80

[S. KENNEDY.

I.—6a.

b Fog or ii- Palling enow. Bui these men ignored it. They say, "That is not necessary. There is the instruction to the driver; be lias to oome in so thai he can stop with his hand-brake; thi fore we do nol need to have fog-bignals. We do not need to do anything. We will leave it all In the driver." They did. and the result was that the driver could nut see where he was; he did nut know the road, and a fog came up. and there was a collision; and now these people want t.> say it «.,s the driver's fault because he did not carry out Rule 211. In my opinion this is a most unreasonable thin;.'. It is recognized by the rules themselves thai a driver in a fog cannot tell where lie is, and for that reason a number of rules are furnished which provide for detonating signals being placed on Hie rails in advance of the signal, si. as to warn the driver that he is approaching it. This was not carried out. With regard to Rule "211, Mr. Whisker admitted thai it was impossible to carry out this hand-brake requirement in going into s<.me stations on the .Main Trunk line: it is impossible since we have had our rolling-stock equipped with the air-brake. We know we have a good brake, hut the hand-brake has never been improved since then. You had almost as much brakittg-power in the old days—you had more on some of oiii locomotives —than you have at the p resent day. It is not necessary to increase the hand-lirak i iilt part of the business, and it has not been dune, so that on some of our Mains the hand-brake would not control a train entering some of our stations. Therefore, the rule, although it is there, cannot possibly lie carried out. 1 think the fog lias been conclusively proved by the affidavits and by the disinterested witnesses who have come before the Committee. Now I want to come to tlie morning of the accident, when No. •"> arrived, and I want to say a few words with regard to the extreme carelessness and la\it\ of the station staff in the way they shunted No. 5. I think that No. ■">. when it arrived at New Lynn on that morning, had three assistants on it, besides the guard. Four men, t believe, were on that train. They knew perfectly well there was a train coining down the bank to conic into that station. They knew that the main line had to be cleared as quickly as possible and this train put away. The guard tells you lie went to the latrine. He does not even know what his first assistant was doing. lie says he thought he was on the engine, but he is not sure. No other one i>l , those four seems to have taken any interest whatever in the putting of this train away—only the one man, and he went up to put the train away, and what part he took in it we have no evidence to show. But he failed to '.ret that train into the siding; and you have the driver's and the fireman's statement that they stood three or four minutes cm the bridge just inside the signal, trying d> iret a signal to come back into the station. They stood there actually until the other train ran right into them. Driver Benney says he could not gel a eignal to come back mi account of the fog. The man who was putting the train away seems to have thought that there was some other obstacle —carelessness; but Ido nut think he gave evidence before the inquiry. If there had not been a very general fog that morning, why did not Driver Benney or his fireman see No. <> coming down the hill before they did? They tell you that the train was into them almost instantly. Why? I think there is only one answer to that. They must have been standing there feeling very anxious indeed—] know I would have been. I think Driver Benney would be watching to see if he could yet any indication where the other train was. and watching very attentively to get a signal to c back. I think there is only one explanation why he was kept in that position—that the fog was so dense when he pulled ahead that he could nnt take a signal to come back and he could not see the other train coming down. If he could have seen the other train passing the signal he would not have stood there till it ran into him ; he would have backed down, irrespective of any signal. He would not have stood there till the other train dashed into him. Tf he had got an intimation that the train was passing the signal, even a couple of chains before it struck him. he would have got his train moving and would have minimized the collision. But he admits thai he is not sure whether his train was moving at all, and I question very much whether it was. The oilier train simply lurched nut of the fog, bumped into him, and the collision was nvor. You heard, of course, of the system of shunting this train that Guard Hooten told you of. That is just another proof of the great laxity thai existed at this station in the crossinir of these two trains. There seems to have been no proper system of putting No. 5 into the siding even when she did pull <ip there. Mr. Hooten says he gave two whistles for the driver to come back. Now, that is not in the rule-book. As far as I am concerned T do not recollect ever in my life having received such a signal from a guard, or known any one else to do it. If the guard came tn me and said, "I cannot see you when you gel up there: I will give you two whistles, and when I give them you come back." then I will admit that the arrangement would lie satisfactory. But if I was working at New Lynn where he could not see me T would not allow this thing to oontinue. 1 would point out to the Department that this train was being pulled ahead and that I could imt gel a proper signal to come back, and the Department —T have found them very good in this way -would at once Bay that it must be discontinued, that the movement must be done rapidly and surely, and that a man would be sent up, or else that the practice must be discontinued at once, or that they would have a signal put up. T think it is one more proof that gross carelessness prevailed at that station in the shunting of No. fi out of the way of what I consider was a very important train that passenger-train down to Auckland that morning. Now I oome to distances, and I think we are in a very great fog about distances. There has been a plan nn the table during the inquiry, but as far as I know that plan has not been certified by any one as being correct. No one has come here and sworn that it was a correct plan. T got a man at New Lynn to measure the distances from the foot of the l-in-45 grade tn the signal, and from the signal tn the station —in fact, tn get all particulars with regard to distances, and I find that they do not agree with the various suggestions mad;' by Mr. McVilly in questioning witnesses. He has estimated the. distance at various limes in speaking to witnesses. He has made it as much as .10 chains ironi the station In the fool nf the grade, at other times 24 chains, and so on. I asked this man to go up and measure the distances, and he gives me them as follow ;