25

D.—2b.

or interruption was made in good faith for some necessary purpose, and without any intent to avoid or unnecessarily interrupt such continuous carriage or to evade any of the provisions of this Act." And in the third it is declared that, " Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective, lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates and charges between such connecting lines; but this Act shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business." The 4th section of the Act has also important possibilities as a restraint upon reckless rate wars. The reductions, when such wars are in progress, have generally been made chiefly at competitive points a considerable distance apart; and when a reduction of rates at such points involves also a reduction to or from a great number of intermediate points, a resort to a cutting of rates that goes beyond the warrant of legitimate competition becomes unlikely in proportion, as it would be injurious to the party inaugurating it. The pooling of freights and of railroad earnings, so far as the Commission has knowledge or information on the subject, came to an end when the Act took effect. But as pooling was only one of several purposes had in view in forming railroad associations, the leading associations have not been dissolved, but have been continued in existence for other objects. Among these objects are the making of regulations for uninterrupted and harmonious railroad communication and exchange of traffic within the territory embraced by their workings. Some regulations, in addition to those made by the law, are almost, if not altogether, indispensable. Thus, while the 7th section of the Act forbids the carriers preventing shipments from being continuous by the device of changing timeschedules, carriage in different cars, &c, it has not undertaken to provide for the making of such time-schedules as would facilitate the continuous shipment, or to prescribe rules for the loading and movement of cars for that purpose. However desirable this might have been if it were practicable to make'rule's which, while general in their nature, should be sufficiently definite for enforcement as laws, it was doubtless perceived by Congress that these and many other matters of detail, though they might be of high importance, could not be wisely and effectively dealt with by general legislation, but that such legislation must chiefly be restricted to provisions for regulation and to prevent abuse. Moreover, these matters of detail, to a considerable extent, involve the element of contract and also of credit, when one company becomes the agent for another in the sale of tickets and the collection of freight-moneys, and they then require the assenting minds of parties ; and the number of parties whose minds are to be brought into accord being commonly very considerable, an association of officers or agents is made the means of bringing about the desired unity of action, and is also made a common arbiter, to prevent frequent and serious disturbances. Classification also, as has been said, is not by the Act taken out of the hands of the carriers, though a certain power of supervision is vested in the Commission; and classification is not only best made by joint action, but if it were not so made, and the methods of the roads thereby brought into harmony, it would probably become indispensable, however undesirable it might otherwise be, for the law to undertake to provide for it. Moreover, when classification is made and put into effect, it becomes necessary to make provision for inspection or some sort of supervision of its application in order to prevent its being employed as a device for giving preferences as between shippers. A fraudulent classification, through connivance of the agent in making out deceptive shipping bills, has often been resorted to for this purpose ; and, as the fraud affects the competing carriers as well as the shippers who are discriminated against by means of the cheat, the carriers and the public alike are interested in such a supervision of the work of all the roads as will be likely to detect the fraud. Self-interest on the part of the carriers will impel to this supervision, and it is most generally done through some common agency. If it shall be fairly done as between the carriers themselves it will tend to the protection of the public, and the benefits will be on the same line with those the Act undertakes to establish or provide for. Xl.—Seasonable Charges. Of the duties devolved upon the Commission by the Act to regulate commerce none is more perplexing and difficult than that of passing upon complaints made of rates as being unreasonable. The question of the reasonableness of rates involves so many considerations, and is affected by so many circumstances and conditions which may at first blush seem foreign, that it is quite impossible to deal with it on purely mathematical principles, or on any principles whatever, without a consciousness that no conclusion which may be reached can by demonstration be shown to be absolutely correct. Some of the difficulties in the way have been indicated in what has been said on classification, and it has been shown that to take each class of freight by itself and measure the reasonableness of charges by reference to the cost of transporting that particular class, though it might seem abstractly just, would neither be practicable for the carriers nor consistent with the public interest. The public interest is best served when the rates are so apportioned as to encourage the largest practicable exchange of products between different sections of our country and with foreign countries, and this can only be done by making value an important consideration, and by placing upon the higher classes of freight some share of the burden that on a relatively equal apportionment, if service alone were considered, would fall upon those of less value. With this method of arranging tariffs little fault is found, and perhaps none at all by persons who consider the subject from the stand-point of public interest. Indeed, in the complaints thus far made to the Commission, little fault has been found with the principles on which tariffs for the transportation of freight are professedly arranged, while applications of those principles in particular cases have been complained of frequently and very earnestly. 4—D. 2b."