I.—6a.

78

[S. KENNEDY.

1. Mr. Veitch.] What was that?—lt was with regard to the rule —Rule 211—which provides that you aie to approach crossing-places and terminal stations so that you can stop with the hand-brake if necessary. Now, all railway men know that this rule xvas put in the rule-book in days gone by. I think it was twelve months ago that my association approached the General Manager and asked him to bring this rule into line xvith modern requirements, and Mr. Ronayne said that owing to the Westinghouse brake not being established throughout the Dominion he thought it was better to let the rule stand for a time. You knoxv xve have several small sections that have not got the Westinghouse brake. This particular rule stipulates that the driver is to enter a station where he crosses a train or a terminal station so that he can stop xvith the hand-brake if necessary, and it also mentions that he is not to rely upon the guard's brake. But, if you will notice, that rule makes no reference xvhatever to the Westinghouse brake. That has come in long since this rule was framed. The rule is still in our rule-book, 1 will admit, and we are still as drivers bound by it, but I may tell you that it has gone into disuse. Any one of you that wants to satisfy himself on that point can go along to Wellington Station here. That is a terminal station : it is a crossing station also for almost any train. Or he can go anywhere where you meet trains in the country, and as the train enters the station he can ask himself, "Could that train, if any obstruction occurred suddenly on the main line, stop before it had passed the home signal? " You xvill find that in 999 cases out of a thousand it could not possibly be done. The fact is that we have an un-to-date brake on our trains now —a splendid brake, and it seems remarkable if, with that equipment on the train, the men are not going to rely on it. They should take every precaution, by testing this brake, to ensure that it is in proper workingorder, and then they xvould do as they are doing now; they would trust to it to a certain extent, it is quite as reliable as ever a hand-brake was. I do not think you xvould find more failures with a continuous brake than you would perhaps with the old hand-brake. This Committee's duty is to find out the cause of the collision at New Lynn, and I have endeavoured, as far as 1 possibly can, to answer that. Mr. Wynne, in his evidence, stated that during a fog it would be unsafe to shunt trains Nos. 5 and 6in the manner that was done. Noxv, Mr. Wynne is the signal expert in New Zealand, and he said that if there xvas a fog it would be unsafe to shunt in that manner. Now, 1 want to point out that of the witnesses who gave evidence here not one has minimized the fog or attempted to say it was a light fog xvho is not an interested party. You have the evidence of the man in charge of the station, Mr. Mortimer; you have the evidence of the guard of No. 6; you have the evidence of the driver of the engine that pulled out to the signal. Although the driver of the engine admits there was a heavy fog on that morning, he still seems to try to make out there was not sufficient fog to prevent him seeing the signal. All your independent witnesses say there was a considerable fog, a heavy fog, a dense fog, and so forth. The rule-book docs not say "in a light log," or " a heavy fog," or " a dense fog." It simply says "in foggy weather or in falling snow." You have had affidavits put in by disinterested people from NewLynn. 1 understand, although I have not seen them, that those affidavits certify that there was a heavy fog on the morning of the accident. These men are quite disinterested; they have nothing to gain by saying there was a fog if there xvas no fog. But the other men, by minimizing the fog, endeavour to justify their actions and their mode of shunting the train on that particular morning. Ido not ask you to take Corich's word about the fog :heis an interested party, and it xvould probably be to his interest to say there was a dense fog if he could not see the signal. I ask you to take the word of those who are not interested in this thing in any way —men who have nothing to gain by saying the fog was worse than it xvas. And I also ask you to take no notice of the man who says the fog was light xvhen it suits his purpose—xvhen that is his argument for clearing himself of blame for the disaster. Now we come to the absence of fog-signalmen. It seems an extraordinary thing that after the rule-book had been in circulation for a number of years and these fog-signalling rules had been inserted in it, in the Auckland District absolutely no notice xvhatever had been taken of those rules, as far as I can gather. This rule-book came out in 1907, and I think it was the first one that had the fog-signalling in it. Yet on the Auckland Section man after map states that he has never known fog-signalling to be carried out until after the accident. If you are going to find out the cause of the accident, I think you should commence there. You cannot commence with the Legislature of this country, because this rule-book is their part. It is also the General Manager's part, I presume. But when you come to the Department's officers in the Auckland District, the men xvho are responsible for seeing the fogsignalling carried out; when you come to the Traffic Manager; when you come to the Traffic Inspector, the man whose duty it is to see that all regulations arc carried out; and when you come down to the tablet-porter in charge of the station, the guards that xvere running there, the drivers that were running in aud out of the stations on the Auckland Section, and the firemen, and every member of the service who has been carrying out this rule that is at the top of each page of the rule-book, " The first and most important duty of every member is to provide for the public safety" —I say that every one of those men, from the Traffic Manager doxvn to the lowest member of the service, who should understand his rules, is indirectly responsible for the accident that occurred at Now Lynn on the 28th May last. Each one of them, if he knew this regulation was not being carried out, should have reported it every time that he observed it. It is useless to say there are no fogs on the Auckland Section. We know there are fogs there, as in all other parts of Nexv Zealand; and we know that there being fogs fog-signalling should have been carried out; and xve know that once the rule came into the book the very first thing the head of the Department should have done xvas to have seen that provision xvas made for carrying out the fogsignalling —I mean, in the xvay of supplying material and appointing men according to the rule. Noxv, there was no fog-signalman appointed at Nexv Lynn—not one. There was no list put up, as the rule stipulates, to shoxv who the fog-signalmen were. Hence, when a fog did occur, the Railway Department xxere not prepared for it. Noxv, a general opinion seems to have been held by the witi