BRITISH POLICY ON THE NILE.

Evening Post, Volume LVI, Issue 128, 26 November 1898, Page 2

BRITISH POLICY ON THE NILE.

♦ AN INTERESTING DISCLOSURE. THE REAL PURPOSES OF THE. SOUDAN EXPEDITION. FASHODA, NOT KHARTOUM, WAS THE POINT AIMED AT. [from ouk special cobbespondent.] London, 22nd October. That the Fashoda difficulty has attained the dimensions of a grave Anglo-French crisis you are aware. Before these lines reach your columns the die may have been cas t — probably Avill have been cast — on the momentous issue of peace or war But even so, it will be none the less useful and interesting to follow the various stages of this critical and pregnant period of the world's history. I urn iri a position to disclose what has long been necessarily a State secret of the most profound character. It will be seen at once that Jt could not be earlier revealed without the risk of precipitating a disastrous crisis. It is highly creditable to all members of the Ministry and of the Public Service that so momentous a secret should have been so closely preserved in spite of the strong temptations that must have existed to disclose it in self-defence against the bitter onslaughts of politicians and journalists, including many who are actually thorough-going supporters of the Suiisbury Administration, but who believed that it had at last fallen a prey to cowardice and inertia. That secret is that the Soudan expedition, Avhich was so secretly organised and so suddenly arid unexpectedly announced 2£ years ago had for its objective puint, not Khartoum, but Fashoda, and was in reality aimed not at the Khalifa and the Dervishes, but against French aggression on the Nile. Yes, that is the plain fact, and no harm can be done now in letting this be known.. It has become history — although history of which the British people in general are as yet ignorant, and the French no less. The extraordinary thing is that at the present time, when the Chauvinist journals of Paris are racking their brains for every angry and inflammatory thing to say "about England. They have not hit upon this point even as a guess. Perhaps it is felt that to publish the fact would be to admit that France had been caught napping and out-diplomatised. At all events so it is. ' To make the matter clear I must needs | go back a, long time, and my readers must not grudge the trouble of following me if they desire really to comprehend the situation, and to understand how and why a crisis has been brought about, which before my words can reach New Zealand may have involved that colony with the rest of the British Empire in a vast and^ terrible war. It will perhaps be remembered that shortly before Lord Rosebery resigned his brief Premiership he had mentioned at a large public meeting that he w^as at that moment labouring under the ke*enest anxiety with regard to a question of England's foreign relations. Subsequently it became known that as his' mouthpiece, Sir Edward Grey had made to France the now historic intimation that any aggression on the Nile would be regarded by England as "an unfriendly act," and that such an aggression had been foreshadowed if not actually threatenefi by the French Government. Here was indeed ample ground for the deepest anxiety and Lord Rosebery has since made it clear that this was the trouble which occasioned it. But it must not be supposed j that Lord Rosebery ran away from an impending peril or deserted his post at the hour of danger. No ; his party deserted him. Sir William Harcourt was undisguisedly disloyal to his leader and openly malcontent, if not overtly hostile. So was Air. Labouchere. So were other prominent members of the Radical party. Nor was it at oil certain that Mr. Gladstone himself was entirely faithful to the man he had expressty nominated to the Sovereign as his successor. This uncertainty was soon converted into negttive certainty. Lord Rosebery, findiug j himself face to face with a foreign difficulty of the gravest type, with a very slender and even dubious majority at his fyick in the House of Commons, and w ( ith appearance of an adverse majority in* the country, seized the first opportunity offered by a defeat in the House of Commons, to resign his no longer tenable position. How Lord Salisbury's accession to office was followed by an appeal to the country with the result that the present Ministry was placed in power^ by the largest majority on l'erecora is ancient history. So is the reappearance of Mr. Gladstone in public to denounce the policy of his successor and so is its, result, the relinquishment by Lord Rosebery of his leadership of the Radical party. When Lord Salisbury came into power he found the shadow of this menaced trouble with France on the Nile still overhanging the international situation. Then came the announcement of the Rus-so-French entente— represented by France as an offensive and defensive alliance, and the suggestion from Paris, that England's persistent occupation of Egypt should be brought under the purview 'of the Great Powers. It was aldo known that the French were organising and despatching various expeditions to the Upper Nile which could be disavowed if unsuccessful, or acknowledged if such course should prove politic. Here then was a situation wkich manifestly demanded a prompt resolute and consistent attitude. Suddenly the British Government announced, to the amazement of Europe, of Great Britain and even of its own party, the intended despatch of an expedition for the recovery of the Soudan for Egypt, to go first to Dongola, and then to Khartoum, "smashing the Mahdi" en route. It soon turned out that preparations for this coup had long been going on, and that everything was, in complete readiness for action. Europe >yas at first simply paralysed with astonishment and puzzlement. When at length it 'became realised that the expedition had actually started, European, and especially French, feeling found utterance in 'discontented grumblings at British " perfidiousjiess," it being taken for granted fjljat England's object was to strengthen still farther her hold on Egypt and to provide art excuse for delaying the fulfilment of Mr Gladstone's ill-advised promise of an early evacuation. Even the warmest supporters in this country of the Salisbury Government could not conceive what induced it to embark tipon such a dangerous and doubtful undertaking, apparently "with a light heart," and Avith no seemingly sufficient warrant. " Does Lord Cromei approve it?' 1 was asked over and over again. Ministers returned studiously guarded replies to all queries. The Opposition leaders were quite at a loss for words to denounce with adequate virulence the " stupendous folly " of the Government. Mr, Morley could only conjecture helplessly that Ministers mus: simply hftve lost their reason and become insane. On 20lh March,. 1896, Mr. Mor ley said — " 1 think it must be possibli for cabinets to go mad. It is pecausc we conceive it to have gratuitously, wantonly, without any fair foundation of fact' or circumstances, entered upon an infatuated policy that wo make this protest at the earliest opportunity that is permitted." The first victory thai at Atbaro produced no impression on Mr. Morley. Last year he said— -"The' right honourable gentleman reminded the Committee that I used the word madness in connection with the actioi of ncr Majesty's Government in undertaking the Doncola exnecUtion. I am

