3

A.—4a.

tatives, or increasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of the State, or in any manner affecting the provisions of the Constitution in relation thereto, shall become law unless the majority of the electors voting in that State approve the proposed law. 5. With regard to the resolutions — " (c.) Inland Eivers," " if.) Money Bills," " (g.) Judicial Appeal from States," The Premiers, after fully considering these proposals, do not find it practicable to recommend any alteration in the provisions contained in the Bill. 6. With regard to the resolutions— (h.) The Alteration of the Constitution," The Premiers agree that, where there is a difference of opinion between the two Houses as to whether the people should have the opportunity of deciding if any alteration should be made in the provisions of the Constitution, one House should not have the power to prevent the question being decided by the people. They have therefore endeavoured to provide a means whereby, after full discussion and reasonable delay, the matter may be referred from either House to the electors. The Premiers are unable to agree that the decision should rest on the result of a National Eeferendum, it being considered of vital importance that any alteration in the Constitution which the States have agreed to accept should only be made if a majority of the electors of the Commonwealth, and also a majority of the electors in a majority of the States, determine that it is proper to make such alteration ; and in order to give effect to such views — The Premiers have agreed that (including the amendment before suggested), clause 127 should be amended so as to read as follows :— ALTEEATION OP THE CONSTITUTION. Mode of altering the Constitution. 127. This Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner :— The proposed law for the alteration thereof must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament, and not less than two nor more than six months after its passage through both Houses the proposed law shall be submitted in each State to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of the House of Eepresentatives. But if either House passes any such proposed law by an absolute majority and the other House rejects or "fails to pass it or passes it with any amendment to which the first-mentioned House will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the first-mentioned House in the same or the next Session again passes the proposed law by an absolute majority with or without any amendment which has been made or agreed to by the other House, and such other House rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with any amendment to which the first-mentioned House will not agree, the Governor-General may submit the proposed law as last proposed by the first-mentioned House, and either with or without any amendments subsequently agreed to by both Houses, to the electors in each State qualified to vote for tlie election of the House of Representatives. When a proposed law is submitted to the electors the vote shall be taken in such a manner as the Parliament prescribes. But until the qualification of electors of members of the House of Eepresentatives becomes uniform throughout the Commonwealth only one-half the electors voting for and against the proposed law shall be counted in any State in which adult suffrage prevails. And if in a majority of the States a majority of the electors voting approve the proposed law, and if a majority of all the electors voting also approve the proposed law, it shall be presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent. As No alteration diminishing the proportionate representation of any State in either House of the Parliament, or the minimum number of representatives of a State in the House of Eepresentatives, or increasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of the State, or in any manner affecting the provisions of the Constitution in relation thereto-, shall become law unless the majority of the electors voting in that State approve the proposed law. With regard to the resolutions— " (i.) Number of Senators," The Premiers consider that the number of the Senators for each State as fixed in the Bill— namely, six—is a reasonable one — And have agreed that no alteration should be made in the clauses relating thereto. Pbovision foe Queensland. The Premiers have further agreed that, in view of the peculiar conditions of Queensland, it is advisable that permission should be given to that State, if it joins the federation at its establishment, to provide for the division of the colony into electorates for the election of the Senate, reserving power to the Pederal Parliament to make the system of election uniform throughout the Commonwealth; and the Premiers agree that clause 7of the Bill should be amended so as to read as follows :— Pact II. —The Senate. The Senate. 7. The Senate shall be composed of Senators for each State, directly chosen by the people of the State, voting, until the Parliament otherwise provides, as one electorate. But until the Parliament of the Commonwealth otherwise provides, the Parliament of the State of Queensland, if that State be an original State, may make laws dividing the State into divisions,