43

A.—4

APPENDIX 11. STATEMENT BY MR. BALFOUR ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. (Bth July, 1921.) Mr. Balfour : I have always been a League of Nations man, long before the League of Nations came into existence ; and an experience now extending over one or two years has not only strengthened my conviction that the League of Nations is necessary, but also, I am sorry to say, my fears that it is an institution in many respects difficult to work. Perhaps I might begin by explaining where I think the special difficulties lie before I go on to show how much the League has already done, and how hard it would be to create any other authority to take its place. Difficulties in Way of League of Nations. It is true that some of our difficulties are only temporary. The statesmen who at Paris framed the Covenant of the League undoubtedly assumed that the Treaty of Versailles would rapidly and effectually settle the new frontiers, redistribute territories in accordance with the wishes of the populations concerned, leaving to the League of Nations the relatively simple duty of maintaining rights clearly established, and prevent national differences developing into national wars. Everybody knows that these hopes have not as yet been completely fulfilled. The Treaty of Sevres is still in dispute, and even the Treaty of Versailles has not been fully carried out. One of the most important objects, for example, of the latter was the determination of the boundaries of Poland. But the boundaries of Poland remain still unsettled. Another problem was the status of Galicia ; but the status of Galicia is still unsettled. Now, everything that leaves Middle Europe in a perturbed condition really requires the League of Nations to deal with a situation never contemplated by those who framed the Covenant under which the League has to do its work. Another thing that was perhaps not fully considered by the framers of the Covenant was the difficulty of dealing with semi-civilized populations in territories not under mandate. For instance, at the last Assembly one of the problems that excited most interest was the problem of Armenia. The Assembly was deeply moved, but quite helpless. Nothing effectual was done, nothing effectual could be done. The League could only make appeals in favour of a population which it was quite powerless to protect. America. Perhaps, however, the most serious difference between the League as it was planned and the League as it exists arises out of the absence from its ranks of three of the greatest nations of the world, two of which are not, so far as we can see at the moment, very likely to join it in the near future—l mean America and Russia. Russia and Germany. I hope that Germany will at no very distant date become a member. But Russia will only come in when she has ceased to be what for the moment she is. And whether the Soviet Government endures or perishes she is likely for some time to come to be a disturbing influence in the east of Europe which it will be difficult for the League of Nations to guide and control. These embarrassments are in their nature temporary ; but there are others, due to the constitution of the League itself. There is the difficulty, for example, of manning the Council and the Assembly. This is partly the effect of the immense distances which separate many members of the League from our meeting-place in Geneva, but partly also it is due to the fact that the statesmen best qualified by their position to deal with League problems—namely, the Prime Ministers and the Foreign Secretaries of the various nations —cannot possibly make a regular practice