not be brought into harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Whereas according to the Covenant the question whether a disturbance of peace exists has to be decided by a carefully regulated procedure and the application of coercive measures is subject to conditions which have to be conclusively established, all these decisions, according to the system outlined in the French note, would be put into the hands of one of the contracting parties. Such a system would not maintain peace and might even give rise to the danger of serious complications. 111. According to the opinion of the German Government, the entrance of Germany into the Leagi e of Nations would not be a necessary condition for the realization of the fundamental ideas of the German memorandum. The Allied Governments, however, on their part, are of the opinion that the security pact as suggested in the German memorandum is only conceivable if Germany enters the League of Nations. In view of the great importance which the German Government attach to the solution of the security question, they will, in principle, not raise any objection against the linkingup of the two problems. They must, however, draw attention to the fact that the question of Germany's entry still needs to be carefully cleared up.

18

A.—5D

The standpoint of the German Government in this question is known to the Allied Governments from the memorandum handed to them in September last, as well as from the German note addressed to the League of Nations on the 12th December last. The note of the Council of the League of Nations of the 13th March last, mentioned in the French note, has not removed the objections that have been expressed by Germany against the acceptance of the obligations under article 16 of the Covenant. Even after the explanations by the Council of the League of Nations the danger remains that Germany, as a disarmed country, surrounded by strongly armed neighbours, in a central position, having been in history repeatedly the theatre of great wars, would, after entering the League of Nations, be exposed without limitation to the danger of being involved in the armed conflicts of third countries. Germany as a member of the League of Nations can only be considered as enjoying equal rights when her disarmament is followed by the general disarmament provided for by the Covenant of the League of Nations and the preamble to Part Yof the Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, if the immediate entrance of Germany into the League of Nations is to be rendered possible, a solution has to be found to tide over the time till general disarmament has become a reality. This solution would have to pay due regard to the special military and economic as well as to the special geographical situation of Germany. With regard to the contents of the note of the 16th June, the German Government wish to confine themselves for the present to these remarks. In spite of the doubts and apprehensions indicated, they are able to note that on essential points a significant rapprochement of the views of the two sides has already taken place. The interested Governments are, in principle, unanimous in the earnest desire to settle the security problem by a guarantee pact, as suggested by Germany, and by further development of the system of arbitration treaties. Where there still exist doubts and differences of opinion concerning the details of such a settlement, these also can be overcome, if the Governments keep their eyes fixed firmly on the goal to be reached and do not lose sight of the indispensable requirements of equality and reciprocity. The German Government, therefore, believe they are justified in hoping that further discussions will lead to a positive result. They would heartily welcome an acceleration of these discussions so that the urgent desire of the nations for reliable guarantees of peace and peaceful development, as well as for the restoration of the world's normal economic relations destroyed by the war, may soon be satisfied. Paris, July 20, 1925.

Authority : W. A. G. Skinner, Government Printer, Wellington.—l92s.

19