not yet repentant of the use of that word. I urn by no means repentant, because it is perfectly clear that what wo foresaw layt year, is going to come truo, and (hat the Dongola expedition is now avowed \o be the first step to a large, prolonged, costly, and dangerous set of operations which it is no tlnng short of madness in the present position of the world for the Government gratuitously and without any active occasion to plunge into." Those protests of Mr. Morley were supported — perhaps not in such strong language, but by their votes — by the whole Op (position. Still, Ministers could not be " drawn," but went calmly on in persistent reticence. I say "reticence" for the harmless platitudes in which Lord Salisbury ■ and Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain now and then indulged as to our duty to leave Egypt with the territory she possessed before we ■ assumed the ad • ministration of her affairs, and to give effective aid to our friend Italy, must be regarded as merely the well-known tactics oi the cuttlefish, whose mode of defence is to obscure its position by lavish outpouring of ink into the sur rounding waters. J\ext, France and Russia had a chance of making a hostile move by opposing the appropriation of Egyptian revenues towards defraying the cost of the expedition. They voted adversely, and as Germany remained inert, England could not obtain the requisite majority ou the Bimrd of Control. Defeated for the moment on this point, England simply smiled, shrugged her shoulders, and paid the money herself. Germany's support I has since been secured in anticipation oi a, further tussle on this head. Here let me break off a moment and ask if you recollect a statement made by Mr. Chamberlain which has been much derided by his opponents, virtually to the effect that the extent ot England's advance into the Soudaia would depend a good deal upon the opposition she encountered. That was ridiculed immeasurably by the Radical speakers and writers. They must wish now that they had kept silence. 01 course they jumped to the conclusion that Dervish opposition was meant. f Not at all. what Mr. Chamberlain really hinted at, but could not prudently say, was French opposition. Thus, you see, I am by degrees " clu< Idating all the riddles of the past in this connection. Lord Kosebery resigned ue ,cause he saw this trouble Was coming, and he knew he could not face it with a weak and disloyal party behind him, and with a minority in the country. 'Lord Salisbury embarked on the ' mad" expedition to Khartoum via Dongola and Atbara because he knew tb:o the French were secretly and persM.enlly plotting the seizure of the tipper Nile, and that it was simply a race who should get there first in sutti-'iont strength to secure and hold the posi tion. This could only be accom^'-ish.'.J by England by first " smashing v*e Mahcu " and recovering .Quu ,oiun. There was a time when it was gravely feared that a Franco-Abysinnian force might reach Khartoum bef > c the Sirdar and hiss force could' get there, so that the conflict might hay« to be fought, not with the KhaUta and his Dervishes, but with a French e;:pec'ition assisted by Abyssintans The Emperor Menelik was known to be very jealous of British ascendency on the Red Sea, of the British acquisition of Kassala from Italy, and of the brilliant victory of Atbara, which seemed to temporarily eclipse the glory of hia success over the Italians. It was also known that France and Russia had been coquetting with Abyssinia, and endeavour ing to secure her good will toward their desired exploitations in the neighbourhood. These things pointed to an imminent peril of the most serious .kind. It wa>fully recognised even three or four month? ago that Sir Herbert Kitchener, on reachI ing Khartoum, might find it in French occupation, as later he did find Fashoda, and that he might even have to fight ar allied force of French and Dervishes. i. But in any case the only hope of retain- ' ing the Nile and its territories for Egypt was to recover the Soudan with all possible speed aud surene'ss. Failing 'ftuch swift and sure recovery, its conquest and retention by France would have been, a matter of absolute certainty. The sub sequent serious international complications would have baen matter of equal uncertainty, but of utterly indefinite magni tude. Here, then, you have at last a clue to the whole mystery of the last two years and a half, culminating as it does in our present critical relations v with France. When I first revealed to you the fact of the gigantic preparations for war which were being so secretly anu swiftly made by the British Government I hinted as clearly as I could with safety that France was the Power aimed at. Now you can see it all clearly, at least I hope so. Meanwhile France is making with feverish haste efforts to get her naval and coastal defences into full readiness for war Some nervous people have been urging the British authorities to "go and do likewise," but the reply is calmly made that everything deemed necessary has been already done, and that so far as human foresight can go, England is quite ready and fully prepared for all consequences. Our Admiralty authorities are quietly, but absolutely confident — I trust with good rea«son — that Great Britain is able to deal a crushing blow at the veny" outset as well as to repel every conceivable description of attack. But, however good our own prospects may appear to be in the deplorable event of mostilities proving inevitable, the possibility of war between the two leading Powers of the civilised world is felt by all thoughtful persons in both countries to be a grave stain on nineteenth-century civilisation. It has been justly said by both French and English writers that auch a war would be " a crime against civilisation." But what is to be done in a case of this sort ? It is all very well to talk glibly about disarmament and arbitration but here is an instance in which there seems to be no possible modus vivendi save in the absolute yielding of one side. England — not merely the Salisbury Government, for Lord Kos.ebery was equally firm — has taken up a stand from which the national honour forbids her to budge one inch. Unless France can be brought to see that no national humiliation is involved in the abandonment of an untenable position and the relhrquishment of an indefensible claim, then there is no mistake about it — we have to fight. It is a great misfortune that the French, ov those who lead them,' cannot be made to see how resolute and determined is the present spirit of the British people. But there is no one who can or will show them the truth. And so the greatest possible danger exists that the French Government may be hounded into an insane and unwarrantable war by the clamours of the Army and the shrieks of the Parisian " Gutter Press." As to the British feeling there can be no mistake whatever. All ilie old wnrlike and vigorous spirit of the nation has been thoroughly aroused. Tho British lion has! "smelt blood" at Atbara and Omdurman, and is 'ess disposed than ever to submit to insult from a" neighbour. Never was the zeal for " soldier-ing " so keen or recruiting so active. Peaoe-at-any-pnce enthusiasts may preach and scold, but human nature is too strong for them, and as Lord Kosebery justly said, no Ministry that paltered or faltered on this Fashoda question could live a week. It would be blown from office by a tornado of public execration. There is no doubt about that. It is a stern and solid fact. Yesterday was Trafalgar Day, and public enthusiasm knew no bounds. The Nel-

