A.—7

46

the other hand, that Australian interests outside Australia itself are peculiarly open to foreign interference, and to possible destruction by an enemy in time of war. No expedition, whether despatched from an enemy's base in the Eastern seas or from Europe, could hope to reach its destination until the British navy had been definitely worsted. It has been publicly stated that the maintenance of sea supremacy may be assumed as the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire. (Duke of Devonshire, President of Council of National Defence, 3rd December, 1896.) As long, therefore, as Australia remains part of the British Empire so long will the inviolability of her shores and the security of her commerce depend in a large measure upon the power of Great Britain to maintain her supremacy at sea. Possible form of attack. Oversea aggression could only be attempted (1) by a raid of two or more cruisers with a small striking force for the purpose of landing; (2) by a large and well-equipped force conveyed in numerous transports and escorted by an enemy's fleet. Attack by large force. The latter attempt may, under existing conditions, be considered difficult in the extreme, more especially in view of the military spirit which animates the inhabitants of Australia. No commander would venture to land small bodies of troops on the shores of this continent, knowing well that it would mean but to court disaster and consequent loss of prestige to the nation attempting it. Any force destined for aggression would have to be of sufficient strength to conquer and hold either an important strategical position or a considerable portion of territory under the certain condition of jeopardizing, if not losing completely, its communications by sea. To enable an enemy to undertake, with any hope of success, such operations on Australian territory a large expeditionary force of all arms, fully equipped, would be required. The small landing force available even from a strong fleet of cruisers would find such a task impossible. Attaok by a raid. Efforts at oversea aggression upon Australian soil will in all probability, therefore, be reduced to raids by an enemy's cruisers based on his defended ports. Such raids might be undertaken to extort an indemnity under threat of bombardment, or to destroy commerce, or to obtain coal. Security of naval bases and of trade centres. General security to life and property from foreign aggression and from domestic violence. It must, however, be remembered that the present prosperity of Australia, and its future commercial development, will largely depend upon its immunity from attack, and the supremacy of the navy must be insured at all costs as the primary element of success. Australia must be prepared not only to protect the naval base of Sydney and to make secure the important strategical positions at King George's Sound and Thursday Island, so as to enable the navy to have all that it needs for free action at sea, but the great trade centres also, such as Sydney, Melbourne, &c, must further be rendered secure. It is practically impossible to undertake the local defence of the numerous bays, rivers, harbours, and estuaries which an enemy might avail himself of as a harbour of refuge or a rendezvous in time of war. This must be left to the general protection afforded by the navy. It is, however, necessary to deny access to all cities, towns, and harbours of commercial importance, and to make it impossible for a hostile expedition to establish itself upon Australian soil. To this end careful arrangements must be made to concentrate on any threatened point as many available field troops as circumstances may render necessary. It is hoped that the contemplated extension of railway communication between South Australia and West Australia may be accomplished at an early date, as without such extension Western Australia is always liable to isolation in time of war. The Commonwealth has undertaken not only to protect each State against invasion, but, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, to protect it from domestic violence (vide Constitution Act, section 119). Complete security for life and capital must therefore be insured not only for the population now existing in Australia against foreign aggression and domestic violence, but that security must be further assured in the eyes of the commercial world beyond its shores. It follows as a matter of vital importance that the security of Australia should be placed beyond doubt, and that the security to capital in this country should be assured in the event of any warlike complications. Vigorous ofienoe is the main principle of defence. The principles governing defence are not, however, limited to those of a purely passive kind. History has shown that the surest and better defence is by a vigorous offence. The successful defence of an island such as Great Britain has in the past been insured by means of warlike operations forced on the enemy, and fought out on other than English soil. During the last hundred and fifty years, five distinct threats of invasion have been made by England's enemies, and in no instance did England remain satisfied with preparations for passive defence only, but effected her object and defeated her enemies by a vigorous and successful offence. The same principle in a very large measure applies to the defence of Australia. Defence of Australian interests. The defence of Australia cannot, moreover, he considered apart from the defence of Australian interests. Australia depends for its commercial success and its future development firstly upon its seaborne trade* ; and secondly upon the existence, maintenance, and extension of fixed and certain

* The exports and imports from oversea countries alone for the year 1900 amounted to £47,816,438 and £43,164,922 respectively, being a total of £90,981,360.