20

The first paragraph of the Argentine resolution, asking for a definition of procedural matters, was rejected by 19 votes to 12 (including New Zealand), with 10 abstentions. The second paragraph, concerning the abstention of parties to a dispute was rejected by 15 votes to 13, with 12 abstentions (including New Zealand). The Cuban resolution was then voted upon paragraph by paragraph. The first paragraph was rejected by 27 to 8 (including New Zealand), with 8 abstentions. The second paragraph was rejected by 20 votes to 13 (including New Zealand), with 8 abstentions. The resolution, as finally adopted by the Committee and subsequently by the Assembly, reads : "The General Assembly, " Mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and having taken notice of the divergencies which have arisen in regard to the application and interpretation of Article 27 of the Charter ; " Earnestly requests the permanent members of the Security Council to make every effort, in consultation with one another and with fellow-members of the Security Council, to ensure that the use of the special voting privilege of its permanent members does not impede the Security CounciLin reaching decisions promptly; " Recommends to the Security Council the early adoption of practices and procedures, consistent with the Charter, to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of Article 27 and to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions ; and " Futher recommends that, in developing such practices and procedures, the Security Council take into consideration the views expressed by Members of the United Nations during the second part of the first session of the General Assembly." This is, of course, a very anaemic resolution, and it casts but a pale shadow of the very widespread dissatisfaction expressed by more than three-quarters of the members of the United Nations and by four of the five Great Powers themselves, with the operation of the existing provision as to voting powers on the Security Council. It was, however, the best that could be obtained from this Assembly, and if any steps are taken —as they may be —to mitigate or regulate the exercise of the veto until it is possible to abolish it altogether, this will be due, not to the resolution, but to the very strong expressions of dissatisfaction with the veto power that were so remarkable a feature of the present Assembly. 3. Information concerning the Strength of Armed Forces The origin of this discussion was a proposal by the Soviet delegation asking that information be furnished concerning the troops of members of the United Nations stationed in the territory of other members. A similar proposal had been made to the Security Council, but the Council had not agreed to place the matter on its agenda.