son monument in Trafalgar-square was decorated up to n pitch almout of comicality, and its vicinity was thronged all day' and night by worshippers of Britain* naval hero as representing Britain's naval supremacy. At the time I write only a, portion of Marchand'g report is to hand, and the French want time to receive and consider the whole. Unfortunately this has too much the appearance of mere temporising in order to gain time for further preparation, in which task the French are exerting every effort. So the question arises whether we can afford to grant France time which is so obviously being used to our serious disadvantage, and it is gravely to be feared that it may prove necessary to adopt the course which, as I stated more than six months ago, the Government had even then long recognised as being a possible necessity, and for whioh they had been so earnestly, though secretly, preparing, namely, to declare war in advance and to strike the first blow suddenly, and, it is to be hoped, irresistibly. As to Russia's attitude, that, as usual, is involved in the profoundest obscurity. That she will, also a« usual, endeavour to profit by any quarrel among the other Great Powers is a matter of course. But it is deemed doubtful whether she will commit herself to actual active co-opera-tion with France. There are many reasons why she should refrain from overt hostilities. Germany also is a factor of some uncertainty. It is understood that we have her hearty good will, as we have that of Amerioa, but we must not look for their active aid. It is no doubt quite possible that Germany^ might seize the opportunity of putting the French " revanche" out of all future question, and also of anticipating the long.counted-upon struggle with Russia by attacking each while both are hampered by a war with England — that is, assuming Russia to become France's active ally. But all these things are yet mere speculations. They are State and diplomatic secrets of the deepest obscurity, and I shall not attempt at present to penetrate th« darkness. But I must, in conclusion, offer one more earnest warning to New Zealand. The danger of the colony is no longer merely of desultory attacks on particular ports or cities. Such attacks will no doubt be made if possible. But iNew Zealand's peril is of a far more serious kind. Just as it has been openly — and most foolishly — proclaimed W Jingo British prints that if we beat France we shall take from her her navy and all her colonies, so it is fixedly resolved alike by France and by Russia that in the event of Great Britain's being worsted in the war which now seems so terribly imniinent, one penalty to be paid by the defeated country is to be the cession of New Zealand to the victorious Power, as the key of the Pacific. Thus one issue depending upon the result of the threatened war is New Zealand's continued existence as a British community. Let mere be no mistake at all about this. New Zealand's future hangs absolutely upon the outcome of the present international situation.