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Mr. Campbell appeared on behalf of the registered proprietors (Sarah Jane Lefroy and others); Mr. Myers for the District Land Registrar; Mr. Treadwell for Mr. Joshua Jones; Mr. Skerrett, K.C. (with him Mr. Tringham) for the purchaser (Mr. H. Lewis). This was an application to the Court by the purchaser of leases of certain parts of the Mokau-Mohakatino Block, Hermann Lewis, of Wellington, to order the removal of a caveat lodged against the land by Mr. Joshua Jones. The facts of the case were, briefly, that in 1904 Jones commenced an action in the High Court in England against Messrs. Flower and Hopkinson (two English solicitors), claiming the sum of £433,000 for slander of title. It was alleged in the statement of claim in that action that plaintiff had acquired a lease for fifty-six years of 56,000 acres in the Mokau district at a low rental; that the land contained very valuable coal-measures; that he went to England to float a company to work the coal, and there became the client of Flower; that he had previously mortgaged his interest in New Zealand, and that the mortgagees under the mortgage put the property up for sale; that he agreed that they should buy the property and hold it in trust for him until the company could be floated; that the property was bought by Messrs. Flower and Hopkinson, who claimed it as their own, and refused to recognize plaintiff as having any interest in it, and that plaintiff was thereby prevented from forming a company or selling the land. Defendants denied the agreement, and alleged that they had bought the property for themselves. The action was compromised by the defendants agreeing to give Jones two years to purchase the property back, and if he could not purchase in that time it was agreed that the defendants should transfer the property to Jones on his giving them a mortgage to secure the sum of £18,000. Plaintiff could not purchase the land, and he therefore took a transfer of it, and gave a mortgage to secure £18,000. He also entered into an undertaking to lodge no further caveat against dealings with the land. In 1907 the executors of defendant Flower (who had died in the meantime) sold the land through the Registrar of the Supreme Court at New Plymouth, owing to default having been made in the payment of principal and interest. The executors became the purchasers themselves. Subsequently, the leases of parts of the property were purchased by Hermann Lewis. A caveat was, however, lodged by Jones to prevent dealings with the land, and it was in respect of this caveat that the application was now made to the Court. The grounds on which it was contended that the order with reference to the caveat should be discharged were as follow :— (1.) That the caveat was lodged by Jones in contempt of two orders dated the 27th July, 1904, and the 10th August, 1906, made in the action in the High Court of Justice in England. (2.) That the caveat was lodged contrary to good faith and in breach of an undertaking by him dated the 16th November, 1906, pursuant to the above-mentioned orders not to lodge any caveat in respect of the leasehold lands or of the title to the Mokau property the subject of the action in which the orders were made. (3.) That all matters in dispute between Joshua Jones and Flower and others were settled by the orders of the 27th July, 1904, and the 10th August, 1906, and the lodging of the caveat was an attempt to' reopen the disputes. (4.) That Jones by the orders in question (the orders having been acted upon by all parties) was estopped from lodging the caveat or bringing into litigation the matters settled or agreed to be settled by the orders. (5.) That Jones, by his undertaking dated the 16th November, 1906, was estopped from lodging the caveat. Mr. Treadwell, on behalf of Mr. Jones, advanced argument at considerable length in support of the contention that the caveat ought to be extended. In conclusion, he submitted that under all the circumstances the Court ought to consider the advisableness of extending the order, so as to give Jones an opportunity to bring on an action against Flower's executors for redemption of the mortgage. The Court intimated that it did not consider it necessary to call on counsel for the other parties to deliver addresses. Their Honours then proceeded to deliver their judgments. The Chief Justice said the Court was asked to extend a caveat that had been lodged against dealings in certain leases of land on the following grounds: (1.) That the caveator had suffered certain wrongs at the hands of Mr. Flower, who died in September, 1904—and these wrongs were founded on circumstances which occurred prior to the compromise of 1904. (2.) Assuming that certain transactions could not be reviewed, Jones still had the right to redeem a mortgage executed by him in 1906 to the executors of the deceased. With reference to the first part of the claim, his opinion was that if an action relative to the transactions which took place prior to 1906 had been brought on in the Supreme Court it would have been dismissed as being frivolous and without any merits. That being the position, the caveat could not be extended. Jones was estopped by the contract which he had made from raising the question of the transactions prior to 1904; he was debarred from going back on the contract. Seeing that he was prevented from going into transactions anterior to the compromise of 1904, Jones could therefore only apply to redeem under his mortgage of 1906. He was bound by his mortgage, and on the 10th December, 1906, he got notice of demand, and signed the document acknowledging the receipt of the demand. Jones knew that the executors were going to sell, and accordingly in due course they proceeded to do so. Under the New Zealand Property Act, if a mortgagee sold through the Registrar the sale was conclusive. He (His Honour) was not aware of any power to allow redemption in the case of guch a sale unless it was alleged that there was "some fraud or misconduct, In the present case no fraud or misconduct on the part of the executors was alleged, and in the absence of such fraud or misconduct the title could not be attacked. The Court should not extend the caveat.

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