A. -5c

impossible to hold such a Conference before or during March, 1925. It would seem, therefore, that the only possible course open to His Majesty's Government is to refuse adhesion in March, and it would seem that such a refusal could not be construed as a refusal to concur in any scheme of general compulsory arbitration. The refusal would obviously be limited at present to the ground that His Majesty's Government cannot commit the Empire without due consultation, and that the date fixed allows no time for such consultation. It is earnestly hoped that His Majesty's Government will adopt that course, for New Zealand will never consent to be bound by the Protocol in its present form, and believes that the whole Empire would be endangered if the signature of Great Britain were appended to such a document, dangerous in its effect, crudely and hurriedly drafted, and capable of various interpretations. Great Britain will always keep faith in letter and spirit with any obligations it signs. If other nations are to be similarly bound to conform to the letter and the spirit, both must be defined with far greater accuracy than has been attempted in the terms of the Protocol. But apart from the form of expression, the intention and effect of the document itself is not in accord with common-sense, however much it may accord with visionary doctrines. The principal objections from the point of view of New Zealand are : — 1. The reference of matters to the Court of International Justice. So far Great Britain has never made a declaration under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court authorizing that Court to determine, without special submission, the matters defined in paragraphs A, B, C, and D of that Article, and New Zealand never will consent to such a declaration. But Article 3 of the Protocol binds the signatory States to accept that jurisdiction in all matters. The reference in that Article to reservations is idle and useless as the Protocol is drafted. A reservation would have absolutely no effect in limiting the jurisdiction in matters referred under the Protocol, though it might limit the jurisdiction in matters of peaceful negotiations. Where a question of international law arises in the course of arbitrations under the Protocol, that is to say, in cases where war is threatened, the permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague is given express jurisdiction, firstly, to decide whether a claim by a nation is a claim in respect of matters within its domestic jurisdiction, and, secondly, to determine all other questions of international law, and signatories are to be bound by such decision. New Zealand's immigration laws are framed to preserve, as far as possible, British nationality in New Zealand. No foreigner may come to New Zealand to reside without having first made written application from his country of origin. Whatever the jurists at Geneva may think, the law advisers of the Crown in New Zealand believe that there is grave danger that the International Court of Justice at the Hague, consisting mainly of foreigners, might hold that the New Zealand law is contrary to the comity of Nations, and that the New Zealand system is not a question of merely domestic jurisdiction. And our law advisers believe that, if a question arose for determination under the Protocol, the Permanent Court might decide, firstly, that the right of foreigners to reside in New Zealand was not a matter exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of New Zealand, and, secondly, that as a matter of international law we must admit them or reduce the restrictions on their admission. But consideration of the minor interests of New Zealand in this respect is negligible as compared with admission of the Permanent Court as the deciding factor in Great Britain's belligerent rights at sea. It seems to us idle to contend, as has been contended, that, inasmuch as such questions would only effectively arise during actual war, and as the assumption is that Great Britain will only wage war with the consent of the League, therefore the point may be waived. That seems to us idle because the question would be raised by neutrals whose vessels were stopped and searched for contraband. It is with regard to the rights of His Majesty's ships against neutrals when Great Britain is at war that difference exists between the opinions of foreign jurists and the decisions of the English Courts. And it seems obvious that the effect of adhesion to the Protocol would be deliberately to accept a foregone conclusion against the exercise of privileges in war which are essential to the defence of the Empire. 2. The Protocol, it is true, partly cuts down the rights and duties of signatory nations expressed in Article 8 of the Covenant, but that reduction of obligation is objectionable. Provision is made in the Protocol for suspension of operations by nations about to go to war, and for non-mobilization, &c., and it authorizes defence against acts of aggression by a nation attacked. The definition of aggression in Article 10 is not, and obviously is not intended to be, exclusive, and it may be assumed that any attack on territorial integrity or political independence as mentioned in Article 10 of the Covenant would still be aggression under the Protocol, but there is absolutely no provision in the Protocol enabling or entitling a nation which is not itself attacked by aggression to come at once to the assistance of a friendly nation which is so attacked. Indeed the effect of the Protocol is to prevent such nations from entering upon war to aid another nation against actual attack on its territories, until such time (probably far too late for effect) as the Council, after the tedious procedure directed, is at liberty to authorize assistance. This may be intentional, but if it is intentional Great Britain will surely not consent to such a limitation to its rights and duties to France and Belgium as is expressed in Article 10 of the Covenant and subjected to such ludicrous limitation by the Protocol. 3. The object and effect of Articles 11 and 13 of the Protocol is to create for the Council of the League an entirely new power and authority in warfare between Signatories to the League. It is not true to say that those Articles merely define the effect of Article 16 of the Covenant. It does not appear necessary to amphasize this by quotation, the intention and the effect is apparent, and those Articles require drastic amendment. 4. Reference has already been made to the Document A 35 1924 IX of the League of Nations, containing a reprint of the replies received from the various Governments to. the proposal for the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The reply of His Majesty's Government is to be found on pages 15, 16, and 17 of that Document, and it is no exaggeration to say that the whole of that criticism is equally applicable to the terms and effect of the Protocol. If His Majesty's present Government agrees with that criticism of the late Government, it will find in paragraph 12 on page 17 a concise Statement of

6