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abstentions should count as negative votes. The New Zealand representative (Sir Carl Berendsen), followed by many others, pointed out that under the Rules of Procedure decisions in Committees (as distinct from decisions in the General Assembly itself) were to be taken by a " majority (i.e., a bare majority) of the members present and voting." Also, the phrase " present and voting " meant present and voting for or against the amendment; abstentions should not be counted. The representative of Poland spoke to the same effect. The view of the Chairman was, however, supported by the representative of ByeloRussia and the representative of the Soviet Union. The Rapporteur proposed a new wording in his report which would add to the form of words proposed by the Argentine delegate an explicit reference to the relevant passages of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. The Chairman agreed to the Rapporteur's revision, which he hoped would render possible a unanimous decision of the Committee. It was, however, obvious that the real point at issue was whether the Argentine amendment had been adopted by the Committee or not. In the end, and after a very lengthy debate on procedure, a formal appeal was made against the Chairman's ruling and put to a vote. The Committee rejected the Chairman's ruling by 4 votes in favour, 46 against (including New Zealand), and one abstention. The report then went forward to the Plenary Session of the Assembly without any addition other than the amendment proposed by the Argentine delegate. In the Plenary Session, however, the longer formula which had been suggested in Committee by the Rapporteur was unanimously approved. There had been at no time any objection to this formula on its merits, but in the conditions in which it had been presented in the Committee it was felt that to accept it then would be to throw in doubt the validity of the Committee's acceptance of the Argentine amendment. The interest of this long procedural discussion (which took place on 5 November) lay in the readiness of a number of delegates to detect a treasonable purpose, subversive of the Charter, in the harmless Argentine amendment; also in the firm assertion by the Committee of its rights under the Rules of Procedure. (ii) Most of the time of the Committee on this matter was devoted to the second point —namely, the situation revealed by the inability of the Security Council to recommend the admission of any of the other States which had applied for membership (Albania, Outer Mongolia, Transjordan, Ireland, and Portugal). The admission of two of these States (Albania and Outer Mongolia) had failed to receive the support of the United Kingdom and certain other members of the Security Council; that of the three others had failed to receive the support of the Soviet Union. In the view of several speakers the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council had been used for reasons extraneous to the Charter; in particular, the declaration of the Soviet Union that it could not support the admission of Ireland and Portugal